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from the A thole brigade, and the other from General Gordon's and Lord Ogilvy's regiments; and, by the time these four guards had served in rotation, he reckoned that the city would be taken, or the blockade removed. A council of war was held at Brampton upon this proposal, which came to the resolution, that as soon as the whole body, which formed the blockade, had taken their turn as guards, the division of the army at Brampton should march in a body, and form the blockade, but that no detachments should be sent from the different corps; nor did the council think it fair to order any such, as these corps had had all the fatigue and danger of the blockade of Edinburgh.*
Such were the circumstances which preceded the resignation of Lord George Murray, who, in a letter to Prince Charles, dated the fifteenth of November, threw up his commission, assigning as his reason the little weight which his advice, as a general officer, had with his royal highness. He, however, stated, that as he had ever had a firm attachment to the house of Stuart, " and in particular to the king," he would serve as a volunteer, and that it was his design to be that night in the trenches. In a letter, which he wrote the same day to the marquis of Tullibardine, he stated that he was constantly at a loss to know what was going on iu the army, and that he was determined never again to act as an officer; but that as a volunteer, he would show that no man wished more to the cause, and that he would do all in his power to advance the service. At the request of the marquis, who informed Lord George that Charles wished to see him, Lord George waited upon the prince, who appears to have received him dryly. On being informed by Lord George, that he had attended in consequence of a message from the prince, Charles denied that he had required his attendance, and told him that he had nothing particular to say to him. His lordship then repeated his offer to serve as a volunteer. Charles told him he might do so, and here the conversation ended. In a conversation which took place afterwards, between Lord George and Sir Thomas Sheridan, the former entered into some details, to show that in his station, as lieutenant-general, he had had no authority, and that others had usurped the office of general, by using the name of the prince. He complained that, while he was employed in the drudgery, every thing of moment was done without his knowledge or advice. He concluded by observing, that he had ventured his all,—life, fortune, and family,—in short, every thing but his honour,—that, as to the last, he had some to lose, but none to gain, in the way things were managed, and that, therefore, he had resolved upon a private station, f
Although it does not appear from the letters of Lord George Murray, referred to, that he resigned his commission from a dislike to servo under the duke of Perth, who had, in reality, acted as commander-inchief at the siege; yet it is generally understood, that this was one of
• Jacobite Memoira, v. 49-50. t Jacibito .Memoirs, p. Si
the reasons, if not the principal, which induced him to resign. This view seems to derive support from the circumstance of his accepting the chief command, which was conferred upon him on the resignation of the duke of Perth. Mr Maxwell of Kirkconnel, who was with the army it the time, gives the following statement in relation to this affair:—
"This command of the duke of Perth had like to have had bad consequences. It was not so much relished by some of the prince's friends as it had been by his enemies. It seems it had not gone well down with Lord George Murray; for about the time Carlisle surrendered, he had resigned his commission of lieutenant-general, and acquainted the prince, that henceforward he would serve as a volunteer. It would be rash in me to pretend to determine whether ambition, or zeal for the prince's service, determined Lord George to take this step; or,—if both had a share in it,—which was predominant. It belongs only to tht Searcher of hearts to judge of an action which might have proceeded from very different motives. The duke of Perth was an older lieute nant-general than Lord George Murray. Hitherto they had had separate commands, and did not interfere with one another till this siege, when the duke of Perth acted as principal commander, having directed the attack, signed the capitulation, and given orders in the town till the prince's arrival. This was a precedent for the rest of the campaign: it was perhaps not agreeable for Lord George to serve under the duke of Perth, who was certainly much inferior to him in years and experience. He thought himself the fittest man in the army to be at the head of it, and he was not the only person who thought so. Had it been left to the gentleman of the army to choose a general, Lord George would have carried it by vast odds against the duke of Perth; but there was another pretext which was more insisted on, as less offensive to the duke of Perth, who was much beloved and esteemed, even by those who did not wish to see him at the head of the army; and that was his religion, which, they said, made him incapable of having any command in England. It was upon this the greatest stress was laid by those that complained of the duke's command. They said that in England, Roman catholics were excluded from all employments, civil and military, by laws anterior to the Revolution,—that these laws, whether reasonable or not, ought to subsist until they were repealed,—that a contrary conduct, without a visible necessity for it, would confirm all which had been spread of late, from the pulpit and from the press, of the prince's designs to overturn the constitution, both in church and state,—that indeed the prince, in his present circumstances, could not be blamed for allowing a Roman catholic the command of a regiment he had raised, or even a more extensive command, if a superiority of genius and military experience entitled him to it; but these reasons could not be alleged for the duke of Perth. A good deal to this purpose was commonly talked in the army, and by some people with great warmth. A gentleman who had been witness to such conversation, and dreaded nothing so Hi. ■
much as dissension in a cause that could never succeed but by unanimity, resolved to speak to the duke of Perth upou this ungrateful subject. He had observed, that those that were loudest in their complaints were least inclined to give themselves any trouble in finding out a remedy. The duke, who at this time was happy, but not elevated by his success, reasoned very coolly upon the matter. He could never be convinced, that it was unreasonable that he should have the principal command. But when it was represented to him, that since that opinion prevailed, whether well or ill founded, the prince's affairs might equally suffer, he took his resolution in a moment, said he never had any thing in view but the prince's interest, and would cheerfully sacrifice every thing to it. And he was as good as his word, for he took the first opportunity of acquainting the prince with the complaints that were against him, insisted upon being allowed to give up his command, and to serve henceforth at the head of his regiment. A plain narrative of the duke of Perth's behaviour on this delicate occasion, is the best encomium that can be made of it. By this means, Lord George Murray, who had resumed his place, became general of the army, under the prince; for his brother, the duke of Athole, * .who was in a bad state of health, took nothing upon him." f
• Marquis of Tulllbardine. f Kirkcomiel MS.
The following Is a copy of a note, or memorandum holograph of the prince, among the Stuart Papers, in the possession of his Majesty, In relation to Lord George Murray. That part of it which relates to the battle of Culloden, will be afterwards noticed.
"LA G(eorge consider(ed) being very bad before joiningy• F(rince) at P(erth.J His refusing to make the siege of Carlisle, which P(rince) undertook himself, after he layd doun his comition, and y* D(uke) of P(erth) opened the trenches, by >• Ps orders they surrendered at discretion, as by the countenance the P. made, it made them believe his army was Ten T(housand) M(en) and cannon of four-and-twenty, tho' in reality he had bearly Three T. fitting all, and only four Swedish field pieces of 4 pounders. A little before y* Inst unfortunate B(aUle) IA. G. M. undertook the attack of the Poste of Bier Castell, where >• Hessian T(roops) were, and he took an officer, which he sent back without so much as consulting the P. This is a thing so contrary to all rule, or any military practice, that no one that has the least sense can be guilty of without some privat reson of bis own. When y« enemy was so much aprochlng, and seeming to be determined to alack us lastly at Inverness, iff wee did not them y P. caled a Co unci 11 of war on y• 16 May, (should be 15th April,) when all y« chins were assembled, and IA. G. M.—)• P. let every one spake before him. IA. G. M. wus the last, and he proposed to stock him that night as y« best expedient: this was just what y• P. intended, but had kept it in his brest. Y« P. then embraced, L*. G. M. aproved it, and oued it was his project; it was agreed upon. But then it was question of y« manor. It is to be observed, that ft P. proposed to keep F. Augustus, and to make it searve as a pleace of ralleing in caso of a defete. But that Was unanimously reject by y« chin's, so it was bloon up."
Inexplicable conduct of Marshal Wade—Charles holds a council of war, which resolves to march south—Departure of the Highland army from Carlisle—Arrives at Manchester—Formation of the Manchester regiment—Departure of the Highland army from ManchesIer, and arrival at Derby—Alarm at London—Council of war held at Derby—Determination of Charles to march to London—He is overruled by his council, which resolves to retreat—Proposal of Charles to march into Wales also rejected —Extraordinary conduct of Sir Thomas Sheridan, Secretary Murray, and others— •Second meeting of the council—Resolution to retreat adhered to—Negotiations of the Chevalier's agents with France—Arrival of Prince Henry, brother of Charles, In France—Treaty of Fontainebleau—French expedition under Lord John Drummond —His arrival and proceedings—Retreat of the Highland army to Scotland—Skirmish at Clifton—Re-capture of Carlisle.
Although Marshal Wade must have been duly apprized of the arrival of the Highland army in England, yet it was not until he had received intelligence of their march to Brampton, and of their probable advance upon Newcastle, that he began to move. He set out from Newcastle on the sixteenth of November, the day after the surrender of Carlisle; but a deep snow, which had just fallen, retarded his march so much, that his army did not reach Ovington till eight o'clock that night . Next day he advanced to Hexham, where the first column of his army arrived about four o'clock in the afternoon; but the rear did not get up till near midnight. The army, unable to proceed farther on account of the snow, encamped on a moor near the town, and the men were provided with a sufficient quantity of straw to repose upon by the inhabitants, who kindled large fires all over the ground to protect the troops from the cold, which was unusually severe.* At Hexham, Wade was informed of the reduction of Carlisle. He remained there three days in the expectation of a thaw; but the road to Carlisle continuing impassable, he returned to Newcastle, which he reached on the twenty-second of Novembcr.f The conduct of Marshal Wade, in delaying his march from Newcastle, has been justly censured, for there can be no doubt that had he made a movement in advance upon Car
• Professor Moclaurin, the celebrated mathematician, in returning to Edinburgh from York, whither he had fled on the entrance of the Highland army into the capital, caught a cold on the road, during Thursday, the 14th of November, and the two following days, from the effects of which he never recovered.—Cultodm Papert, p. 268.
t Royse, p. 101.
lisle about the time the insurgents marched to Brampton, that town would have been saved.
The sudden and unexpected success which had attended Charles's arms in England, spread a general alarm through all the northern and western parts of that kingdom, and extended even to the capital itself. Such was the alternation of hope and fear in the minds of the people of all classes, that whilst the most trifling article of good news led them to indulge in the most extravagant manifestations of joy, the smallest reverse of fortune plunged them into the most abject distress. Sir Andrew Mitchell, alluding to this circumstance in a letter to President Forbes, says, that if he had not lived long enough in England to know the natural bravery of the people, he should have formed a very false opinion of them from their demeanour at the period in question.*
As soon as the news of the surrender of Carlisle was known in London, the government resolved to assemble an army of ten thousand men in Staffordshire, under Sir John Ligonier, an officer of considerable military experience. For this purpose, Sir John left London on the twenty-first of November, taking along with him nine old battalions, two regiments of dragoons, and part of his own regiment of horse. In addition to this and the other army under Wade, a third army, to be placed under the immediate command of his majesty, was ordered to be raised, and encamped in the vicinity of London for its protection. The city and castle of Chester were put in a proper state of defence, and the town of Liverpool raised a regiment of seven hundred men, who were clothed and maintained at the expense of the inhabitants.
When mustered at Carlisle, the prince's army amounted only to about four thousand five hundred men.f The idea of marching to London and overturning the government with such u force, in the face of three armies and a numerous militia, amounting in all to upwards of sixty thousand men, could scarcely have been entertained by any adventurer, however sanguine his hopes may have been; but Charles was so full of his object, thai he shut his eyes to the great difficulties of the enterprise, which he imagined would be surmounted by the tried valour of his troops, and the junction of a considerable party in England devoted to his cause.
To determine upon the course to be next pursued, Charles called a council of war a few days after the capture of Carlisle, in which different opinions were maintained. As there was no appearance of either an invasion from France, or an insurrection in England, some of the members proposed returning to Scotland, where a defensive war could be carried on till such time as the prince should be in a condition to resume offensive operations. Others were for remaining at Carlisle, and quartering the army in the neighbourhood till they saw whether there
• Culloden Papers, p. 255.
t The Chevalier Johnttone says it did not exceed 4,5(10; and Maxwell of Kirkconnel, Ihal II amounted to 4,400.