views of the supreme standard in morals, it should be remembered always that many of the theories held by the most representative writers cannot be classed quite definitely under any one head, but rather represent combinations of the different views. Thus, even the Stoics may be said to stand midway between the theory of Duty and that of Perfection; for though their ideal may be described as that of obedience to law, it is at the same time that of the attainment of the life of the perfectly wise man. The same applies to the Cartesians and to Kant. Again, in the Moral Sense School, the ideas of Duty and Happiness are to a large extent combined, as they are also, in a different way, in the views of Dr. Sidgwick. The modern Evolutionists, such as Mr. Herbert Spencer, combine the ideas of Happiness and Perfection. And in many other ways the different theories have been united. But, as we are not at present studying the history of ethical theory, but only its most typical forms, it is most convenient for us to consider the different views, as far as possible, apart.

Eth.

II

CHAPTER III.

THE STANDARD AS LAW.

PART I.: THE GENERAL IDEA OF MORAL LAW.

§ 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.-In dealing with the different types of ethical theory, it seems most convenient to start with those that take as their fundamental conception the idea of Duty, Right, Law, Obligation. To the race, as to the child, morality presents itself first in the form of commandments, and even in the form of threats. It is only at a later stage of development that we learn to regard the moral life as a good, and finally as the realisation of our own nature. Hence it seems most natural to begin with those theories which are based rather on the idea of rightness than on that of the Good. From this point of view, morality presents itself as obedience to the Law of Duty. The significance of this conception, and the different forms which it may take, are what we have now to consider.

§ 2. THE MEANING OF LAW IN ETHICS.-A good deal of confusion has been caused in the study of Ethics, as well as in that of some other subjects, by a certain ambiguity in the word Law. It is important, therefore, that we should try to understand exactly the sense in which it is here to be used.

It has been customary to distinguish two distinct

1 Cf. Whately's Logic, p. 209; and Welton's Manual of Logic, vol. i., p. 8.

senses in which it may be used. We speak of the laws of a country and also of the laws of nature; but it is evident that the kinds of law referred to in these two phrases are very different. The laws of a country are made by a people or by its rulers; and, even in the case of the Medes and Persians, there is always a possibility that they may be changed. There is also always a possibility that the inhabitants of the country may disobey them; and, as a general rule, they have no application at all to the inhabitants of other countries. The laws of nature, on the other hand, are constant, inviolable, and all-pervading. There are three respects, therefore, in which different kinds of law may be distinguished. Some laws are constant: others are variable. Some are inviolable: others are liable to be disobeyed. Some are universal: others have only a limited application. The last of these three points, however, is scarcely distinguishable from the first for what is universal is generally also constant and necessary, and vice versa. Consequently, it may be sufficient for the present to distinguish different kinds of laws as (1) changeable or unchangeable, (2) violable or inviolable-though we shall have to return shortly to the third principle of distinction. Adopting these two principles, we might evidently have four different classes of laws-(1) Those that can be both changed and violated, (2) those that can be changed but cannot be violated, (3) those that can be violated but cannot be changed, (4) those that can neither be changed nor violated.

1 I mean such laws as those that are stated in treatises on theoretical mechanics. These laws relate to tendencies that are operative throughout the whole of nature. See following note.

Of the first and last of these, illustrations have already been given. Of the second also it is not difficult to discover examples. The laws of the solar system, of day and night, seedtime and harvest, and all the vicissitudes of the seasons, are inviolable so long as certain conditions last; but if these conditions were changed-say, by the cooling of the sun, by the retardation of the earth's velocity, or its collision with some comet or erratic meteor-the laws also would change with them. Again, most of the laws of political economy are of this character. They hold good of certain types of society, and among men who are swayed by certain motives; and within these limits. they are inviolable. But change the conditions of society, or the characters of the men who compose it, and in many cases the laws will break down. Such laws are sometimes said to be hypothetical. They are valid only on the supposition that certain conditions are present and remain unchanged. Some philosophers have thought that even the laws of mathematics may be of this character-that there might be a world in which two and two would be equal to five; and that if a triangle were formed with the diameter of the earth for its base and one of the fixed stars for its apex, its three angles might not be equal to two right angles.3 But this appears to be a mistake. The laws of

2

1 It might be urged that all laws of nature are of this character, i. e. that they are all hypothetical, depending on the continuance of the present constitution of the universe. This is true, unless there are some laws of such a kind that no system of nature could exist without them. The consideration of this question, however, belongs to Metaphysics.

2 E. g. J. S. Mill.

8 This was the opinion of Gauss, for instance.

mathematics belong rather to the last of our four classes.

The laws of Ethics, however, must on the whole be regarded as belonging to the third class. They cannot be changed, but they may be violated. It is true, as has been already stated, that the particular rules of morals may vary with different conditions of life; but the broad principles remain always the same, and are applicable not only to all kinds of men, but to all rational beings. If a spirit were to come among us from another world, we might have no knowledge of his nature and constitution. We might not know what would taste bitter or sweet to him, what he would judge to be hard or soft, or how he would be affected by heat or sound or colour. But we should know at least that for him, as for us, the whole is greater than any one of its parts, and every event has a cause; and that he, like us, must not tell lies, and must not wantonly destroy life. These laws are unchangeable. They can, however, be broken. We may, indeed, speak of ethical principles which it is impossible to violate. An ethical writer, for instance, may insist on the truth that every sin brings with it some form of punishment. This is a truth from which there is no escape; but it is rather a metaphysical than an ethical truth. It is a fact about the constitution of the world, not a moral law. A moral law states something that ought to happen, not something that necessarily does happen.

I

Moral laws are not the only laws that are of this

1 Some theological writers have denied this, holding that goodness in God may be something entirely different from goodness in man. This opinion is ably refuted by Mill in his Examination of Hamilton, chap. vii.