tionably small, the quotient, which expresses the degree of virtue, may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the prince, the statesman, the general, are capable of true heroism, though these are the chief characters, whose fame is diffused through nations and ages; but when we find in an honest trader, the kind friend, the faithful prudent adviser, the charitable and hospitable neighbour, the tender husband and affectionate parent, the sedate yet cheerful companion, the generous assistant of merit, the cautious allayer of contention and debate, the promoter of love and good understanding among acquaintances; if we consider, that these were all the good offices which his station in the world gave him an opportunity of performing to mankind, we must judge this character really as amiable, as those, whose external splendor dazzles an injudicious world into an opinion, "that they are the only heroes in virtue."

DAVID HARTLEY

(1705-1757)

OBSERVATIONS ON MAN, HIS FRAME, HIS DUTY, AND HIS EXPECTATIONS* PART I. INTRODUCTION

MAN consists of two parts, body and mind.

The first is subjected to our senses and inquiries, in the same manner as the other parts of the external material world.

The last is that substance, agent, principle, &c. to which we refer the sensations, ideas, pleasures, pains, and voluntary motions.

Sensations are those internal feelings of the mind, which arise from the impressions made by external objects upon the several parts of our bodies.

All our other internal feelings may be called ideas. Some of these appear to spring up in the mind of themselves, some are suggested by words, others arise in other ways. Many writers comprehend sensations under ideas; but I everywhere use these words in the senses here ascribed to them.

The ideas which resemble sensations, are called ideas of sensation: all the rest may therefore be called intellectual ideas.

It will appear in the course of these observations, that the ideas of sensation are the elements of which all the rest are compounded. Hence ideas of sensation may be termed simple, intellectual ones complex.

The pleasures and pains are comprehended under the sensations and ideas, as these are explained above. For all our pleasures and pains are internal feelings, and conversely, all our internal feelings seem to be attended with some degree either of pleasure or pain. However, I shall, for the most part, give the names of pleasure and pain only to such degrees as are consider

* London, 1749; 2d ed. (with Life), 1791; 6th rev. ed., 1834.

able; referring all low evanescent ones to the head of mere sensations and ideas.

The pleasures and pains may be ranged under seven general

classes; viz.:

I. Sensation;

2. Imagination; 3. Ambition;

4. Self-Interest; 5. Sympathy;

6. Theopathy; and,

7. The Moral Sense;

according as they arise from:

1. The impressions made on the external senses;

2. Natural or artificial beauty or deformity;

3. The opinions of others concerning us;

4. Our possession or want of the means of happiness, and security from, or subjection to, the hazards of misery;

5. The pleasures and pains of our fellow-creatures;

6. The affections excited in us by the contemplation of the Deity; or

7. Moral beauty and deformity.

CHAPTER I. SECTION II. THE FORMATION OF COMPLEX IDEAS BY ASSOCIATION

- SIMPLE IDEAS WILL RUN INTO COMPLEX ONES, BY MEANS OF ASSOCIATION

In order to explain and prove this proposition, it will be requisite to give some previous account of the manner in which simple ideas of sensation may be associated together.

Case 1. Let the sensation A be often associated with each of the sensations B, C, D, etc., i. e. at certain times with B, at certain other times with C, etc., it is evident, from the tenth proposition, that A, impressed alone, will, at last, raise b, c, d, etc., all together, i. e. associate them with one another, provided they

belong to different regions of the medullary substance; for if any two, or more, belong to the same region, since they cannot exist together in their distinct forms, A will raise something intermediate between them.

Case 2. If the sensations A, B, C, D, etc., be associated together, according to various combinations of twos, or even threes, fours, etc., then will A raise b, c, d, etc., also B raise a, c, d, etc., as in case the first.

It may happen, indeed, in both cases, that A may raise a particular miniature, as b, preferably to any of the rest, from its being more associated with B, from the novelty of the impression of B, from a tendency in the medullary substance to favour b, etc., and in like manner, that b, may raise c or d preferably to the rest. However, all this will be over-ruled, at last, by the occurrency of the associations; so that any one of the sensations will excite the ideas of the rest at the same instant, i. e. associate them together.

Case 3. Let A, B, C, D, etc., represent successive impressions, it follows from the tenth and eleventh propositions, that A will raise b, c, d, etc., B raise c, d, etc. And though the ideas do not, in this case, rise precisely at the same instant, yet they come nearer together than the sensations themselves did in their original impression; so that these ideas are associated almost synchronically at last, and successively from the first. The ideas come nearer to one another than the sensations, on account of their diminutive nature, by which all that appertains to them is contracted. And this seems to be as agreeable to observation as to theory.

Case 4. All compound impressions A+B+C+D, etc., after sufficient repetition leave compound miniatures a+b+c+d, etc., which recur every now and then from slight causes, as well such as depend on association, as some which are different from it. Now, in these recurrences of compound miniatures, the parts are farther associated, and approach perpetually nearer to each other, agreeably to what was just now observed; i. e. the association becomes perpetually more close and intimate.

Case 5. When the ideas a, b, c, d, etc., have been sufficiently

associated in any one or more of the foregoing ways, if we suppose any single idea of these, a for instance, to be raised by the tendency of the medullary substance that way, by the association of A with a foreign sensation or idea X or x, etc., this idea a, thus raised, will frequently bring in all the rest, b, c, d, etc., and so associate all of them together still farther.

And upon the whole, it may appear to the reader, that the simple ideas of sensation must run into clusters and combinations, by association; and that each of these will, at last, coalesce into one complex idea, by the approach and commixture of the several compounding parts.

It appears also from observation, that many of our intellectual ideas, such as those that belong to the heads of beauty, honour, moral qualities, etc., are in fact, thus composed of parts, which, by degrees, coalesce into one complex idea.

CHAPTER IV. SECTION VI. THE PLEASURES AND PAINS OF THE MORAL SENSE

PROP. XCIX. TO EXAMINE HOW FAR THE PLEASURES AND PAINS OF THE MORAL SENSE ARE AGREEABLE TO THE FOREGOING THEORY

There are certain tempers of mind, with the actions flowing from them, as of piety, humility, resignation, gratitude, etc., towards God; of benevolence, charity, generosity, compassion, humility, gratitude, etc., towards men; of temperance, patience, contentment, etc., in respect of a person's own private enjoyments or sufferings; which when he believes himself to be possessed of, and reflects upon, a pleasing consciousness and selfapprobation rise up in his mind, exclusively of any direct explicit consideration of advantage likely to accrue to himself, from his possession of these good qualities. In like manner the view of them in others raises up a disinterested love and esteem for these others. And the opposite qualities of impiety, profaneness, uncharitableness, resentment, cruelty, envy, ingratitude, intemper