Handbook of Moral PhilosophyMacmillan, 1888 - 376 من الصفحات |
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عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
absolute according action activity admitted Agnosticism application Aristotle basis belonging categorical imperative Causality character common conception concerned conduct Conscience consciousness deliberate desire determined Dialectic Evolution disorder distinction Divine duty essential ethical thought exercise existence experience external F. H. Bradley facts faculty feeling finite force happiness harmony Hegel Hegelian Herbert Spencer higher human idea ideal imperative implies impulse individual intel intellectual intelligence intuition Intuitionalism involved J. S. Mill judgment Kant Kant's knowledge Libertarians logical ment metaphysical mind moral agent moral disorder moral law Moral Philosophy Moral Sentiment motive nature Neo-Kantian nerve notion object obligation organism perplexity Philos physical pleasure possible practical present principle problem procedure question rational realise Reason recognised reference regard relation Religion says sciousness seek self-realisation sensation sense sensory social Spinoza theory things tion transcendent true truth unity universal Utilitarianism virtue volition whole
مقاطع مشهورة
الصفحة 322 - But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable.
الصفحة 324 - ... you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself: and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world.
الصفحة 105 - The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
الصفحة 322 - The original of them all, is that which we call SENSE, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.
الصفحة 65 - Thus, that principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have some influence; which may be said of every passion, of the lowest appetites: but likewise as being superior; as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others; insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency.
الصفحة 36 - So that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike.
الصفحة 324 - But there is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart as well as his external actions, which passes judgment upon himself and them, pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust, which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly...
الصفحة 124 - The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard - What is its sanction? what are the motives to obey it? or more specifically, what is the source of its obligation? whence does it derive its binding force?
الصفحة 126 - If the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy of the nature of the moral sense be correct, this difficulty will always present itself, until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the consequences...
الصفحة 116 - Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments : it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty ; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete.