the sacrifice of happiness as in itself a good. On the contrary, as Kant himself remarks,1 both the Stoics and Epicureans were agreed in identifying virtue with happiness: only while the Epicureans held that the pursuit of happiness is virtue, the Stoics held, contrariwise, that the pursuit of virtue is happiness.2 I have thought it desirable to dwell on this slight divergence between my view on this point and that stated in Mr. Muirhead's Elements, not for the purpose of emphasising my disagreement, but rather to bring out the fundamental identity of our views. For if the reader will turn to the passage in Mr. Muirhead's book, I think he will easily see that the difference between us is merely superficial. Although Mr. Muirhead treats of the Kantian Ethics under the heading "The End as Self-Sacrifice," and refers to it as illustrating the ascetic principle in morals, yet his actual treatment of Kant's fundamental position does not, I think, materially differ from that suggested in the present manual. I am convinced, therefore, that our divergence on this point is little more than verbal. It is perhaps fair to add here that a partial reply to Schiller's objections (referred to above, § 13) was made by Kant in his treatise on Religion within the Bounds of mere Reasons Kant there admits that a thoroughly virtuous man will love virtuous activities, and perform them with pleasure; but he regards this as a mere result of action from the sense of duty. The man who acts from a sense of duty has a feeling of pleasure gradually superinduced. This admission obviates the grosser forms of the criticism that has been passed on Kant with regard to this point; but it still leaves a fatal dualism between the law of reason and the affections of human kindness. In short, it still has the defect of emphasising the mere isolated good will instead of the good character. Cf. above, Book I., chap. iii., § 2. 1 Critique of Practical Reason, Part I., Book II., chap. ii. (Abbott's translation, p. 208). 2 Or at least that a certain form of happiness is an inseparable accident of the pursuit of virtue. See Sidgwick's History of Ethics, pp. 83-4 8 Cf. also Metaphysical Elements of Ethics (Abbott's translation), PP. 312-13. 4 The point that it is specially important to remember is, that Kant always insists that duty must not be done from inclination. He never denies that it may be done with inclination. Consequently, he is not properly an ascetic. CHAPTER IV. THE STANDARD AS HAPPINESS. § 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.-We thus see that the idea of a categorical imperative breaks down, or at least lands us in sheer emptiness. It tells us only that we must judge our actions from the point of view of a universal self, not from a private standpoint of our own, and that we must act in a way that is consistent with the idea of this higher self. All this is formal: ' 1 In saying that it is merely formal, I do not of course mean to deny its practical importance. In concrete life we constantly tend to judge ourselves and others by standards that are not of universal application; and Kant's formula is useful as a safeguard against this. Perhaps the following passage from Bryce's American Commonwealth (chap. lxxv.) may serve to illustrate this danger. "All professions," he says, "have a tendency to develop a special code of rules less exacting than those of the community at large. As a profession holds certain things to be wrong, because contrary to its etiquette, which are in themselves harmless, so it justifies other things in themselves blamable. In the mercantile world, agents play sad tricks on their principals in the matter of commissions, and their fellow-merchants are astonished when the courts of law compel the ill-gotten gains to be disgorged. At the English Universities, everybody who took a Master of Arts degree was, until lately, required to sign the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. Hundreds of men signed who did not believe, and admitted that they did not believe, the dogmas of this formulary; but nobody in Oxford thought the worse of them for a solemn falsehood. . . . Each profession indulges in deviations from the established rules of morals, but takes pains to conceal these deviations from the general public, and continues to talk about itself and its traditions with an air of unsullied virtue. What each profession does for itself most individuals do for themselves. They judge themselves by them we now wait for the content with which the form is to We have to ask, in short, what is the nature be filled. § 2. HIGHER AND LOWER UNIVERSES.-That certain forms of will are higher or better than others, may almost be said to be the fundamental assumption of Ethics. Now it follows from this that certain desires, or certain universes of desire, are higher or better than others. Thus it becomes a problem to determine why it is that any desire or universe of desires should be regarded as higher or better than any other. The significance of this problem may perhaps be best indicated by suggesting a possible answer. It is obvious that some universes are more comprehensive than others. If a man acts from the point of view of the happiness of his nation as a whole, this is evidently a more comprehensive point of view than that from which he acts when he has regard only to his own happiness. The former includes the latter. So too, if a man acts from the point of view of his own happiness throughout the year, he acts from a more comprehensive point of view than if he has regard only to the happiness of the passing hour. Now the narrower the point of view from which we act, the more certain we are to fall into inconsistency and self-contradiction. selves, that is to say, by their surroundings and their own past acts, and thus erect in the inner forum of conscience a more lenient code for their own transgressions than that which they apply to others. We all know that a fault which a man has often committed seems to him slighter than one he has refrained from and seen others committing. Often he gets others to take the same view. 'It is only his way,' they say: 'it is just like Roger.' The same thing happens with nations." There is perhaps some cynicism in this; but it contains sufficient truth to illustrate the present point. If the universe within which we act is merely that of the passing hour, that universe will no longer be the dominant one when the hour is past; and then we shall find ourselves acting from some different, and perhaps inconsistent point of view. If, on the other hand, the universe within which we act is broad and comprehensive, we may be able to maintain our point of view consistently through life, and also to apply it to the actions of others. The wider universe may, therefore, be regarded as higher or better than the narrower one, since it enables us to maintain a more consistent point of view in our actions. From this consideration we may partly see why it is that one universe is to be regarded as higher or better than another. Still, this does not make it quite clear. For sometimes when we prefer one universe to another, the former does not include the latter, and is not obviously wider than it. What is the ground of preference in such cases we shall consider at a later point in this inquiry. But in the meantime, it may be well to notice a plausible explanation of the preference, which we shall see reason afterwards to reject. In such a subject as Ethics, erroneous doctrines are often almost as instructive as those that are correct. § 3. SATISFACTION OF DESIRES.-When a desire attains. the end to which it is directed, the desire is satisfied; and this satisfaction is attended by an agreeable feeling a feeling of pleasure, enjoyment, or happiness. I 66 'I follow Dr. James Ward and others in using the term "Feeling" for pleasure and pain. It is, however, a very ambiguous term, and perhaps the term Affection," which is used by Prof. Titchener in his Outline of Psychology, is in some ways preferable. See Stout's Manual of Psychology, Book II., chap. viii. Eth. 14 On the other hand, when the end of a desire is not attained, we have a disagreeable feeling-a feeling of pain, misery, or unhappiness. Now if we act within a wide universe, or within a universe that includes desires that are continually recurring throughout life, we shall be acting in such a way as to satisfy our desires with great frequency, and so to have many feelings of pleasure. On the other hand, if we act within a narrow universe, or one containing desires that do not often recur, we may have few satisfactions and a frequent occurrence of painful feelings. Now it seems plausible to say that, since what we aim at is the satisfaction of our desires, the best aim is that which will bring the greatest number of pleasures and the smallest number of pains. This consideration would supply us with a criterion of higher and lower universes. The highest universe within which we could act would be that which would supply us with the greatest number of pleasures and the smallest number of pains. The highest universe, in fact, would be that which is constituted by the consideration of our greatest happiness throughout life; or, if we consider others as well as ourselves, by the consideration of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This leads us to the consideration of Hedonism. $4. VARIETIES OF HEDONISM.-Hedonism is the general term for those theories that regard happiness or pleasure as the supreme end of life. It is derived from the Greek word oor, meaning pleasure. These theories have taken many different forms. It has been held by some that men always do seek pleasure, ie. that pleasure in some form is always the ultimate object of desire; whereas other Hedonists confine themselves |