change of universe; and the "best intentions," or the worst, may lead to nothing. This is especially true when the purpose is one that carries great consequences in its train, involving perhaps a complete. change of the world within which we have been living. In such a case the changed world cannot be with any completeness imagined, and some very small circumstance may easily give a completely new turn to our thoughts. The "insurrection "2 by which the universe within which we are living is to be overthrown cannot be at once carried out, and we cannot with any thoroughness think ourselves into the new conditions that are to arise. Thus a mere resolution is still far from being an act.3 What is commonly called "force of will" means the power of carrying resolutions into act. This power depends largely on the habit of fixing our attention upon the salient features of an object that is aimed at, and not allowing ourselves to be distracted by subordinate conditions. Hence, narrow-minded or hard-hearted men have often more "force of will," in this sense, than those who take wider views. But a wide-minded man may also acquire "force of will" by taking a clear and decided view of the circumstances 1 Cf. below, Book III., chap. vi., § 3. 2 Cf. Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar, Act II., scene i., 11. 63 sqq. "Between the acting of a dreadful thing And the first motion, all the interim is The nature of an insurrection." 8 For an admirable summary of the elements involved in an act of will, see Muirhead's Elements of Ethics, pp. 48-50. that are important, and thus eliminating insignificant details. § 10. THE MEANING OF PURPOSE.-When Will is regarded in relation to the end at which it aims, it is called Purpose. This term, however, is sometimes used also to describe the end itself, rather than the fact of aiming at an end. Purpose should be carefully distinguished from those tendencies to action which accompany appetite, desire, and wish. Action based on appetite is generally described as impulsive; but this term is sometimes used also with reference to actions that issue from desire. We may use the terms Blind Impulse and Conscious Impulse to mark the distinction. The tendency of a wish, again, to issue in action is most properly described by the term Inclination. When we are inclined to do anything, we are not merely conscious of an impulse to do it, but we to a certain extent approve the impulse; though it may be that, on reflection, we may resolve not to follow it. A Purpose or Resolution is thus distinguished from an Impulse (whether Blind or Conscious) and from an Inclination. § 11. WILL AND CHARACTER.—“A character," said Novalis, "is a completely fashioned will." Character may be said, in the language we have just been using, to consist in the continuous dominance of a definite universe. A man of good character is one in whom the universe of duty habitually predominates. A miser is one in whom the dominant universe is that which is constituted by the love of money. A fanatic is one in whom some particular universe is so entirely dominant as to shut out entirely other important points of view. And in like manner all other kinds of character may be described by reference to the nature of the universe that is dominant in them. When Pope said that "Most women have no characters at all," he meant that the universes of desire in which they live are so continually varying that no one of them can be said to be habitually dominant. And certainly it is the case that most men, as well as most women, cannot be accounted for by so simple an explanation as the exclusive dominance of such "ruling passions" as Pope dealt with. In the case of most actual human beings what we have is not so much any one universe that decidedly predominates as a number of universes that stand to one another in certain definite relations. The different relations in which they stand to one another constitute the differences of character. How it comes that now one, and now another, predominates, is, as we have already remarked, a question rather for Psychology than for Ethics. The habitual modes of action that accompany a formed character are described by the term Conduct. The meaning of this we shall have to discuss almost immediately.' 1 Mr. Stout's article on "Voluntary Action" (Mind, New Series, Vol. V., no. 19) will be found in the highest degree instructive on several of the points referred to in this chapter, as well as on some of those that are dealt with in the following chapters. See also the closing chapter of his Manual of Psychology. CHAPTER II. MOTIVE AND INTENTION. § 1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.-So far we have been considering the general nature of the relationship between Desire and Will. It is now necessary that we should direct our attention to the nature of the end involved in Volition; and, in particular, that we should consider the important distinction between an Intention and a Motive. This is a point on which a good deal of discussion has turned; and, owing to the great difficulties that are involved in it, it is a point that requires very careful study. First, then, we must try to understand exactly what Intention and Motive mean. § 2. THE MEANING OF INTENTION. -The term Intention corresponds pretty closely to the term Purpose. Indeed, they are sometimes used as synonymous. But Purpose seems to refer rather to the mental activity, and Intention to the end towards which the mental activity is directed. Intention, understood in this sense, means anything which we purpose to bring about. Now what we thus purpose is often a very complicated result. We may aim at some. external end, i. e. at the accomplishment of some change in the physical world-e. g. the building of a house; or in the social system within which we live e. g. the overthrow of a government; or, again, we may aim at the bringing about of some state of our own minds, or at the realization of some principle. Some distinctions between different kinds of Intention may help to make this clear. In the first place, we may distinguish between the immediate and the remote intentions of an act. Thus, two men may both have the immediate intention of saving a third from drowning; but the one may wish to save him from drowning simply in order that his life may be preserved, whereas the other may wish to save him from drowning in order that he may be reserved for hanging. In this case, while the immediate intentions are the same, the remote intentions are very different. The remote intention of an act is sometimes called the motive; but this use of the term seems to be incorrect. In the second place, we may distinguish between the outer and the inner intention of an act. This may be illustrated by the familiar story of Abraham Lincoln and the pig that he helped out of a ditch. On being praised for this action, Lincoln is said to have replied that he did it, not for the sake of the pig, but rather on his own account, in order to rid his mind of the uncomfortable thought of the animal's distress. Here the outer intention was to rescue the animal, while the inner intention was to remove an uncomfortable feeling from the mind. The inner intention, in this instance, is evidently only a particular case of the remote intention; but it is not so in every inThus if a man were to endeavour to produce stance. 1 Cf. Mill's Utilitarianism, chap, ii, p. 27, note. |