to the view that men ought always to seek pleasure. The former theory has been called by Prof. Sidgwick Psychological Hedonism, because it simply affirms the seeking of pleasure as a psychological fact; whereas he describes the other theory as Ethical Hedonism. Again, some have held that what each man seeks, or ought to seek, is his own pleasure; while others hold that what each seeks, or ought to seek, is the pleasure of all human beings, or even of all sentient creatures. Prof. Sidgwick has called the former of these views Egoistic Hedonism; the latter, Universalistic Hedonism. The latter has also been called Utilitarianism—which, however, is a very inappropriate name. Most of the earlier ethical Hedonists were also psychological Hedonists; but this latter view has now been almost universally abandoned. Egoistic Hedonism has also been generally abandoned. Its chief upholders were the ancient Cyrenaics and Epicureans. Some more modern writers, however,-such as Bentham and Mill -did not clearly distinguish between egoistic and universalistic Hedonism, and consequently, though in the main supporting only the latter, often seemed to be giving their adhesion to the former. The student must be careful to distinguish between these different kinds of Hedonism: otherwise great confusion will 1 See below, § 9. 2 For an account of these see Sidgwick's History of Ethics, pp. 32-3, and pp. 82-90. See also Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools, and Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Prof. Wallace's little volume on Epicureanism (“Chief Ancient Philosophies") is a most delightful book, which every student ought to read. Prof. Watson's Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer is also exceedingly interesting, and, though somewhat popular in its mode of treatment, is nearly always reliable. result. Now the doctrine of Psychological Hedonism has already been considered in Book I. It is simply a statement of fact; whereas Ethical Hedonism is a theory of Value, a theory of the ground upon which one form of action ought to be preferred to others. § 5. ETHICAL HEDONISM. -We have seen that the theory of psychological Hedonism is unsound. Ethical Hedonism, however, does not stand or fall with this. On the contrary, as Dr. Sidgwick has pointed out, ethical Hedonism is scarcely compatible with psychological Hedonism, at least in its most extreme form. If we always did seek our own greatest pleasure, there would be no point in saying that we ought to seek it; while, on the other hand, it would be absurd to say that we ought to seek the pleasure of others, except in so far as this could be shown to coincide with our own. Of course, if psychological Hedonism be merely interpreted as meaning that we always do seek pleasure of some sort, then ethical Hedonism may be understood as teaching that we ought to seek the greatest pleasure, whether our own or that of others. But, in any case, there is no necessary connection between the two doctrines. The confusion that has often been made 1 Methods of Ethics, Book I., chap. iv., § I. 2 It will be seen, therefore, that I do not agree with Mr. Muirhead (Elements of Ethics, p. 114) in regarding the psychological form of Hedonism as "also its logical form." At the same time, it should be observed that systems of ethical Hedonism (especially when egoistic) have nearly always been made to rest on psychological Hedonism. Nor is this necessarily inconsistent; for most Hedonists (especially egoistic Hedonists) have denied any absolute "ought" as having authority over men's natural inclinations. They have regarded Ethics as simply laying down rules for the guidance of our actions, so as to secure the greatest possible gratification to our natural impulses. They have thought that by the introduction of adequate "sanc 1 between the two theories seems to be due in part to an ambiguity in the word "desirable." This point. also may be illustrated by a passage from Mill. "The only proof," he says, "capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it. . . . In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it." It is here assumed that the meaning of the word "desirable” is analogous to that of "visible" and "audible." But "visible' means "able to be seen," and "audible" means "able to be heard"; whereas "desirable" does not usually mean "able to be desired." When we say that anything is desirable, we do not usually mean merely that it is able to be desired. There is scarcely anything that is not able to be desired. What we mean is rather that it is reasonably to be desired, or that it ought to be desired. When the Hedonist says that pleasure is the only thing that is desirable, he means. that it is the only thing that ought to be desired. But the form of the word "desirable" seems to have misled several writers into the notion that they ought to tions" (see below, Note to Book III., chap. vi.) the greatest pleasure of the community as a whole might be made coincident with the individual's greatest pleasure. Bentham was particularly explicit on this point, saying even, paradoxically, that the word "ought "ought to be abolished." (But cf. Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. i., § 10.) But this view is, of course, incompatible with the admission (now generally made by all Hedonists) that the gratification of our own inclinations may conflict with duty. If this is allowed, ethical Hedonism cannot rest on psychological. Cf. Gizycki's Introduction to the Study of Ethics, pp. 70—78. 1 Cf. Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Book III, chap. xiii., § 5 show also that pleasure is the only thing that is capable of being desired. The latter view is that of psychological Hedonism, which seems clearly to be unsound. The former is that of ethical Hedonism, which we have still to examine. We have already stated that there are two forms of ethical Hedonism-egoistic and universalistic. But before we proceed to consider these, it will be well to indicate more precisely what the general meaning of ethical Hedonism is. § 6. QUANTITY OF PLEASURE.-Hedonism is not merely the vague theory that we ought to seek pleasure. It states definitely that we ought to seek the greatest pleasure. Otherwise of course it would give us no criterion of right and wrong in conduct. Pleasure may be found by acting in the most contradictory ways. But when we are told to seek the greatest pleasure, there can usually be but one course to follow. In estimating the quantity of pleasure, it is usually said. that there are two points to be taken into accountintensity and duration. Some pleasures are preferable to others because they last longer. Pains require also 1 The fallacy here involved is that known to writers on Logic as the “Fallacy of Figure of Speech” (figuræ dictionis). See Whately's Logic, pp. 117-18, Davis's Theory of Thought, p. 270, Welton's Manual of Logic, vol. II., p. 243. Jevons (Elementary Lessons on Logic, p. 175) seems to have quite misunderstood this fallacy, as well as many others. 2 In estimating the value of pleasures, there are, according to Bentham, some other qualities also which should be taken into account -viz. certainty, propinquity, fecundity (power of producing other pleasures), and purity (freedom from pain). He considered also that we should take account of their extent-i. e. the number of persons who participate in them. See his Principles of Morals and Legislation. He summed up his view in the following doggerel verses Pain is simply the opposite to be taken into account. of pleasure, and is consequently to be treated just as negative quantities are treated in mathematics. If a pleasure is represented by + a, the corresponding pain will be represented by -a; and what we are to aim at is to secure the greatest sum of pleasures or the smallest sum of pains, pleasures being counted as positive and pains as negative. If there are three pleasures, valued respectively at 3, 4, and 5; 5 is to be preferred to either 3 or 4, 3 + 4 is to be preferred to 5, 35 to 3+4, and 4+ 5 to 3 + 5. Again, if we have pains valued at 3, 4, 5; -3 is to be preferred to – 4, and -4 to 5. So too 5 3 is to be preferred to 4-3, and 3-4 to 3-5; while between 4-3 and 5-4, or between 3-3 and 4-4, there is no ground of preference. And so on. § 7. EGOISTIC HEDONISM.-Egoistic Hedonism is the doctrine that what each ought to seek is his own greatest pleasure. Almost the only writers who have held this doctrine in a pure form are the Cyrenaics and Epicu The writers of the former school, however, confined themselves to inculcating the pursuit of the pleasure of each moment as it passes-i. e. they did not take account of duration. The Epicureans inculcated rather the endeavour to secure the happiness "Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure, Cf. Sidgwick's History of Ethics, pp. 240-1, and Dewey's Outlines of |