Besides, it was not the purpose of Washington to entice the enemy to a general action, or allow himself to be drawn into one, if it could possibly be avoided. Such an experiment, with his raw troops and militia, against a force superior in numbers, and still more so in experience and discipline, aided by a powerful fleet, he well knew would be the height of rashness, and might end in the total ruin of the American cause. Wisdom and prudence dictated a different course. To wear away the campaign by keeping the enemy employed in small encounters, dividing their attention, and interposing obstacles to their progress, was all that could be done or undertaken with any reasonable hope of success. Such a system would diminish the resources of the enemy, habituate his own soldiers to the practices of war, give the country an opportunity to gather strength by union and time, and thus prepare the way for more decisive efforts at a future day. This policy, so sound in its principles, and so triumphant in its final results, was not relished by the short-sighted multitude, eager to hear of battles and victories, and ready to ascribe the disappointment of their wishes to the fault of the General. The murmurs and complaints of such persons, though so loudly and widely expressed that they might be taken as denoting the public sentiment, were borne with fortitude by Washington; nor did he suffer himself to be turned by them from what he believed to be his duty in watching over the vital interests of his country.

The recent defeat produced a most unfavorable impression upon the army, which is described as follows in a letter from General Washington to the President of Congress.

"Our situation is truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their

minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition in order to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances, almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies, at a time. This circumstance, of itself, independent of others, when fronted by a well-appointed enemy superior in number to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable; but, when their example has infected another part of the army, when their want of discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government, have produced a like conduct but too common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary to the well-doing of an army, and which had been inculcated before, as well as the nature of our military establishment would admit of, our condition becomes still more alarming; and, with the deepest concern, I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops.

"All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded if not entirely lost, if their defence is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean, one to exist during the war. Nor would the expense, incident to the support of such a body of troops, as would be competent to almost every exigency, far exceed that, which is daily incurred by calling in succour and new enlistments, which, when effected, are

not attended with any good consequences. Men, who have been free and subject to no control, cannot be reduced to order in an instant; and the privileges and exemptions, which they claim and will have, influence the conduct of others; and the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, irregularity, and confusion they occasion."

He added, that, by the last returns, the number of troops fit for duty was less than twenty thousand, and that many had since deserted. One thousand men. were immediately ordered to join him from the Flying Camp, then in New Jersey under General Mercer. A bounty of ten dollars had been offered to each soldier, that would enlist into the Continental service; but this produced little effect, as the bounty to the militia was in some instances double that amount. "Till of late," he observes, "I had no doubt of defending New York; nor should I have yet, if the men would do their duty; but this I despair of." In such a situation, a more gloomy or discouraging prospect could hardly be imagined. No trials, however, in a good cause, could depress the mind, or unnerve the energy of Washington.

CHAPTER IX.

New York evacuated, and the British take Possession of the City. - The American Army posted at Haerlem Heights and Fort Washington. Situation and Prospects of the Army. Its new Organization. — The British land in Westchester County, and march into the Country.— Washington advances to White Plains and forms an Encampment. Battle of Chatterton's Hill. - Part of the American Army crosses the Hudson. Capture of Fort Washington and Fort Lee. - General Washington retreats through New Jersey, and crosses the Delaware at Trenton. Conduct and Character of General Lee. Reduced State of the Army. Reinforced by Troops from Ticonderoga. - General Washington invested with extraordinary Powers by Congress. — His Manner of using them.—He recrosses the Delaware. - Battle of Trenton. Battle of Princeton. - The Army goes into Winter Quarters at Morristown. Remarks on these Events.

WHEN General Howe had taken possession of Long Island, his plans began to be unfolded. The fleet came into the harbour, and an armed vessel passed up the East River; but there were no indications of an attack on the city. It was obvious, indeed, that he designed to take New York by encompassing it on the land side, and to refrain from a cannonade and bombardment, by which the city might be injured, and rendered less fit for the accommodation of his troops in the winter, and less valuable as a place to be held during the war. Such being clearly the aim of the British commander, the attention of Washington was next drawn to the best mode of evacuating the city.

As a preparatory step he removed beyond Kingsbridge the stores and baggage least wanted. In a council of general officers there was a difference of opinion as to a total evacuation. All agreed, that the town would not be tenable, if it should be bombarded; and it was manifest, that this might be done at any

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moment. Some were for destroying the city at once, and leaving it a waste, from which the enemy could derive no benefit. As an argument for this procedure, it was said two thirds of the property belonged to Tories. Others thought the position should be maintained at every hazard, till the army was absolutely driven out. A middle course was taken. It was resolved so to dispose the troops, as to be prepared to resist any attack on the upper parts of the Island, and retreat with the remainder whenever it should become necessary. Nine thousand men were to be stationed at Mount Washington, Kingsbridge, and the smaller posts in the vicinity of those places, five thousand to continue in the city, and the residue to occupy the intermediate space, ready to support either of these divisions. The sick, amounting to one quarter of the whole army, were to be removed to the Jersey side of the Hudson.

While these arrangements were in progress, the enemy were not idle, although probably less active than they would otherwise have been, in consequence of an interview between Lord Howe and a committee of Congress at Staten Island, solicited by the former in the hope of suggesting some plan of reconciliation conformable to the terms of his commission. This attempt proving abortive, the operations commenced in earnest. Four ships sailed into the East River, and anchored about a mile above the city. The next day six others followed. Parties of British troops landed on Buchanan's Island, and a cannonade was opened upon a battery at Horen's Hook.

On the 15th of September in the morning, three men-of-war ascended Hudson's River as high as Bloomingdale, with the view of dividing the attention of the Americans, by making a feint on that side. At the same time General Howe embarked a strong division