long remove the capital from Washington, so as to be rid of connection with that disgrace.

When an appropriation of $100,000 was asked for to remove the Seminoles, Mr. Giddings exposed the causes of the Seminole War, which were rooted in slavery and in the aid given to it by the general government. Mr. Adams's Diary speaks of this speech, with its documentary proofs, as an "exquisite torture of the Southern duelists and slave-mongers,' who, at its close, insulted Giddings as much as possible by abusive language, Black of Georgia and Waddy Thompson of South Carolina taking the lead. Giddings retorted with spirit. The speech was circulated extensively at the North, with great effect.

Mr.

The next attempt to crush the outspoken Northerner was connected with the Creole Case. A coasting ship, the Creole, with 130 slaves, was going (Nov. 1841) from Virginia to New Orleans, when the slaves rose upon the whites, killed one man, and took the vessel to Nassau where they were free by British laws. Webster, Secretary of State, demanded that the negroes be delivered to the United States. Senators and others declared that if England should fail to restore them, the United States would have reason to declare war. Webster carried his servility so far as to say to England, what he knew to be false, that the slaves were property under the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Giddings was indignant at this attempt to nationalize slavery. He prepared resolutions which affirmed the local rights of the Slave States, but declared that slavelaws could not by state law be extended to the high seas, and hence did not cover the Creole on her voyage. But the glove was thrown in the face of the Southern representatives by the seventh and eighth resolutions.

(7) "

"That the persons on board said ship, in resuming their natural rights to liberty, violated no law of the United States, incurred no legal penalties, and are justly liable to no punishment."

(8) "That all attempts to regain possession of or to re-enslave said persons are unauthorized by the constitution or laws of the United States, and are incompatible with our national honor."

The resolutions were presented March 21, 1842, and twice read, the second time amidst the closest attention. Their audacity was astounding. Everett of Vermont moved to lay them on the table, and expressed his "utter abhorrence of the fire-brand course of the gentleman from Ohio." Fessenden of Maine, Millard Fillmore, and others, wished to avoid an immediate debate and vote upon them, and in

But he

duced Giddings to withdraw them. must be punished for his daring. John Minor Botts of Virginia at once drew up a series of resolutions of censure, which Weller, of Giddings's own state, offered, moving the previous question, the adoption of which would cut off any defense on the part of Mr. Giddings. No opportunity was given him, and under the previous question the vote of censure was passed by 125 to 69. Mr. Giddings promptly resigned, appealed to the people of his district, and was reelected. But the ordinary course of business was altered for one year to keep him from offering his resolutions again.

One thing more could be done. One Northern member, Cilley of Maine, had been murdered in a duel by Graves of Kentucky and Wise of Virginia, having been shot after both seconds had urged that the duel should cease. As Mr. Giddings would not accept a challenge, a collision must be had in which he could be murdered. Only a few were in this scheme, for only a few of the Southerners were bullies. After Giddings had spoken on the coastwise slave-trade, Dawson of Louisiana passing him gave him a violent push, which he recognized with the exclamation, "Dawson!"

"That member turned around and seized the handle of a bowie-knife which partially protruded from his bosom, and immediately advanced toward Giddings until within striking distance, when Giddings said, lookmanner?' He answered, Yes. For the purpose of ing him in the eye, Did you push me in that rude insulting me? Yes,' said Dawson, as he partially removed the knife from the scabbard. Giddings rejoined, No gentleman will wantonly insult another. I have

6

no more to say to you, but turn you over to public contempt, as incapable of insulting an honorable man.' By this time Mr. Moore of Louisiana and other members seized Dawson and took him from the hall. . . . It was generally believed that Dawson intended to provoke a blow from Giddings which would have served as an excuse for assassination."

This was on February 14, 1843. Two years later, Dawson reappears in the same character. Giddings had spoken on an appropriation bill and exposed some Georgians who had obtained enormous sums for indefinable constructive losses. Black of Georgia replied with vile personalities, saying, among other things, that Giddings would be in the penitentiary, as he deserved, if the House could send him there; and he added two false charges, which involved the honor of Mr. Giddings. Giddings replied, and referred to the fact that Black had been discarded by his constituents, as unworthy, after one election. Black advanced on Giddings with a cane raised to

strike, and cried, "If you repeat those words I will knock you down!" Giddings immediately repeated the words. But Black's friends caught him in their arms and carried him off.

"Giddings continued his remarks, when Mr. Dawson of Louisiana, who had assaulted him on a previous occasion, came across the hall within a few yards of him, and placing his hands in his pocket, said "I'll shoot him, by G-d! I'll shoot him!' at the same time taking care to cock his pistol so as to have the click heard by those around him. Mr. Causin, a Whig from Maryland, instantly took his position in front of Giddings and between him and Dawson, folding his arms across his breast with his right hand apparently resting upon the handle of his weapon; while Mr. Sliddell of Louisiana and Mr. Stiles of Georgia, with two other Democratic members, at the same moment took their position near Dawson. At the same time, Kenneth Raynor, a North Carolina Whig, fully armed, took his place on the left of Giddings, while Mr. Hudson of Massachusetts placed himself on his right, and Mr. Foot of Vermont at the entrance of the aisle through which Black had made his exit. With armed foes in front and friends on either hand, Giddings continued his remarks; but the slave-holders in front began to realize the awkwardness of their position, and quietly returned to their seats, except Dawson, who remained until Giddings closed his speech, Causin facing him. . . Giddings says that this was the last effort made to silence a member

of the House by violence during his service in Congress." We have cited these incidents to show what need there was of the highest moral and physical courage on the part of Anti-slavery representatives. They needed to be men who "looked rather to the day of judgment than to the day of election." Only two of them, Only two of them, Adams and Giddings, were returned term after term by appreciative constituencies. As we read their lives, we cannot wonder that they tired of their burdens, fell into hopelessness, and wished to retire from political life. This mood of mind came upon Giddings in 1842, after the censure had been passed upon him and before his first encounter with Dawson. Accordingly he wrote to the editor of the "Ashtabula Sentinel," requesting him to announce his withdrawal. Instead of doing that. Mr. Fassett summoned friends of Mr. Giddings and of the cause, who persuaded him to continue in the service of the people. In this they were aided by the congratulatory letters and addresses which came to him from various sources, and which showed that his work was not only appreciated, but effective in advancing the cause of freedom. However much like a warrior he has seemed in scenes we have sketched, he loved peace; only love of justice drove him into conflict. In a letter of this time to his wife, he speaks with longing

of the time when I may lay aside the cares and responsibilities of public life, and making my bow to the people, I may be allowed to retire from the arena of strife and danger to the bosom of my family."

Mr. Adams was in a similar tired and hopeless condition. As chairman of a special committee on rules of the House, he had prepared a code without the famous twenty-first or "gag" rule, when this incident occurred:

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Giddings relates that during the progress of this debate, on entering the hall one morning he found Mr. Adams greatly burdened in mind. His appearance indicated the loss of sleep. He declared that our government had become the most perfect despotism of the Christian world; that he was physically disqualified to contend longer for the floor; and that he must leave the vindication of his report to Giddings, as duty to himself forbade further attempt on his part. He said he had indulged the hope of living to see the gagrule abrogated; but he now considered this doubtful."

Giddings soon fulfilled the old man's wish; and in the following December (1844) Mr. Adams's customary motion to strike out that rule prevailed by a vote of 108 to 80.

It

The relation of these two mighty men to each other was at first that of friendship and coöperation; but it grew to be a love like that of Jonathan and David — or, perhaps it is better to say, like that of father and son. found frequent expression in words and deeds. Comrades in what seemed like a desperate, almost hopeless battle, they had soon in public life the same friends, the same foes, the same hopes and fears for their country, and the same plans for its future welfare and security. No sadder mourner than Giddings followed the body of the old man eloquent to its grave in Quincy.

But when Adams departed, the prospect was already brighter. The group of defenders of liberty in Senate and House was growing, and soon included Chase, Hale, Sumner, Wilmot, Preston King, Allen, Durkee, Julian, Howe, Root, and Tuck, all able and brave men. And though there came the dark time of the compromises of 1850, the Fugitive-Slave Law and the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, it was plain that the tide of love of Freedom was rising to an irresistible flood. Giddings's hopefulness and his faith in humanity found increasing reasons for their existence. He did not live to see the end of the war, though it was plainly approaching when he died, May 27, 1864, while he was consul at Montreal; his heart failed suddenly, and in eight minutes he was dead.

In this review of Mr. Julian's excellent biography of this hero of the great struggle, it has been impossible to give even a sketch of the large amount of work done by Mr. Giddings with tongue and pen, or to show how his reputation grew and honors were heaped upon him: for these things we refer to the book. It has seemed better to show something of the dangers and difficulties that beset the political opponents of slavery from 1838 to 1848, and to present the hero since we could not show the full man. The younger and the middleaged men of to-day know of the Civil War and its great men; but only by reading lives of Giddings and his co-workers can they see where the greater battles of freedom were fought. The greatest task was to stir the nation to see the dangers that threatened our liberties of thought, speech, and political action. No American should be ignorant of our critical periods, among which we must include those shameful days.

A few words on the book itself. It is admirable as to paper and type, so that it is easy to read and pleasant to the eye. We have found no misprint. The publishers are to be congratulated on their share of the work, and Mr. Julian on his successful authorship.

SAMUEL WILLARD.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN MEDIE-
VALISM.*

In a leading Roman Catholic journal, Dr. St. George Mivart explained, some years ago, that he had not assumed "the position of Catholic apologist in the arena of biological science on his own responsibility, but "in a spirit of obedience." He is thus a man with a message; and in whatever estimation this may be held, it is impossible not to admire the patient persistency with which, led by conviction, he continues to explore the same ground and arrive at the same conclusions, hoping, evidently, by many metaphysical droppings to wear away even the stony hearts of the agnostic school. His two somewhat ponderous volumes of "Essays and Criticisms" deal, in a more or less popular way, with a wide range of subjects, which may be classified, for the purpose of review, as scientific, philosophical, ethical and religious, and political. Of so extensive a survey, of course only the briefest and most fragmentary criticism can be attempted.

* ESSAYS AND CRITICISMS. By St. George Mivart, F.R.S. In two volumes. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

Since Dr. Mivart's philosophy is avowedly based on science, the first step in an examination of his thought is naturally to consider his scientific views. His attitude toward modern theories is well known, and the teaching of this book is the same as that of his "Genesis of Species." He defines "evolution" as "the unfolding from potential into real existence of constantly new forms of animals and plants": a formula which recalls Aristotle's theory that matter exists only potentially, attaining actual being solely through form. In harmony with such conceptions, Dr. Mivart holds that species originate by the operation of " innate law, modified by the subordinate action of Natural Selection." His disbelief in the adequacy of natural selection to explain the differentiation of species is connected with his conception of human reason as an isolated fact, not to be referred to any antecedents in sensation, however remote. His denial of reason and the moral sense in animals practically begs the question, since the point is not, of course, whether these faculties are actually developed in animals, but whether they do not possess such rudiments of them as may be safely considered an adequate basis for their higher development in man. The distinction between "degree" and "kind" of intelligence seems merely assumed.

Yet even on his own ground, Dr. Mivart's logic is open to criticism. Thus, he makes selfconsciousness the basis of true rationality, declaring that no animal has this. But elsewhere

he says that "no true memory can exist in a creature devoid of true self-consciousness," defining two kinds of "true memory," "one in which the will intervenes, and which may be spoken of as recollection, and the other in which it does not, and which may be termed reminiscence." All unconscious psychical accompaniments of automatically repeated actions, or of organic habits, are expressly excluded from the definition. But nothing is more certain about animals psychologically than that they do consciously remember, in the second, at least, of these two ways; so that, according to Dr. Mivart's statement, they must possess true selfconsciousness. Again, in denying reasoning powers in animals, he observes, apropos of

ideas of number:

"The real gulf lies between the animal able to count two [the savage] and the animal not able to count at all. The difference between being able to count two and having the integral calculus at one's fingers' ends is but a difference of degree."

That this is a dangerous admission is proved

"Once while I watched a Dammara floundering hopelessly in a calculation on one side of me, I observed Dinah, my spaniel, equally embarrassed on the other. She was overlooking half a dozen of her newborn puppies [to see if any were missing]. . . . She kept puzzling and running her eyes over them, backwards or forwards, but could not satisfy herself. She evidently had a vague notion of counting, but the figure was too large for her. Taking the two as they stood, dog and Dammara, the comparision reflected no great honor on the man."

may

The arguments with regard to the lack of language among animals are equally unsatisfactory, especially since Mr. Garner has succeeded in identifying definite words of the monkey tongue. Another criticism that be made of Dr. Mivart's treatment of the subject of brute intelligence is that he considered only the two departments of sensation and reason, leaving that of emotion quite unnoticed. But certainly the emotions of affection and gratitude, so common among the higher animals, are a true link between them and hu

manity. As for the moral sense, the appendix on "Judyism" to Spencer's "Justice" ought to convince any unprejudiced mind that some animals possess at least a rudimentary morality. How many persons have known some creature like Matthew Arnold's dog Geist, into whose short years were crowded "all that life and all that love," a " loving heart" and "patient soul"; a being so distinct in personality that not all the infinite resource of nature

"Can ever quite repeat the past,

Or just thy little self restore."

Dr. Mivart's system of evolution is certainly well adapted to spare certain theological prejudices. The value of the theory may be questioned, however, after the controlling idea of constant unbroken development has been changed for that of a mere physical continuity existing throughout a series of predetermined stages, isolated by unfathomable gaps between inorganic beings, the "vegetative," the "animal," and the "rational" souls. As Mr. As Mr. Leslie Stephen has observed, "Creation' is really nothing but a name for leaving off thinking, and giving to cessation of thought a positive name." Dr. Mivart's well-known contention that the theory of evolution not only is in perfect harmony with the teachings of the Catholic Church, but was actually anticipated, in a way, by some of her early theologians, is certainly well calculated to exasperate his rationalistic opponents. Dispassionate observers will be likely to consider his process of thought

modern liberalism in another field, so acutely described by Sir Frederick Pollock in his "Jurisprudence and Ethics":

"Just as the law which is enounced in deciding a new case is by an inevitable fiction conceived as having always been the law, so the moral rules proceeding from the invisible and informal judgment-seat of righteous men, which yet is more powerful than any prince or legislator, are referred to doctrines originally based on a far narrower foundation."

The papers on Spencer and Lotze are chiefly vehicles for the conveyance of Dr. Mivart's own philosophical creed. An important point of this is his denial of the "relativity of knowledge" doctrine. He argues that if all our knowledge is relative and phenomenal, the proposition which asserts the fact must share the same limitations. "It has no absolute value, does not correspond with objective reality, and is therefore false." The italicised words are rather astonishing. They show a confusion of two very distinct ideas: the denial that we can know objective reality, and the denial that objective reality is what it appears to be. The former proposition alone could accurately be called agnosticism. But Dr. Mivart speaks, later, of Spencer's system as one" which asserts that neither extension, nor figure, nor number, is in reality what it appears, or that the objective connections amongst these properties are what they seem to us to be." Yet he goes on in the same sentence to quote Spencer's words: “What we are conscious of as properties of matter are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies which are unknown and unknowable." "What we are conscious of " is by no means to be identified with objective "extension, figure, and number."

Dr. Mivart objects also to the doctrine of the conservation of energy, on the ground that it savors of realism (in the ancient sense, as opposed to nominalism), energy being apparently conceived as a real entity apart from its special manifestations. He observes in another place that even these are "in themselves nothing but abstractions of the mind. There is no such thing as heat' or as 'motion'; though of course there are numberless warm bodies," etc. Yet in the essay called "Why Tastes Differ," he seeks to establish the idea of absolute "goodness," "truth," and "beauty," as actual entities, regardless of the fact that in consistency he should find these qualities only in particulars. But the way of the believer in innate ideas is hard. Dr. Mivart's

solute and supreme, if it is impossible even to conceive an evasion of its universal and unconditional

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nas, he would maintain that the ideas or thoughts of things in the divine mind, antecedent to creation, were universalia ante rem." The teaching of what we believe to be true philosophy," he says, "is that the types shadowed forth to our intellects by material existences are copies of divine originals, which respond to prototypal ideas in God."

Dr. Mivart, of course, asserts the freedom of the will; and this point leads to the consideration of his ethical and religious views. "Fully maintaining that atheists generally are not only in error but culpable," he is horrified at Professor Huxley's saying that "the necessity of a belief in a personal God, in order to a religion worthy of the name, is a matter of personal opinion." He himself once defines God as "the concrete infinity," a quite overwhelming term. He seeks to show an anthropomorphic deity legislating in behalf of an anthropocen

6

tric universe. God has willed that the lower animals should minister to man, to whose care he has entrusted them. The highest motive for the cultivation of art and science" is "their cultivation for God's sake." The utility of a reestablished Benedictine abbey is set forth thus:

"No thoughtful man, while admiring the beauties of creation, or enjoying the multifold benefits which spring from the harmonious coordination of its parts and powers, can but feel impressed with the insufficiency of his own acts of grateful recognition and reverent homage. To one so impressed, the knowledge cannot be unwelcome that there is a new community of men in the land, whose whole lives are set apart to atone for and supply the neglects of others." Happy England! since, while the numbers of her criminals and slums are still undiminished, a company of men can be found willing to devote their lives to the sufficient object of making up the arrears of national thanksgiving! Worse than these crudities is the question, in a paper on "National Education," "What harm can be done by reinforcing morality by religious sanctions?" Dr. Mivart, however, does not really believe that morality is reinforced by sanctions, and proves in another essay ("Why Tastes Differ") that the remark quoted is but a passing inconsistency.

"Some religious persons will probably say that the goodness of anything depends on the will of God. ... But in our perception of duty and moral obliga

tion we recognize that it addresses conscience with an essentially absolute and unconditional imperativeness.

But if goodness' cannot be dependent even on the will of God, if the commands of conscience are ab

it were, within the inmost heart, in the very foundation, so to speak, of the great whole of existence which it pervades. The principles of the moral law must be at least as extensive and enduring as are those starry heavens which shared with it the profound reverence of Kant."

The supremacy of ethics could not be asserted in a nobler spirit; and the same lofty conception pervades the paper on "The Meaning of Life."

There is a saying related of a certain American political scholar: "The State is an organism but keep it dark!" Dr. Mivart's reticence is not so great, as he devotes several pages to the exposition of the familiar physiological parallel. One is more grateful for his protest against the metaphysical conception of the State as an actual Ding an sich, and not merely as a name for "the nation in its collective and corporate character," to use one of Matthew Arnold's aptly-chosen phrases. His own theory of the State, however, is not clearly defined, and there seems to be some inconsistency in the different views of social organization idea of the subdivision of labor, he observes that which he puts forth. For instance, adopting the "class distinctions must, if we are not to retrograde, hereafter increase in number, and our social condition become, in a certain sense, an increasingly divided one." It is not quite easy to see how an increase of class distinctions is to be harmonized with even the qualified "liberty, equality, and fraternity" which he elsewhere advocates. He even glows over the social contract theory, very justly reasoning:

66

But, because the theory is false historically, is it necessarily devoid of all value? Have on this account its many eloquent and philanthropic advocates written or declaimed altogether in vain? By no means. False as an historical fact, it is a pregnant truth as an ideal for the future. What else, indeed, is all constitutional government but an approximation towards such an ideal?"

An ideal, it may be added, after which our own government was, to a considerable extent, consciously framed. Dr. Mivart, however, does not admire our methods. He opposes government by the masses, and demands the representation of interests, not of numbers. Perhaps an increased familiarity with the workings of Tammany and its compeers would lead him to regard us as rapidly approaching this political summum bonum. For the present we must be grateful for the mildness of