the fact of the superinduction of the social feeling. But inasmuch as the apprehension of a hurt to some assignable person involves the sympathy of the spectator, and inasmuch as sympathy, according to Mr. Mill, constitutes the essence of the social feeling-it follows that in New-utilitarianism the notion of a right in no respect differs from the sentiment of Justice itself. Thus the figure which it was necessary to add to the notion of a right in order to complete the sentiment of Justice is at best a cipher without a multiplying power.

In conclusion, we can assure Mr. Mill that it is no necessary part of the creed of Intuitionalism (although the generalities in which its defenders too often indulge justify his criticism) to hold that 'Justice is wholly independent of utility, and is a standard per se which the mind can recognise by simple introspection of itself.' We no more believe this than that the terms Right, Duty, Conscience defy analysis, and are invested with a sacredness which should hibit it.

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The exposition which we have endeavoured to give of utilitarianism as advocated by Mr. Mill, brief though it has necessarily been, will suffice at least to suggest the relation of his doctrine to past and present theories; and if, in our estimate of it, we cannot admit that it possesses so consistent and thoroughgoing a character as the parent utilitarianism of Bentham, it is gratifying to find that its deficiencies

in respect of logical precision and inner consistency are due to a deeper sensibility and a wider reach of thought than were characteristic of the older doctrine, and consequently give good promise of an approach to that non-personal subjective sentimental eudæmonism in which are to be found, we believe, the elements of the reconciliation of a strife which has lasted for more than two thousand years.

PROFESSOR BAIN'S UTILITARIANISM.1

AMONG other remarks which indicate the dubious attitude assumed by Mr. Mill towards utilitarianism, is a footnote on p. 73 of his essay, in which he speaks in terms of strong laudation of Mr. Bain's ethical views. A more careful consideration of these, especially in their connexion with Mr. Bain's Dissertations and Notes on Paley, which are in perfect harmony with more recent expressions of opinion, would have shown Mr. Mill that, except in the recognition of Honour and the Virtues as existing in some artistic region of man's nature, Mr. Bain out-Bentham's Bentham, and revives the very doctrines which Mr. Mill has laboured to qualify and amend. Were it not, indeed, for this reactionary character of Mr. Bain's writings-reactionary as against advanced utilitarianism itself—it might not be necessary here to exhibit their tendencies.

To illustrate further the nature of right,' says Mr. Bain, we would remark that obligation implies punishment. Where a penalty cannot be inflicted, there is no effective obligation; and in cases where, although rules have been violated, punishment is not

1 As the basis of our remarks on Mr. Bain, we have taken the Dissertations and Notes on Paley, collating these, however, with his work on the Emotions and the Will.

considered proper, obligation is virtually denied. We find, for example, that there is no disposition to punish men for not being benevolent; and, therefore, we must presume that benevolence is not held to be a universal and indispensable duty. Punish

ment means the infliction of positive pain or evil in amount proportioned to the degree and the continuance of the offence.'1

This theory of obligation or moral law contains implicitly Mr. Bain's theory of morality. By permitting the question of obligation to override the question of moral ends, and, consequently, of the standard of the right, he has, in our opinion, introduced further confusion into ethical science. This confusion he has succeeded in overcoming, in so far as the consistency of his own thought is concerned, by giving a special and arbitrary definition to the term obligation. If that only is a matter of obligation which society compels a man to do under pain of suffering, and which his personal and physical security compels him to do under a similar penalty, it follows that morality proper is confined within the sphere of the penal; and that all acts other than those which are so essential to per-. sonal and social security as to fall under the notice of the police, lie outside the moral, the right, the obligatory, and require to be arranged under some new name.

Ends of Action.-Accordingly, when we turn to the dissertation on the ends of action, we find these 1 Notes on Paley, p. 86.

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classified as ends of primary, secondary, and what we may call tertiary1 morality, according to the extent of the obligatoriness. Primary morality includes all those acts which bear so directly on personal and social Security as to be subjects of legislation, written or unwritten, and which are consequently of full obligation. Secondary morality embraces such acts of benevolence as exceed the legal demands of society, and are of less obligation. Lastly, such acts of nobleness, self-sacrifice, purity, heroism as call forth our admiration, in consequence of their being akin to the beautiful and sublime in nature and art, may be included under the head of tertiary, or, as it might also be denominated, artistic morality.

Let us shortly look at these Moral ends in their order.

The following quotations convey with sufficient clearness Mr. Bain's doctrine of Primary morality :

Man has, under an instinct of self-preservation, the care of his own being, or the maintenance of his bodily existence, with the provision of all things essential thereto.' 'The rules and maxims of bodily prudence come to be improved and refined upon as intelligence is expanded, and, at the same time, new motives of obedience are brought into play.' "The end of prudential morality may, therefore, be assumed to be the preservation and the pleasure of the individual.' "The uniform practice

1 This term tertiary is not employed by Mr. Bain, but it is implied in his classifications, and the employment of it helps to bring out his meaning.