the cause of unequal [i.e., unjust, bad] affection, must of necessity be the cause of vicious action in every intelligent or rational being.' Thus far a knowledge of Right and Wrong is essential to Virtue in every man-that is, such a use of Reason as 'is sufficient to secure a right application of the affections.'

Accordingly, with intelligent creatures goodness [goodnesses], virtues, etc., constitute 'rational objects,' and become 'rational affections;' and where these rational affections triumph over the 'sensible' or nonrational, a man is rightly called virtuous. Provided always it be the affection towards Goodness or Virtue which has led to the triumph, and not some secondary motive or ulterior self-interested end.

'The nature of Virtue consisting in a certain just disposition or proportionable affection of a rational creature towards the moral objects of Right and Wrong, nothing can, in such a creature, exclude a principle of virtue, or render it ineffectual, except what either takes away the natural and just sense of Right and Wrong; or creates a wrong sense of it; or causes the right sense to be opposed by contrary affections. And again, nothing can advance virtue in a man, except what either nourishes and promotes a sense of Right and Wrong; or preserves it genuine and uncorrupt; or causes it, when such, to be obeyed, by subduing and subjecting the other affections to it.' Shaftesbury then proceeds to consider the possible influence for good or evil in these three directions of the various opinions regarding the Supreme Being, set

forth in the beginning of his essay on Virtue. It is unnecessary to follow him through this part of his argument; because although full of suggestive thoughts on a subject of great interest, it has not, in the present state of ethical inquiry, a direct bearing on the leading problems. His concluding words on this topic will therefore suffice :

'Hence we may determine justly the relation which Virtue has to Piety; the first being not complete but in the latter; since where the latter is wanting there can neither be the same benignity, firmness, nor constancy; the same good composure of the affections or uniformity of mind. And thus the perfection and height of Virtue must be owing to the belief of a God.'

In his second book Shaftesbury, having in the previous part of his treatise considered 'What Virtue is,' and to whom the character of 'Virtuous' properly belongs, enters on the question of the Obligation to Virtue.' In establishing this obligation, he proceeds by first repeating as his starting-point that 'Rectitude, Integrity, or Virtue,' is to have one's affections right and entire, not only in respect of one's self, but in respect of the Kind or System of which we form a part. He then combats the opinion that Selfinterest is in opposition to the Public interest or good, although the respective affections (Selfish and Good) have objects which seem to imply an inherent antagonism. That the fact is quite the reverse, he shows

by citing, by way of illustration, the misery of the illhumoured, rancorous, and perverse man. With reference to such cases, he shows that we are too apt to omit from our reckoning the balanced constitution of our nature, and the discord and consequent misery which ensues on a disturbance of its harmony. We forget to regard ourselves in the light of the notion of a Whole made up of parts, and thus fail to understand how some particular act should result in moral pain. When a man is thoroughly bad, we all admit that he is miserable, while sometimes disposed to doubt the wretchedness which must naturally follow from any one particular vicious act. If we kept in view this 'fabrick' of the mind, we should see that whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his Integrity, Goodnature, or Worth, would of necessity act with greater cruelty towards himself than he who scrupled not to swallow what was poisonous, or who, with his own hands, should voluntarily mangle or wound his outward form or constitution, natural limbs or body.'

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Entering more into detail, Shaftesbury goes on to show that the Affections or Passions which may influence or govern are (1.) The Natural Affections, which lead to the good of the Public; (2.) The SelfAffections, which lead only to the good of the Private; and (3.) Such as are neither of these, nor tending to any Good of either the Public or Private, but contrariwise; and which therefore may justly be styled unnatural affections.' The last sort is wholly vicious; the two former may be vicious or virtuous, according

to their degree. For, it is not right that the Selfaffections should be too weak, nor, on the other hand, that the Public affections should be too strong. He recurs here to the idea of an inward constitution or economy, and maintains that virtue is not truly attained where harmony and balance of the passions and affections are lost. If, for example, Self-affections are overpowered by the Public, the whole system suffers, as well as the individual. Strictly speaking, therefore, to have any 'natural affection too high, or any self-affection too low, though it be often approved as a Virtue, is a Vice and Imperfection.' Strictly speaking it is so; but at the same time he confesses that a man is properly to be considered as vicious, only when (1.) Either the public affections are weak and deficient; (2.) or the private and self-affections are too strong; or (3.) (as stated above) where such affections arise as tend neither to the support of the public or private system, but contrariwise. His next task is to consider these three mental conditions, with a view to show that it is contrary to man's interest to manifest any of these affections, and that it is 'his Interest to be wholly Good and Virtuous.'

First, it has to be shown that 'to have the natural affections (such as are founded in Love, Complacency, Goodwill, and a sympathy with the Kind or Species) is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoyment; and, that to want them is certain misery and ill.' To

prove this, we must first know what it is which constitutes Happiness, which may be summed up as the Pleasures of the Body and the Mind. The Pleasures of the Mind are much greater than those of the Body ; and it consequently follows, that whatever creates in any intelligent being a constant flowing series of mental enjoyments, is of more importance to his happiness than bodily pleasures. As such mental enjoyments are either the 'natural' [the good, kindly, virtuous] affections in their immediate operation, or proceed from them as their effects, the due establishment of these in a creature is the only means of procuring a certain and solid happiness. Shaftesbury then illustrates this position in detail, by showing the genuine pleasures which are yielded to a rational being by the cultivation of the social and friendly, the Intellectual and the Virtuous (by which he here means consciously exercised benignant), affections ; even the very grief of the affections being associated with a deeper pleasure than the satisfaction of our common appetites. With reference to the effects of the activity of these affections, he cites the pleasures of participating in the joys of others, and the reflected approbation which comes back to us as the doers of benignant deeds. He then shows that the partial exercise of these affections—their grudging exercise— does not result in pleasure, but in the reverse; while the hearty and entire affection (which he identifies with Integrity of mind) carries along with it a consciousness of merited love and approbation from all