followed by Gen. Reynolds with the remainder of his division. After some hours, Gens. Negley and Rousseau followed in the same direction. The instructions to Col. Wilder were to advance within a few miles of Hoover's Gap, and there halt until the infantry came up, and then to carry the works. Learning, however, that the works commanding the Gap were not occupied, he moved forward and took possession of them, before the enemy were sufficiently aware of his approach to make any serious resistance. At the same time he pushed forward to the other extremity of the Gap, and took up a position commanding the road and the enemy's camp. In this movement he captured a train of nine wagons and a drove of beef cattle. The enemy immediately prepared for an attack, and came on in such overwhelming numbers that they would have been successful, had not reënforcements arrived to the aid of Col. Wilder. The fighting continued for two hours, during which the loss of the command was sixty-three killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy was represented by prisoners as exceeding five hundred. Meanwhile, the portion of the corps of Gen. McCook which took the road to Liberty Gap, encountered a force of the enemy near the entrance of the Gap. Gen. Willich, whose brigade led the column, was ordered by Gen. Johnson to drive the enemy. This was done so promptly that their tents, baggage, and supplies were captured. Col. Baldwin was then sent forward to clear the upper end of the Gap, where the enemy were soon found, in a force consisting of a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery. After a sharp and short combat they were driven out, and their position occupied. On the next day, Gen. Johnson held the position which his command had won, in order to continue the delusion of the enemy as to the real designs of Gen. Rosecrans. Skirmishing was kept up by the enemy along the front, and, between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, a formal attack in line of battle was made. A sharp struggle ensued, but after two hours the enemy abandoned the contest. The occupation of these gaps gave to Gen. Rosecrans the command of the position, and as soon as he advanced through them to Manchester and Winchester, he flanked Gen. Bragg at Tullahoma, and obliged him to retreat. This was commenced at once; and on the first of July, Gen. Rosecrans, learning of the retreat of Gen. Bragg, rapidly advanced his forces. Gen. Thomas moved on the Manchester road, and Gen. McCook on the one from Tullahoma. Gen. Thomas moved rapidly, in order to strike the enemy, who were moving directly east to the military road, five miles east of the railroad, and parallel with it. The enemy however, reached the crossing of Elk river before he was overtaken by the advance of Gen. Thomas. The division of Gen. Negley encountered the rear of Gen. Hardee at a point four miles north of Elk river. The resistance made here by Gen. Wheeler was so stubborn, that Gen. Negley was delayed until the trains of the enemy had crossed the river. During the night, their reserve of artillery, consisting of twenty-six pieces, crossed the river at Estelle Springs, and reached Tin Mountain. After crossing, the rear of the enemy burned the bridges, and took up positions in works hastily thrown up on the opposite side, in order to delay the crossing of Gen. Thomas as long as possible, and to enable their infantry and trains to get into the mountains. At the same time heavy rains commenced, and the river rose very high. Gen. Crittenden took possession of the road from Dechard through Tracy City to Chattanooga, and thus forced Gen. Bragg to take the roads across the mountains. On the 2d, Gen. McCook moved so as to flank the road to Winchester and the mountains. At the same time, Gens. Rosecrans and Brannan moved to the upper crossing of Rock creek, to strike the rear of the enemy, who were to be detained by Gen. Negley. But Gen. Negley, mistaking the firing of a cavalry brigade on the right flank of the enemy for that of Gen. Rosecrans, opened with two batteries, and caused them to retreat precipitately to the mountains. On the morning of July 4th, the whole Federal force advanced to the foot of the mountains at Cowan, and found the enemy in full retreat upon Chattanooga. At the same time, Shelbyville was occupied by Gens. Stanley and Granger, and the former pushed on as far as Huntsville in Alabama. This retreat of Gen. Bragg from Tennessee had a demoralizing effect upon his forces, and discouraged the friends of the Confederacy in Tennessee. The result of these operations of Gen. Rosecrans thus far was to recover Middle Tennessee, and to preserve Kentucky from an invasion. His losses in these operations were 85 killed, 462 wounded, and 13 missing. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded is unknown, but 1,634 were made prisoners, and six pieces of artillery, many small arms, much camp equipage, and large quantities of commissary and quartermaster's stores were taken. Gen. Bragg, having returned to Chattanooga on the south side of the Tennessee river, now fortified his position, and threw up defensive works at the crossing of the river and as far up as Blythe's Ferry. The first object of Gen. Rosecrans was to repair the railroad from Nashville to Stevenson in Alabama. At Stevenson the Nashville railroad unites with the Memphis and Charleston road. Stevenson is thirty-seven miles west of Chattanooga, on the line of the latter road. Having completed his preparations, Gen. Rosecrans commenced his movement on Chattanooga and its covering mountain ridges on the southeast, on the 16th of August. On that day, Gen. Thomas moved from Decherd, with the division of Gen. Payne in advance. This divis ion had been stationed at the University on the Cumberland mountains. The corps moved over the mountains on a line nearly parallel with the Nashville railroad to Stevenson: it crossed the Tennessee river at or near Bridgeport, Alabama, by a pontoon bridge. On the 16th, Gen. Johnson's division of Gen. McCook's corps left Tullahoma, and passed through Winchester on the forenoon of the 17th. Gen. Davis's division followed in the afternoon. Gen. Sheridan's division moved from Cowan on the same day, and joined the rest of the corps at Salem, ten miles from Winchester, on the Huntsville road. There the corps moved in column, accompanied by its artillery and baggage, crossing the mountains, and striking the Tennessee river at Bellefonte, Alabama, twelve miles east of Stevenson. Gen. Crittenden's corps moved eastward to feel the strength of the enemy, and to cross north of Chattanooga. The front of the entire movement extended from the head of Sequatchie valley in East Tennessee to Athens in Alabama, thus threatening the line of the Tennessee river from Whitesburg to Blythe's Ferry, a distance of one hundred and fifty miles. On the 26th, a part of Gen. Davis's division crossed at Caperton's Ferry, about six miles below Bridgeport. The remainder of the division followed in a few days, and also Gen. Johnson's division of the same corps; on the 2d of September, Gen. Sheridan, of the same corps, crossed at Bridgeport, followed by the infantry and artillery of Gen. Brannan's division. Gen. Negley, of Gen. Thomas's corps, crossed at the same time at Caperton's Ferry. By the 8th of September, Gen. Thomas had moved on Trenton in Georgia, having seized Frick's and Stevens's Gaps on the Lookout mountain. Gen. McCook had advanced to Valley Head and taken Winston's Gap, while Gen. Crittenden had crossed to Wauhatchie, communicating on the right with Gen. Thomas, and threatening Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout mountain. The first mountain barrier south of the Tennessee being thus successfully passed, Gen. Rosecrans decided to threaten the enemy's communication with his right, while the centre and left seized the gaps and the commanding points of the mountains in front. On the 9th, Gen. Crittenden made a reconnoissance which developed the fact that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga on the day and night previous. The corps of Gen. Crittenden therefore took immediate possession of Chattanooga, which had been the object of the campaign, while Gen. Rosecrans, with the remainder of the army, pressed forward through the difficult passes of the Lookout mountain, apparently directing his march upon Lafayette and Rome. At the same time when Gen. Rosecrans commenced his forward movement on the 16th of August, Gen. Burnside left Camp Nelson in Kentucky for East Tennessee. Gen. Burnside assumed command of the Department of Ohio in March. On the 30th of that month, Gen. Gillmore engaged and defeated a large force of the enemy under Gen. Pegram, near Somerset,Kentucky. The other operations which had taken place consisted of an attempted raid in Harrison county, Indiana, from which the enmy were driven back with a loss of fifty-three made prisoners; a movement under Col. Saunders, with two pieces of artillery, the first Tennessee cavalry and some detachments from Gen. Carter's command, by which the railroad near Knoxville and the bridges at State creek, Strawberry Plains, and Mossy creek were des troyed, and ten pieces of artillery, one thousand stand of arms, and five hundred prisoners were captured, with a loss of one killed, two wounded, and a few missing; also the raid of Gen. Morgan into Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio, which is stated on a previous page. The departure of the ninth army corps to reenforce Gen. Grant, delayed somewhat Gen. Burnside's preparations for an active campaign in East Tennessee. The necessity, however, of his coöperating with the movements of Gen. Rosecrans, compelled him to take the field without awaiting the return of this corps. At this time Gen. Buckner was in command of the Confederate forces in East Tennessee, with his headquarters at Knoxville. Ilis force numbered about twenty thousand men, who were not supplied in the best manner with ordnance. This force was sufficient to have retarded the progress of Gen. Burnside through either the Cumberland, Big Creek, or Wheeler's Gap in the mountains; but he avoided that route. Concentrating his forces at Crab Or chard, on the southerly edge of Lincoln county, Kentucky, Gen. Burnside prepared for the movement over the mountains. The infantry were mounted, the cavalry and artillery were furnished with picked horses, and the divis ion was attended with large droves of packed mules, loaded with commissary stores, in or der that its movements might not be impeded by the slow progress of wagon trains. On the afternoon of August 21st the march commenced, with Gen. S. P. Carter in the advance. After an advance of thirteen miles, a halt was made at Mt. Vernon, the capital of Rockcastle county, Ky. On the 23d the march commenced at 4 A. M., and was continued over some of the wildest and most mountainous parts of Kentucky, twenty-six miles, to London. On the next morning the army was in motion toward Williamsburg, the capital of Whitley county, Ky., twenty-nine miles distant. On the 25th there were heavy rains, and no movement was made. On the 26th the movement continued to the place where the roads from Somerset and Williamsburg meet, about four miles beyond the State line, in Scott county, Tennessee. Here the army rested during the 27th and 28th, and was joined by Maj.-Gen. Hartsuff. On the 29th the movement was continued, with the mounted brigade of Gen. Shackelford in the advance. At midnight the banks of the New river were reached, and the next day the army encamped at Montgomery, in Morgan county, Tennessee, having made, during the two days, a march of forty miles. The movement continued on the 31st, and, on the 1st of September, Gen. Burnside, with an escort, proceeded to Kingston, while the army took a shorter road to Loudon bridge, leaving Kingston to its right. At Loudon, the East Tennessee and Georgia railroad crossed the Holston river over a fine bridge more than two thousand feet in length. To save or to destroy this bridge, as the situation should demand, was undoubtedly one of the objects of the forced march. The distance from Knoxville is thirty-nine miles. The artillery came into position, on the 2d, within easy range of this bridge, just in time to see the rear of the enemy pass over and apply the torch to the structure. It was entirely consumed. By the fire of the artillery several of the enemy were killed and wounded. The march then continued to Leoni Station, twenty-two miles from Knoxville. On the next day it was resumed to Knoxville, which had been occupied on the 1st by the advance. As Gen. Burnside approached Knoxville the inhabitants turned out to welcome him. His reception is thus described by a spectator: "As we neared Knoxville, the evidences of the intense devotion to the Union dwelling in the hearts of the people became more and more apparent. Along the entire route, especially the last ten or fifteen miles, the whole population seemed gathered on the roadside to give welcome to the Yankees. On the appearance of Gen. Burnside on the outskirts of the town, the news of his arrival spread, and everybody, rich and poor, the lame and the halt, rushed out to greet him. It was no vulgar curiosity to see a man famous in the world's history-it was the greeting of an oppressed people to their deliverer. Uncovered, and at a slow pace, the general rode through the streets to his headquarters. His progress was constantly impeded by the rushing of men to his horse's side to seize him by the hand and say, 'God bless you.' On arrival at headquarters, a large crowd assembled in the yard, and were clamorous for speeches. Brig.-Gen. S. P. Carter, a native of East Tennessee, came forward, and in a few words congratulated them on their deliverance. In response to repeated calls, Gen. Burnside then appeared and said, that although his profession was arms, and not speaking, yet he would take the occasion to say that, from the moment he took command of the Department of Ohio, it had been his fervent wish to lead an army into East Tennessee, to their deliverance; and he took great pleasure in saying that he had come with means sufficient, with their assistance, to hold the country permanently and securely. "On the conclusion of the speaking the garrison flag of the United States was flung from the portico, and the crowd rushed up and seized it in their hands, many of them pressing it to their lips. While this was passing at head quarters, the troops had been waylaid all over the city, and carried off by violence to be feasted, without money and without price, on the best which the land afforded. Not officers merely; their bounteous hospitality knew no difference in rank among their deliverers." At Knoxville, three locomotives and a large number of cars and railroad machine shops were taken possession of. A large train was also captured twelve miles northwest on the road to Virginia. On the 4th a movement was made upon Cumberland Gap. At Tazewell a slight skirmish took place with a small force of the enemy under Col. Carter. At daylight on the morning of the 7th, the Gap was invested, and its surrender demanded by Gen. Shackelford. Gen. Frazier, commanding the enemy's force, refused, and stated that he was prepared to hold out. It appeared that the enemy had a large quantity of grain in the gap, with a mill, which they used to grind it. During the ensuing night an expedition was sent out by Gen. Shackelford, which succeeded in destroying the mill. The enemy still refused to surrender, but on the arrival of Gen. Burnside, on the 9th, terms were agreed upon, and a surrender made unconditionally. The officers, however, were allowed to retain their side arms. About forty wagons, two hundred mules, four thousand pounds of bacon, two thousand bushels of wheat, a large quantity of other stores, and ten pieces of artillery, were surrendered. The number of prisoners was about two thousand. The march of Gen. Shackelford to the Gap, a distance of fifty-two miles, was made in sixty hours. Meantime a column of cavalry ascended the valley to Bristol, driving the enemy across the Virginia line, and destroyed the railroad bridges over the Holston and Watauga rivers, so as to prevent their return into East Tennessee. The main body of Gen. Burnside's army was now ordered by the general-in-chief to concentrate on the Tennessee river, from Loudon west, so as to connect with Gen. Rosecrans's army, which reached Chattanooga on the 9th of September. At this time the authorities at Washington were led to believe that Gen. Lee was receiving reënforcements from Gen. Bragg. The slight resistance made by the enemy in East Tennessee, and his abandonment without defence of such an important position as Chattanooga, rendered plausible the reports of spies and deserters from Gen. Lee's army, that reënforcements were arriving there. Fearing, therefore, that Gen. Rosecrans's army might be drawn too far into the mountains of Georgia, where it could not be supplied, and might be attacked before reënforcements could reach it from Gen. Burnside, Gen. Halleck sent the following despatch to Gen. Rosecrans: HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., Maj-Gen. Rosecrans, Chattanooga: Gen. Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland Gap that he holds all East Tennessee above Loudon, and also the gaps of the North Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is moving toward Athens to connect with you. After holding the mountain passes, on the west of Dalton, or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall move farther south into Georgia and Alabama. It is reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg's army is reenforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. On the same day the following despatch was sent to Gen. Burnside: HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., September 11th, 1863. Maj.-Gen. Burnside, Cumberland Gap: I congratulate you on your success. Hold the gap of the North Carolina mountains, the line of the Hol ston river, or some point, if there be one, to prevent access from Virginia, and connect with Gen. Rosecrans, at least with your cavalry. Gen. Rosecrans will occupy Dalton, or some point on the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta, and also the mountain passes in the west. This being done, it will be determined whether the movable force shall advance into Georgia and Alabama or into the valley of Virginia and North Carolina. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. On the next day, Gen. Rosecrans replied that he was sufficiently strong for the enemy then in his front, and that there were indications that the enemy intended to turn his flanks, and cut off his communications; he therefore decided that Gen. Burnside should move down his infantry toward Chattanooga, on his left, and that Gen. Grant should cover the Tennessee river toward Whitesburg to prevent any raid on Nashville. He was of the opinion that no troops had been sent from Gen. Bragg's army; but that Gen. Bragg was receiving reenforcements from Gen. Loring in Mississippi. On the 13th, Gen. Foster, in command at Fortress Monroe, sent a despatch to Washington, stating that trains of cars had been heard running all the time, day and night, for the previous thirty-six hours, on the Petersburg and Richmond railroad, evidently indicating a movement of troops in some direction. On the morning of the 14th, he further stated that Gen. Longstreet's corps was reported to be going south, through North Carolina. At this time Gen. Meade had been directed to ascertain-by giving battle, if necessarywhether any of Gen. Lee's troops had left. On the 14th he reported to Gen. Halleck as follows: "My judgment, formed on a variety of meagre and conflicting testimony, is, that Gen. Lee's army has been reduced by Gen. Long. street's corps, and perhaps by some regiments from Gens. Ewell and Hill." Upon receiving the despatches of the 13th, Gen. Halleck sent the following telegrams to Gens. Burnside, Rosecrans, Hurlbut, Grant, and Sherman : HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., Į September 13th, 1863. Maj.-Gen. Burnside, Knoxville: S It is important that all the available forces of your command be pushed forward into East Tennessee. All your scattered forces should be concentrated there. So long as we hold Tennessee, Kentucky is perfectly safe. Move down your infantry as rapidly as possible toward Chattanooga, to connect with Rosecrans. Bragg may merely hold the passes of the mountains to cover Allanta, and move his main army through Northern Alabama, to reach the Tennessee river and turn Rosecrans's right, and cut off his supplies. In this case he will turn Chattanooga over to you, and move to intercept Bragg. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D, C., ! September 13th, 1963. Maj.-Gen. Rosecrans, Chattanooga: There is no intention of sending Gen. Burnside into North Carolina. He is ordered to move down and connect with you. Should the enemy attempt to turn your right flank through Alabama, Chattanooga should be turned over to Burnside, and your army, or such part of it as may not be required there, should move to Hurlbut will aid you all he can, but most of Grant's prevent Bragg from reëntering Middle Tennessee. available force is west of the Mississippi. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. IEAQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., } September 13th, 1563. Maj. Gen. Hurlbut, Memphis: I think, from all accounts, that Steele is sufficiently strong. All your available force should be sent to Corinth and Tuscumbia, to operate against Bragz. Should he attempt to turn Rosecrans's right and recross the river into Tennessee, send to Gen. Sherman, at Vicksburg, for reenforcements for this purpose. Gen. Grant, it is understood, is sick in New Orleaus. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., Į September 18th, 1863. Maj.-Gen. Grant or Moj.-Gen. Sherman, Vicksbury: It is quite possible that Bragg and Johnston will move through Northern Alabama to the Tennessee river, to turu Gen. Rosecrans's right and cut off his communications. All of Gen. Grant's available forces should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tuscumbia, to cooperate with Rosecrans, should the rebels attempt that movement. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. On the 14th, the following telegrams were sent to Gens. Foster, Burnside, and Hurlbut: HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., Į September 14th, 1563. Maj. Gen. Foster, Fortress Monroe: Information received here indicates that part of Lee's forces have gone to Petersburg. There are various Suppositions for this. Some think it is intended to put down Union feeling in North Carolina, others to make an attempt to capture Norfolk; others again to threaten Norfolk, so as to compel us to land reenforcements there from the Army of the Potomac, and then to move rapidly against Meade. Such was the plan last spring, when Longstreet invested Suffolk. It will be well to strengthen Norfolk as much as possible, and to closely watch the enemy's movements. I think he will soon strike a blow somewhere. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Maj.-Gen. Hurlbut, Memphis: There are good reasons why troops should be sent tɔ There are several reasons why you should reinforce Rosecrans with all possible despatch. It is believed that the enemy will concentrate to give him battle. You must be there to help him. II. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. At the same time, Gen. Schofield, in command of the Department of Missouri, and Gen. Pope, in command of the Northwest Department, were ordered to send forward to the Tennessee line every available man in their departments; and the commanding officers in Indiana, Ohio, and Kentucky, were ordered to make every possible exertion to secure Gen. Rosecrans's line of communications. Gen. Meade was also urged to attack Gen. Lee's army while in its present reduced condition, or, at least, to prevent him from sending off any more detachments. More troops were not sent into East Tennessee or Georgia, on account of the impossibility of supplying them in a country which the enemy had nearly exhausted. Gen. Burnside's army was on short rations, and that of the Cumberland inadequately supplied. On the 14th of September, the army of Gen. Rosecrans was occupying the passes of Lookout mountain, with the enemy concentrating his forces near Lafayette, to dispute his further advance. The threatened movements of Gen. Bragg to the right and left proved to be merely cavalry raids to cut Gen. Rosecrans's lines of supplies, and threaten his communication with Gen. Burnside. His main army was only awaiting the arrival of Gen. Longstreet's corps to give battle in the mountains of Georgia. It had already been reënforced by troops from Gen. Johnston in Mississippi, and by the prisoners captured at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and released on parole, who had been declared by the Confederate authorities to be exchanged. The line of Gen. Rosecrans's army extended at this time from Gordon's Mills to Alpines, a distance of some forty miles. By the 17th, they were brought within supporting distance, and on the morning of the 18th a concentration was begun toward Crawfish Springs. The advance of Gen. Rosecrans's army can be traced in a few words. The Tennessee river, west of Chattanooga, in its general direction runs southwest. Skirting it is the Racoon range of mountains. Sand mountain, where the army passed over, is a part of this range. After marching over a plateau of twelve or fifteen miles in width, Sand mountain is descended, and the Lookout valley is gained. This valley is about two miles wide, and runs southwest. It is bounded on the east by the Lookout mountains, running parallel with the Racoon range. The right wing, under Gen. McCook, and the centre, under Gen. Thomas, had been in this valley two or three days when Chattanooga was evacuated. Early on Wednesday, the 9th, both corps were in motion to pass the Lookout range. They had only two passes by which to Cross-one eight miles south of Trenton, and the other at Valley Head, more than twenty Files south of Trenton. At Valley Head the razzed mountain melts away into a wild scattering of hills, near which the road is abruptly turned through winding valleys, with a steep and stubborn spur before the summit is gained. After reaching the summit, a plateau gently rolling, about twelve miles in width, is found. There are groves and fields, and smooth-flowing streams, where the imagination pictured crags and cascades. At Valley Head, Gen. McCook's corps passed over Lookout mountain, and reached Alpines, in the valley, called Broomtown valley, on the 10th. Gen. Thomas took the middle gap, and passed through without opposition. At the same time Gen. Crittenden moved south of Chattanooga toward Gordon's Mills, a distance of twelve miles. Bounding Broomtown valley, on the east, is another parallel ridge, known as Taylor's ridge. It is not a formidable barrier, and is crossed by a number of good roads toward Lafayette, where Gen. Bragg was. The first opposition to the present advance of the army took place at Alpines, on Wednesday, the 9th, when a cavalry division had a brisk fight with the enemy, which continued two hours, with the loss of four killed and twelve wounded. The enemy retired, leaving a few dead. When Gen. Thomas passed through the central gap, he found himself in McLemore's Cove or valley, a strip of country enclosed between Lookout mountain and Pigeon mountain, a spur of Lookout, striking northeast from it, and gradually melting away as it approaches the Chickamauga river. To reach the same valley in which Gen. McCook's corps was, Gen. Thomas was compelled to pass through one of the gaps of Pigeon mountain. He therefore, on the 12th, ordered Gen. Negley to feel his way through the central pass. In obeying the order he was suddenly attacked by the divisions of Gens. Witters and Stuart, of Gen. Bragg's army, upon his front and flanks, with such energy as compelled his hasty retreat, with a loss of some forty killed and wounded. The advance of Gen. Rosecrans's army thus far in pursuit of the enemy, had been made under the impression that, as Chattanooga had fallen without resistauce, Gen. Bragg was weak, and the Confederate Government unable to reënforce him; there would, therefore, be no fight north of the Coosa river. This sudden show of strength against Gen. Negley, therefore, created alarm. The question now was, whether this demonstration of the enemy indicated a purpose of giving battle, or whether it was a movement to secure a safe retreat. Gen. Rosecrans decided it to be the former. The next day, Gen. McCook was moving back over the Lookout mountain, with orders to close on the centre, and Gen. Crittenden, at Gordon's Mills, put in a good defensive position. Lafayette, the capital of Walker county, thirty-two miles from Chattanooga, and eighteen from Dalton, was supposed to be the place where the enemy were concentrating. In their front was the Pigeon mountain. This range was the highest at the southern extremity, where it is separated from the Lookout mountain by Doherty Gap, a long and heavy pass. Two miles north is a less elevated gap, called Rape; seven miles farther north is Blue Bird, |
