extent to which this is done. In thus trusting first to private initiative, France and England have played the part of wisdom and discretion. The question of insurance is one that can easily be left to future action. The important point is to establish the basis of compulsory compensation for accidents. If experience demonstrates that this is not sufficient, additional legislation concerning insurance can easily be had.

The two important points of compulsory compensation and compulsory insurance have here been given full consideration. Other features are matters of detail and minor importance. As regards the form of the benefit, England has adopted the system of the payment of a lump sum in final liquidation of all claims, though providing that this sum can be used for the purchase of an annuity from the National Debt Commissioners; while France has adopted the reverse by making the annuity system the normal mode of settlement. The cause for this difference lies in the different temperaments and habits of the people of the two countries.

In both countries, as well as in Germany and Austria, the amount of the indemnity is determined by the usual wages of the sufferer, and, what is of great importance, is as far as possible definitely fixed in advance by the law itself. In all, also, the system of determining the amount of the indemnity according to the degree of incapacity rather than by attempting to draw up a scale of benefits according to the specific kind of injury received has been followed.

The French act, it will be observed, applies to all mine and quarry employees. This in no way conflicts with the miners' compulsory insurance act of June 29, 1894. That act made it obligatory upon mine operators to insure all of their workingmen against sickness through mutual aid societies, and against old age through the national old age insurance bank or through specially created funds.

The present law, therefore, completes this scheme by making it equally compulsory upon mine operators to provide for the compensation of their employees injured by accidents. In doing so, they are allowed to make use of the institutions now used for sick and old age insurance.

In concluding this analysis, mention should be made of a point in which the act seems to be open to criticism. A valuable body of statistical data concerning the frequency of accidents their causes, nature, and results-will come into existence as the result of the enforcement of the act. It is very desirable that this material, as well as that showing the extent to which insurance is practised, should be collected and made public. It is also a matter of practical importance to determine the financial burdens thrown upon employers in the different industries by the new system. The act, however, seems to make no provision for the centralization and publication of this information or the showing in any way of the results of the operation of the act. Under the French system of legislation however, a law frequently but lays down a general rule, leaving the details to be supplied by subsequent administrative orders or decrees. It is possible, therefore, that this point has not been neglected, and that the results will be published in some way.

WILLIAM FRANKLIN WILLOUGHBY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABor,

WASHINGTON.

THE GAS SUPPLY OF BOSTON.*

I.

PERHAPS no companies coming under the designation of "municipal monopolies " offer a more profitable or interesting subject of study than the gas companies. None could well come into closer contact either with the municipal government or with the public at large. All scientific students of modern social and economic conditions, recognizing gas as a necessity of our present civilization, admit that the gas supply must be in the hands either of the public or of a private monopoly under strict public control. The belief that competition works advantageously in the supply of this and similar services has long been abandoned by careful observers; but, unfortunately, the general economic ignorance of the mass of voters, played upon by interested promoters and speculators, has kept the legislative world from accepting the doctrine of monopoly in this industry. The fact that the gas business is highly technical gives, according to American practices, an excellent opportunity for the corporations.

*The chief sources of information on this subject are:

(1) The reports of hearings on lighting bills, held by legislative committees during the sessions of 1884, 1885 (two committees), 1886, 1887 (two committees), 1888, 1889, 1890, 1891, 1894, 1896, and 1897. Except for the years 1896 and 1897, these have all been printed. In every case the counsel on both sides have printed their arguments in full. The report for 1885 includes the report of a special investigation by the State Board of Health on water gas.

(2) The special investigation by order of the legislature of 1893 on the alleged illegal action and relations of certain of the Boston companies (House Document 1008 of 1893). This makes a volume of more than 1000 pages, and is a veritable mine of information.

(3) The annual reports since 1861 of the State Gas Inspector, and the annual reports since 1886 of the Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners.

The technical journals of the gas industry and the complete files of all the Boston dailies for the last thirteen years, as well as the miscellaneous literature on the subject, have been consulted; but every material statement of fact is based on sworn testimony or official record.

conducting the business to keep their accounts secret, and then make vague and unconfirmed claims as to the cost of manufacturing and as to the importance of new inventions, discoveries, and processes.

So far as my observation goes, no other single portion of municipal experience shows in such glaring light the weakness of American governments, and at the same time illustrates so many important phases of the problem of the management and control of private corporations, as the history of the gas supply of Boston and the manipulation of the stocks and debts of the companies engaged in it. The handling of Boston gas securities by foreign (i.e., extra-state) corporations, organized expressly for that purpose, makes a distinct and remarkable chapter in the development of the business corporation and trust. The history of the financiering of these companies, with all their evasions and circumventions of law, is doubly interesting, in view of the fact that Massachusetts is recognized as second to no State in the Union either in the intelligence and high character of her citizenship and legislature or in the care with which she drafts and enforces her laws. The fact that these things go on in Massachusetts is noteworthy also from the fact that she alone of all the States has established an able, honest, and permanent State commission, whose duty it is not only to see that the gas companies conform to all the laws of the State, but also, within a very wide discretion, to protect the consumer against wrong and injustice where no law protects him. It is but fair to say at this point that the events of which I write began before the Gas Commission was established in 1885; but they have continued since that date. Moreover, it may be said here, further, that, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory condition of the gas situation in Boston to-day, the history of the attempts of the State of Massachusetts to control her gas companies during the last thirteen years offers not only some of the most interesting,

but also some of the most promising experiments in the annals of our American commonwealths.

In the present paper I propose to discuss some points in this exceptionally unique history.

The Boston Gas Light Company was organized by special charter in 1822, with a capital stock of $75,000. After the customary diseases of failure, reorganization, and the like, to which infant corporations in those days were subject, it settled down in 1836 to supply Boston proper with gas. With increase of business came increase of capital by special legislative permission. In 1874 the company found itself with a paid up share capital of $2,500,000, and authority to add a million to this at its pleasure. But this authority has never been used, and the capital stands to-day where it did in 1874. In 1861 the State established the office of State Gas Inspector, and provided for the first official inspection in this country of the lighting power and purity of all gas sold in the State. By an act of 1852 the Boston company was required to sell any new issues of stock for cash, and not below par. A similar provision was introduced into the general law of 1868. This, also, forbade the payment of dividends in anything but cash, and prohibited the paying of cash dividends from the proceeds of the sale of stock. The act of 1868 was followed by that of 1873, requiring all increase in the capital stock of existing companies to be sold at auction.

From time to time proposed new companies sought from the city and the State the privilege of entering into competition with the Boston company in the territory already occupied by it. Until 1884-almost two generations after the founding of the Boston company no attempts at actual competition were made. But new companies were. chartered by the State, with rights of operating in Boston and its suburbs, subject to the consent of the local authorities controlling the streets. The