either discontented with the situation in which they found themselves after they came to Inverness, or to see their families or friends. Up to the period of their arrival there, they had received their pay punctually, but at Inverness the face of affairs was completely changed in this respect, and instead of money the troops were reduced to a weekly allowance of oatmeal. The men murmured at first at the stoppage of their pay, but their clamours were quieted by their officers, who gave them assurances that a supply of money would soon be received from France. This expectation would have been realized, but for the misfortune which befell the Prince Charles, and in consequence of that event, the soldiers began to murmur afresh, and some of them seeing no pressing occasion for their attendance, and choosing rather to enjoy a frugal repast with their friends at home than serve without pay, left the army. These absentees, however, had no intention of abandoning the service, and were resolved to rejoin their colours as soon as they saw a probability of coming to action. Accordingly, many of those who had returned to their homes set out of their own accord to rejoin the army, on hearing of the duke of Cumberland's advance, though few of them arrived in time for the battle.*

Reduced in numbers as the prince's army was from the causes alluded to, they still burned with impatience to meet the enemy; and when intelligence of the duke of Cumberland's march from Aberdeen reached Inverness, it was hailed with joy by the portion there assembled. From the fatigues and labours they had experienced during the campaign, and the numerous inconveniences to which they had been subjected from the want of pay, there was nothing the Highlanders dreaded more than another march to the south; but the near prospect they now had of meeting the English army upon their own soil, and of putting an end to the war by one bold and decisive blow, absorbed for a while all recollection of their past sufferings. By drawing the duke of Cumberland north to Inverness, it was generally supposed that the prince could meet him on more equal terms than at Aberdeen, as he would have a better and more numerous army at Inverness, than he could have carried south. This unquestionably would have been the case had Charles avoided a battle till he had assembled all his troops, but his confidence on the present occasion got the better of his prudence.

After crossing the Spey, the duke of Cumberland halted his army on the western bank, and encamped opposite to Fochabers, but the horse afterwards repassed the river and took up their quarters in the town. Here, as at Cullen, every precaution was taken to prevent surprise. Early next morning he raised his camp, and passing through Elgin, encamped on the moor of Alves, nearly midway between Elgin and Forres. The duke of Perth, who had passed the previous night at Forres, retired to Nairn upon his approach. The duke of Cumberland renewed his march on the fourteenth and came to Nairn, where the duke of Perth remained till he was

within a mile of the town, and began his retreat in sight of the English army. In this retreat, Clanranald's regiment, with the French piquets and Fitz-James's horse, formed the rear. To harass the rear, and retard the march of the main body till some of his foot should come up the duke of Cumberland sent forward his cavalry. Several shots were exchanged between the duke's cavalry and the French horse, and in expectation of an engagement with the duke's advanced guard, consisting of two hundred cavalry and the Argyleshire men, the Macdonalds of Clanranald, and the Stewarts of Appin, were ordered back to support the French. These regiments accordingly returned and took ground, and Fitz-James's horse formed on their right and left. The duke's advanced guard thereupon halted, and formed in order of battle, but as the main body of the English army was in full march the rear recommenced their retreat. The advanced guard continued to pursue the Highlanders several miles beyond Nairn, but finding the chase useless, returned to the main body which was preparing to encamp on a plain to the west of Nairn.*

Neither at the time when Charles received intelligence of the duke of Cumberland's march from Aberdeen, nor till the following day (Sunday,) when news was brought to him that the English army had actually crossed the Spey, does Charles appear to have had any intention of speedily risking a battle. He probably expected that with the aid of the reinforcements he had sent to support the duke of Perth, his grace would have been able, for sometime at least, to have maintained a position on the western bank of the river, and that time would be thus afforded him to collect the scattered portions of his army, before being compelled by the advance of the duke of Cumberland, to come to a general engagement; but whatever his intentions were anterior to the receipt of the intelligence of the English army having crossed the Spey, that circumstance alone made him determine to attack the duke of Cumberland without waiting for the return of his absent detachments.

Accordingly, on the morning of the fourteenth, Charles ordered the drums to beat, and the pipes to be played, as the signal for summoning his men to arms. After those who were in the town had assembled in the streets, the prince mounted his horse, and putting himself at their head, led them out to Culloden, about four miles from Inverness. Leaving part of his men in the parks around Culloden house, Charles went onward with his first troop of guards and the Mackintosh regiment, and advanced within six miles of Nairn to support the duke of Perth, but finding him out of danger, he returned to Culloden, where he was joined by the whole of the duke's forces in the evening. Lochiel also arrived at the same time with his regiment. That night the Highlanders bivouacked among the furze of Culloden-wood, and Charles and his prin cipal officers lodged in Culloden house.

• Kirkconnel MS. Lockhart Papers, vol. ii. p. 507.

+ Lockhart Papers, vol. ii. P. 518.

Having selected Drummossie-moor for a field of battle, Prince Charles marched his army thither early in the morning of the fifteenth, and drew his men up in order of battle across the moor, which is about half a mile broad. His front looked towards Nairn, and he had the river of that name on his right, and the inclosures of Culloden on his left. This moor, which is a heathy flat of considerable extent about five miles from Inverness and about a mile and a half to the south-east of Culloden house, forms the top of a hill which, rising at Culloden, dies gradually away in the direction of Nairn. The ascent to the moor is steep on both sides, particularly from the shore. In pitching upon this ground, Charles acted on the supposition that the duke of Cumberland would march along the moor, which was better fitted for the free passage of his army, than the common road between Nairn and Inverness, which was narrow and inconvenient.

In expectation that the duke of Cumberland would advance, Charles sent forward on the road to Nairn some parties of horse to reconnoitre, but they could observe no appearance of any movement among the royal troops. The ground on which the army was now formed had been chosen without consulting Lord George Murray, who, on arriving on the spot, objected to it, on the footing that though interspersed with moss and some hollows, the ground was generally too level, and consequently not well suited for the operations of Highlanders. He therefore proposed to look out for more eligible ground, and at his suggestion Brigadier Stapleton and Colonel Ker, were sent about ten o'clock to survey some hilly ground on the south side of the water of Nairn, which appeared to him to be steep and uneven, and of course more advantageous for Highlanders. After an absence of two or three hours, these officers returned and reported that the ground they had been appointed to examine was rugged and boggy, that no cavalry could act upon it, that the ascent on the side next the river was steep, and that there were only two or three places, about three or four miles above, where cavalry could pass; the banks of the river below being inaccessible. On receiving this information, Lord George Murray proposed, in the event of Cumberland's forces not appearing that day, that the army should cross the water of Nairn, and draw up in line of battle next day, upon the ground which had been surveyed; and that, should the duke of Cumberland not venture to cross after them and engage them upon the ground in question, they might watch a favourable opportunity of attacking him with advantage. In the event of no such opportunity offering, his lordship said that he would recommend that the army should, with the view of drawing the duke after them, retire to the neighbouring mountains, where they might attack him at some pass or strong ground. This proposal met with the general approbation of the commanding officers; but Charles who, two days before (when a suggestion was made to him to retire to a strong position till all his army should assemble,) had declared his resolution to attack the duke of Cumberland even with a thousand

men only, declined to accede to it. His grounds were that such a retrograde movement might discourage the men, by impressing them with a belief that there existed a desire on the part of their commanders to shun the English army; that Inverness, which was now in their rear, would be exposed, and that the duke of Cumberland might march upon that town, and possess himself of the greater part of their baggage and ammunition.*

Concluding from the inactivity of the duke of Cumberland that he had no intention of marching that day, Charles held a council of war in the afternoon, to deliberate upon the course it might be considered most advisable to pursue in consequence of the duke's stay at Nairn. According to Charles's own statement, he had formed the bold and desperate design of surprising the English army in their camp during the night; but, desirous of knowing the views of his officers before divulging his plan, he allowed all the members of the council to speak before him. After hearing the sentiments of the chiefs, and the other commanders who were present, Lord George Murray proposed to attack the duke of Cumberland during the night, provided it was the general opinion that the attack could be made before one or two o'clock in the morning. Charles, overjoyed at the suggestion of his lieutenant-general, immediately embraced him, said that he approved of it, that in fact he had contemplated the measure himself, and that he did not intend to have disclosed it till all the members of the council had delivered their sentiments.t

Had the army been in a condition to sustain the fatigue of a night march of ten or twelve miles, the plan of a night attack was unquestionably the best that could have been devised under existing circumstances. If surprised in the dark, no doubt can exist that the duke of Cumberland's army would have been routed; but supposing the duke to have been on his guard, a night attack appeared to afford the only chance of getting the better of his superiority in numbers and discipline, and of rendering his cavalry and cannon, in which his chief strength lay, utterly useless. But the Highland army, from some unaccountable oversight on the part of the persons who had the charge of the commissariot department, was in a state bordering upon starvation, and consequently not able to perform such a fatiguing march. Although there was a quantity o meal in Inverness and the neighbourhood sufficient for a fortnight's consumption, no care had been taken to supply the men with an allowance on leaving Inverness, and the consequence was, that during this and the preceding day very few of them had tasted a particle of food. To appease their hunger a single biscuit was distributed to each man, but this pittance only increased the desire for more; and hunger getting the better of patience, some of the men began to leave the ranks in quest

A Particular Account of the Battle of Culloden. In a letter from an officer (Lord George Murray) of the Highland army to his friend in London. London, 1749. p. 4 No. 42 of Appendix to Home's works, vol. iii. p. 342.-Jacobite Memoirs, p. 121. + Vide Memorandum by the Prince, note, p. 138.

of provisions. In spite, however, of the deprivation under which they laboured, the army was never in higher spirits, or more desirous to meet the enemy; and it was not until all hopes of an immediate engagement were abandoned that the men thought of looking out for the means of subsistence.*

The expediency of a night attack was admitted by all the members of the council, but there were a few who thought that it should not be ventured upon that night, and not until the arrival of the rest of the army, which might be expected in two or three days at farthest. Keppoch with his Highlanders had just come up and joined the army; but the Mackenzies under Lord Cromarty, a body of the Frasers whom the Master of Lovat had collected to complete his second battalion, the Macphersons under Cluny, their chief, the Macgregors under Glengyle, a party headed by Mackinnon, and a body of Glengary's men under Barisdale, were still at a distance, though supposed to be all on their march to Inverness. The minority objected that, should they fail in the attempt, and be repulsed, it would be difficult to rally the Highlanders,-that even supposing no spy should give the duke of Cumberland notice of their approach, he might, if alarmed by any of his patroles, have time to put his army in order in his camp, place his cannon, charged with cartouch-shot, as he pleased, and get all his horse in readiness to pursue the Highlanders if beat off. Besides these objections they urged the difficulty of making a retreat if many of their men were wounded, from the aversion of the Highlanders to leave their wounded behind them. They, moreover, observed that they had no intelligence of the situation of the duke's camp; and that even could a safe retreat be made, the fatigue of marching forwards and backwards twenty miles would be too much for men to endure, who would probably have to fight next day.†

All these arguments were however thrown away upon Charles, who, supported by the duke of Perth, Lord George Murray, Lord John Drummond, Lochiel, and others, showed the utmost impatience for au immediate attack. The party who supported this view were not insensible to the danger which might ensue should the attack miscarry; but, strange to say, they were urged to it from the very cause to which the failure was chiefly owing, the want of provisions. Apprehensive that if the army was kept on the moor all night, many of the men would go away to a considerable distance in search of food, and that it would be very difficult to assemble them speedily in the event of a sudden alarm, they considered an immediate attack, particularly as Charles nad resolved to fight without waiting for reinforcements, as a less desperate course than remaining where they were.‡

• Kirkconnel MS Lockhart Papers, vol. ii. p. 518. A letter from Mr John Hay of Restalrig, who had the principal charge of the provisions, to Charles, in his own exculpation, will be found in the Appendix. It is dated from Paris, 5th Dec., 1746. The original is in the possession of his Majesty. t Ibid, p. 9.

III.

+ Particular account of the battle of Culloden, p. 6.
2 G