The Philosophy of RhetoricSIU Press, 01/03/1988 - 504 من الصفحات Here, after a quarter century of additional study and reflection, Bitzer presents a new critical edition of George Campbell’s classic. Bitzer provides a more complete review and assessment of Campbell’s work, giving particular emphasis to Campbell’s theological views, which he demonstrates played an important part in Campbell’s overall view of reasoning, feeling, and moral and religious truth. The Rhetoric is widely regarded as the most important statement of a theory of rhetoric produced in the 18th century. Its importance lies, in part, in the fact that the theory is informed by the leading assumptions and themes of the Scottish Enlightenment—the prevailing empiricism, the theory of the association of ideas, the effort to explain natural phenomena by reference to principles and processes of human nature. Campbell’s work engages such themes in an attempt to formulate a universal theory of human communication. Campbell attempts to develop his theory by discovering deep principles in human nature that account for all instances and kinds of human communication. He seeks to derive all communication principles and processes empirically. In addition, all statements in discourse that have to do with matters of fact and human affairs are likewise to be empirically derived. Thus, his theory of rhetoric is vastly wider than, and different from, such classical theories as those proposed by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, whose theories focused on discourse related to civic affairs. Bitzer shows that, by attempting to elaborate a general theory of rhetoric through empirical procedures, Campbell’s project reveals the limitations of his method. He cannot ground all statements empirically and it is at this point that his theological position comes into play. Inspection of his religious views shows that God’s design of human nature, and God’s revelations to humankind, make moral and spiritual truths known and quite secure to human beings, although not empirically. |
من داخل الكتاب
النتائج 1-5 من 83
الصفحة v
... Speaker ought to have of the Hearers as Men in general Of the consideration which the Speaker ought to have of the Hearers, as such Men in particular Of the consideration which the Speaker ought to have of himself The different kinds of ...
... Speaker ought to have of the Hearers as Men in general Of the consideration which the Speaker ought to have of the Hearers, as such Men in particular Of the consideration which the Speaker ought to have of himself The different kinds of ...
الصفحة xxvii
... speaker and the hearers, and both the subject and the speaker for the sake of the hearers, or rather for the sake of the effect intended to be produced in them.” In this statement, Campbell is not saying that rhetoric goes beyond logic ...
... speaker and the hearers, and both the subject and the speaker for the sake of the hearers, or rather for the sake of the effect intended to be produced in them.” In this statement, Campbell is not saying that rhetoric goes beyond logic ...
الصفحة xlii
... speaker recommends, on the other. Campbell states that the role of reasoning in persuasion is to satisfy the hearers' “judgment that there is a connection between the action to which [the speaker] would persuade them, and the ...
... speaker recommends, on the other. Campbell states that the role of reasoning in persuasion is to satisfy the hearers' “judgment that there is a connection between the action to which [the speaker] would persuade them, and the ...
الصفحة xliv
... speaker feels, thus sharing feeling but not experience with the speaker. The Association of Feelings. The theory of association applies not only to ideas of sensation, memory, and imagination, but also to passions, feelings, and ...
... speaker feels, thus sharing feeling but not experience with the speaker. The Association of Feelings. The theory of association applies not only to ideas of sensation, memory, and imagination, but also to passions, feelings, and ...
الصفحة xlv
... speaker is wrong; and we know it not by recurring to the relations of ideas and things, but simply by recurring to the usual conjunction of these words themselves. “Hence the words and names themselves, by customary vicinity, contract ...
... speaker is wrong; and we know it not by recurring to the relations of ideas and things, but simply by recurring to the usual conjunction of these words themselves. “Hence the words and names themselves, by customary vicinity, contract ...
المحتوى
vii | |
liii | |
Corrections and Additions | lvii |
Preface | lxv |
Introduction | lxix |
Book I The Nature and Foundaitons of Elequence | 1 |
Book II The Foundations and Essential Properties of Elocution | 139 |
Book III The Discriminating Properties of Elocution | 285 |
Index | 417 |
Author Bio | 424 |
Back Cover | 425 |
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
addressed admit appear application argument attention better called Campbell cause character circumstances common concerning conjunction connected consequently considerable considered contrary critics discourse discover distinction effect eloquence employed English entirely equal evidence example experience expression fact feeling find first former French frequently give given greater hath hearers human ideas imagination important instance kind knowledge language latter least less manner meaning mentioned mind moral nature necessary never object observed occasion opinion orator original particular passage passion perhaps person perspicuity philosophical phrases preceding present principles produce pronoun proper properly qualities question reason regard relation remark rendered requires resemblance respect rhetoric rules sense sentence sentiment serve sometimes sort sound speak speaker species style term things third thought tion tongue tropes truth understanding verb vivacity wherein whole words writer