ness, even if we are aware, not only that the universe within which these things lie is not of supreme importance, but even that it does not lie within the power of our will to avoid such deficiencies. Such a feeling might be called a quasi-Conscience. On reflection we perceive either that we are not responsible for such shortcomings, or that they are not of serious moral importance; but the feeling at the moment is scarcely distinguishable from that of Conscience proper. Sometimes such a feeling may even conflict with Conscience. Thus, the performance of duty may involve a violation of etiquette; so that, in whichever way we act, we are bound to have the pain either of Conscience or of quasiConscience. Again, Conscience sometimes attaches itself to a universe which has been transcended. When we have recently passed from one universe to another, Conscience will generally be found to have lagged a little behind, and to attach itself to the older universe rather than to the newer one. "Feeling," as Mr. Muirhead says, 2 "is the conservative element in human life." It does not attach itself to a new

1 An excellent illustration of this is given by Mr. Muirhead (Elements of Ethics, p. 77) in an extract from Prof. Royce's Religious Aspect of Philosophy (pp. 53-4): “You ride, using another man's season ticket, or you tell a white lie, or speak an unkind word, and conscience, if a little used to such things, never winces. But you bow to the wrong man in the street, or you mispronounce a word, or you tip over a glass of water, and then you agonize about your shortcoming all day long; yes, from time to time for weeks. Such an impartial judge is the feeling of what you ought to have done.' For similar illustrations, see Stephen's Science of Ethics, p. 323, and Spencer's Principles of Ethics, p. 337.

2 Elements of Ethics, p. 80. Cf. the saying of Mr. Jacobs, quoted by Miss Wedgwood (The Moral Ideal, p. 233), "The thoughts of one generation form the feelings of its successor."

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universe, until we have thoroughly lived into it and made ourselves at home in it; nor does it sever itself from an old universe, until we have thoroughly broken off our connection with it. Hence a man will often feel a pain of Conscience, or quasi-Conscience, in doing an action which his reason has taught him to regard as perfectly allowable or even as a positive duty; while, on the other hand, he will often be able to violate a recently discovered obligation without feeling any pain. In general, however, the pains of Conscience attend any inconsistency with the principles which we recognize as highest; and these, in general, are the principles recognized as binding within the social universe in which we habitually live. 3

With these remarks, we may pass on to the more detailed consideration of social ethics-i. e. to the consideration of the moral order within which the life of

1 "The contradiction between reason and feeling which some of us will recollect, when first we permitted ourselves to take a row or attend a concert on Sunday, is a good example from contemporary life" (Muirhead's Elements of Ethics, p. 80).

2 Hence, partly, the frequency of “back-sliding" in converts to new principles. Conscience does not respond to their shortcomings with sufficient readiness. It may be noted here also that it is often possible to stifle Conscience by transferring ourselves from one universe to another. Thus, a man may perform, under the influence of fanatical zeal, acts of cruelty from which, in his normal state, he would shrink in horror. He stifles Conscience by escaping from the universe in which such acts are condemned into one in which they are rather approved. A good illustration of this is given by Macaulay in his account of the state of mind of the Master of Stair in sanctioning the massacre of Glencoe (History of England, chap. xviii.).

3 For general discussion of the subject of Conscience, see Porter's Elements of Moral Science, Part I., chap. xvi., Dewey's Outlines of Ethics, pp. 182-206, and Muirhead's Elements of Ethics, pp. 73-84 and 238-242

the individual is spent, and of the relation of the individual life to that moral order. Of course this can be done, in such a work as this, only in the most sketchy fashion. But some remarks on the ethical significance of the recognized moral institutions, duties and virtues, may be found helpful.

CHAPTER II.

MORAL INSTITUTIONS.

§1. THE SOCIAL IMPERATIVE.—We have seen to some extent what the nature of the " ought" is. It is, as we may say, the law imposed by our ideal self upon our actual self. Since, however, the ideal self is the rational self, and since the rational self is not realized in isolation, but in a society of human beings, it follows that this "ought" is imposed on societies as well as on individuals. As Mr. Herbert Spencer says, ' "we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state"; and in considering such an ideal we pass a criticism not only on existing men, but on existing social states. Not only can we say that an individual ought to act in such and such a way, but we can also say that a society ought to have such and such a constitution. In so far as an individual acts as he ought to act, we say that his conduct is right, and that he is a good, upright, or moral man. In so far as a society is constituted as it ought to be, we say that it is a well-ordered society, and that its constitution is just. In each case we compare actually existing men or states with the ideal of a rational man and a rationally 1 Data of Ethics, chap. xvi., § 106.

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It may be asked, On whom is this "ought" imposed? The answer is, on the society as a whole, and more particularly on its politicians and other "active citizens."

constituted state. The latter of these we must now briefly consider.

§ 2. JUSTICE.-"Blessed," it is said, "are they that hunger and thirst after justice." But perhaps it is more easy to hunger and thirst after it than to define precisely what it means. Here, at any rate, we can only indicate its nature in the vaguest and most general way. For a fuller treatment reference must be made to works on Politics.

A just arrangement of society may be briefly defined as one in which the ideal life of all its members is promoted as efficiently as possible. The constitution. of a society is, therefore, unjust when large classes in it are so enslaved by others as to be unable to develop their own lives. It is unjust, for instance, when there is any class in it so poor, or so hard-worked, or so dependent on others, as to be unable to cultivate their faculties and make progress towards the perfection of

1 A complete discussion of this subject belongs rather to Politics or Social Philosophy than to Ethics. But it seems necessary to consider it here, in so far as it can be dealt with from a purely ethical point of view. Some of the points dealt with here are somewhat more fully discussed in my Introduction to Social Philosophy, chaps. v. and vi. English writers on Ethics have, as a rule, not given much attention to the subjects referred to in this chapter. Reference may, however, be made to Stephen's Science of Ethics, chap. iii., Porter's Elements of Moral Science, Part. II., chaps. xiii.-xvi., Rickaby's Moral Philosophy, and Clark Murray's Introduction to Ethics, Book II., Part II., chap. i. For fuller treatment the student must consult such works as those of Höffding and Paulsen. Some of the points are also referred to by Prof. Gizycki, whose work has been adapted for the use of English readers by Dr. Stanton Coit. Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts must, however, still be regarded as the model for the treatment of this whole subject. It has recently been translated into English by Professor Dyde.

2 The Greek word dikaιoovn, translated "righteousness," may equally well be rendered by “justice.”