infantry, certain reserves and temporary cers must, besides being more numerous, be transfers from the militia might be so arrang-placed on the same footing as officers of the ed as to swell the force considerably, but regular army, and be accustomed to live and never, it is feared, to such an extent as to serve with them as forming parts of one render the regular forces of the kingdom great force. It is the marvellous homogeneiequal to repelling such an invasion as above ty of the whole hierarchy of Prussian offidescribed. cers, from the chief of the staff to the youngest ensign, which has given their army such unity that its acts are like those of a single organised being. Till a similar com In addition, however, to our regular forces, we have the militia, 80,000 to 100,000 strong on paper; they, however, are only partially drilled, partially officered, and hardly equip-munity exists among the officers of all parts ped at all. They have neither kits, nor tents, nor commissariat, nor ambulance; and worse than all, no field artillery-none, in fact, of the requisites which convert a crowd of men, armed with muskets, into that most complicated organisation, a modern army. If embodied for six months, if we had tents, or huts, or barracks to put them into, they might be rendered efficient, and their artillery branch may even now safely be intrusted with garrison duties in well fortified posts. Beyond this, however, they can scarcely be considered as more than the raw material of an excellent army, but utterly inefficient if called upon within a fortnight to take their place in line-of-battle or to go through the duties of a regular campaign. The difference between trained and partially trained soldiers was never more forci, bly illustrated than in the present campaign in France. The early victories of the Germans, while fighting with the French regular army, were probably as much owing to the strategic skill of the head-quarter staff, as to the fighting qualities of the troops. Had MacMahon not been hopelessly outnumbered at Wörth and Sedan, the result might have been very different, and at Spicheren and Gravelotte the Prussians were able to bring up such overwhelming reserves as to make resistance almost impossible. On the other hand, in the campaign of the Loire, the raw levies of the French have in almost every battle outnumbered the Prussians as two to one, and have fought most gallantly, never allowing that they were beaten, though pressed back day after day; yet hardly in a single fight can they claim a victory. Our case is perhaps not exactly parallel, as in the event of our militia being called upon to defend their country, they would probably have a greater number of regular soldiers with, or among them, to give them support. But even this would be of little use so long as they remain two distinct and separate forces. To be of any use in this respect, the militia must come to be considered as the reserve of the regular army. It must be called out more frequently and at regular intervals, drilled and accustomed to work with regiments of the line, and above all its offi of our army, not only unity of action, but of. command, is impossible; but it is not easy to see how it is to be obtained in our case. This time, however, it is not so much a question of expense as of caste, and of the traditions of the services; and it will require a strong and steady hand to conquer these. But it is the military problem of the day. Properly officered and properly organised, the militia, with the yeomanry cavalry, might, from their being so much more numerous, be made as important as the regular army for purposes of national defence, and at infinitely less cost. At all events, if this cannot be done, it is difficult to know where we are to look. There are still, however, the Volunteers, who form a third element in our defensive strength--as numerous on paper as the other two put together-and in the event of an invasion there seems to be no reason to doubt but that one-half of them would leave their homes and undertake to fight for the defence of their country. At present, however, they can only be considered as a body of gallant men armed with muskets. They have less of the organisation of an army than even the militia. Many regiments no doubt know a good deal of drill, but none know discipline; and their equipments for the field literally do not exist, nor could they be supplied without considerable delay. Their skill as marksmen would no doubt be of great importance when deployed as skirmishers; but it requires the strongest nerves and the coolest head to enable any one to avail himself of this proficiency in time of battle, and in the hurry-skurry of a fight. The same skill would render them still more formidable as Francs-tireurs in a second stage of the war, if we were eventually driven to such a mode of warfare. No nation, however, would probably resort. to guerilla warfare, with all its concomitant horrors, so long as it could hope to maintain independence by fair fighting. It may be, however, that even this may be forced upon us, and then the individual skill and pluck of our volunteers may be of the utmost service. But as neither the regular army nor the militia afford sufficient numbers to make up our line of battle on entering a campaign, it is necessary, in the first instance at least, to consider the volunteers as forming an indispensable part of our regular fighting power. The worst defect of the force is, however, that it has no artillery capable of accompanying it into the field, and without some new organisation it is difficult to see how that is to be supplied; but to send a force armed only with muskets, which are not effective beyond 750 yards, against an enemy possessing artillery which is effective at twice. that range, is simply to expose it to be butchered. It has been suggested, however, that the Volunteers might be supplied with 6 and 9-pounder Armstrong guns, with light carriages and limbers, such as are supplied to men-of-war, and, when landed, are dragged about with facility by ropes by the marines and sailors. The Gatling gun, too, throwing -lb. balls, is effective at 1500 yards, and, for field purposes at least, is superior to the mitrailleuse. The latter is merely mechanical infantry, firing the same class of ball, at the same range. What seems wanted here is something more powerful and of longer range, half-way, in fact, between the rifle and the more powerful regular horse-artillery gun. If twenty men were told off and drilled as a detachment to each of these guns or Gatlings, they would be amply sufficient to drag it and its ammunition about a field of battle and to keep up with any manoeuvres of the infantry to which they were attached. They could not, of course, be expected to drag it along the road on a march, but in this country horses could be found in every town or village or farm-house good enough for that purpose. As in no instance would the horses go into battle, neither they nor their driv ers would require any training. But, supposing every Volunteer battalion of say 1000 men had 800 armed with rifles and 200 told off to the service of ten such guns, a body of 50,000 men so equipped and accompanied by 500 such guns would be very difficult to push from any position that they took up, and would inflict very serious losses on any force of equal strength that ventured to attack them. If some such organisation as this, having wholly reference to defence, were seriously set about, and it was known that we could put 200,000 men, even if only one-third of them were regular soldiers, and with 1000 guns of different sorts, in position in front of London in a fortnight-which would imply very considerable reserves-most nations would think seriously before they attempted the invasion. The Volunteer movement had a wonderfully steadying effect on the French colonels who demanded to be led to London after the Orsini affair, and since that time our military spirit has not been spoken of so slightingly as before. This, however, was the spontaneous uprising of the people, unaided at the time and unencouraged by either the Government or Parliament; and unless Government will boldly take it up, and do what is requisite to amalgamate all these discordant elements into a whole, its component parts while separate must always remain comparatively useless and ineffective. Such an organisation of our defensive forces as we have attempted to describe, or something equivalent to it, is probably as much as even the most sanguine anticipate to realise from our efforts in this direction during the next few years. Even when accomplished, it must be borne in mind that the defensive army would be composed, though of excellent, still of very heterogeneous materials, and the different parts of it would never have had an opportunity of working in the field much less of fighting together before. After six weeks' campaigning the machine might get perfectly into working order, but in a first action two-thirds of the force would be still practically civilians who had never manoeuvred in front of an enemy or heard a shot fired in earnest. It is no slur either on their individual courage or coolness, if it is hinted that under such circumstances mistakes might occur which there might be no time to remedy, and even panic seize some detachments, which might result in disaster. But even if nothing of the sort occurred, it would at best be staking the existence of the nation on the result of a single general action fought in front of the capital. In the event of its being defeated there would be nothing left but for the defending army to retreat on the capital; and no one, it is presumed, would for one moment maintain that, as at present circumstanced, London either could or should be defended. It is situated in a hollow surrounded by heights, the possession of any one of which would expose whole districts to the artillery fire of the enemy; and the houses, especially on the outskirts of the town, are of the flimsiest and most combustible character, so as to render street fighting almost impossible. If any of the suburbs could be so defended as to allow the defeated army time to pass through with a chance of reforming on the north, it is as much as could possibly be done, and more, probably than it would be wise to attempt. If, however, we are the self-governing and patriotic people we suppose ourselves to be, the fall of the capital ought not to entail the surrender of the nation. The government of the country could as well be carried on | benefited by the change of locality, and by at Oxford or at Manchester, and each county the unlimited supply of skilled labour in the is a self-governing community which could iron trades which these districts afford. easily organise itself for defence, and would do so were it not that, by a strange fatality, we have managed to accumulate the whole of our war material and military stores in the capital. Woolwich is our only arsenal where guns or gun-carriages can be manufactured, and where ammunition can be prepared either for artillery or rifles. Enfield is the only place where small arms can be made, and Waltham our only powder mill; and all these places fall with the capital, while the Tower is our only storehouse for small arms and many of the minor munitions of war. If all these fall into the hands of the invader, the army in the field would be entirely dependent on the resources of private firms for the supply of arms and ammunition. As, however, the whole policy of the Government of late years has been to discourage private enterprise and to take the whole manufacturing departments into their own hands, no plant of machinery exists in the country sufficient to meet such an emergency without time for preparation, and unless it is met, the continuance of the struggle is hopeless. If the recommendation of the Commission of 1859-60, for the establishment of a central arsenal at Cannock Chase, had been carried into effect, the case would now have been widely different. The project at the time was warmly espoused by the late Lord Palmerston and adopted by the Cabinet of the day, and 150,000l. were year after year placed in the Estimates for the purchase of the site. No Ministér, however, ever had the courage to ask the House of Commons to vote the money, and at last, as mentioned above, it was withdrawn in order that the growing expense of our sea defences might be met, in part at least, without any considerable increase of the money authorised to be raised by loan. Had the site been purchased at the time, the small arms factory might have been established at Cannock instead of at Enfield, and the additions to the gun factories could have been erected there as cheaply as at Woolwich, and, with the addition of a small laboratory, the nucleus of a central arsenal might have been got together not only without additional expense (except the purchase of the land), but probably with considerable ultimate economy to the Government. At least, as all the private firms of ironmasters find it not only more convenient but cheaper to establish their works in the immediate proximity of the districts where the coal and minerals are found upon which they depend, it is clear that Government would be equally The reason why these recommendations have not been carried out are, however, un- . derstood to be much more departmental than economical, and are a part of our system of government which it will be very difficult to get over. It is an immense convenience to the authorities of the War Office and the Admiralty to have the manufacturing establishments so close to their offices. Either the officials can run down, or can summon their subordinates to attend at any hour, and so keep the management and control of the whole in an intelligible form. This is especially felt during the session of Parliament. No school-boy dreads more going up to the head master with an imperfectly prepared lesson than a Civilian Minister trembles at the idea of answering in the House of Commons an inquiry, on a military or naval question, the bearing of which he naturally only imperfectly understands. So soon as a question is put on the paper it is telegraphed to Woolwich or Enfield, and the proper officer summoned to attend on the next day, with the data requisite for an answer. All this could not be done, or, at all events, would be done with much more difficulty, from Cannock Chase than from Woolwich, and Ministers naturally shrink from a change which would expose them to the necessity of answering questions from their own personal knowledge, or would deprive them of the continual coaching of the heads of the manufacturing departments. If London were or could be fortified, the conditions of the problem would be reversed. There would be no difficulty in finding any number of men that might be required to man the ramparts, and this is just the duty for which citizen or civilian forces are best adapted. In earlier times, and especially during the middle ages, fortifications were used almost solely to enable untrained citizens to defend themselves against regular soldiers, though in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from causes too complex to enter on here, both the attack and defence of forts fell into the hands of the military. At the present day, when we are talking of armed nations as contradistinguished from regular armies, it seems likely that fortification will revert to its original use. The fact is, no manoeuvre of war is so easily or so quickly learnt, either by an educated man or a skilled mechanic, as the art of loading and pointing a gun through an embrasure, while the manoeuvring of field artillery is probably the most difficult, and requires longer and severer training than any other form of drill. The defence of forts, too, has another advantage in favour of improvised soldiers, that no sudden panic or no fit of insubordination, which all undisciplined troops are liable to, can be taken advantage of by the enemy. If terror seizes a garrison in consequence of some explosion or other unexpected event, and every man rushes from the ramparts and hides himself in the casemates, the besieging force may wonder why the fire of the fort has suddenly ceased; but there may be fifty reasons for this besides the true one, and the fit is over long before it is known to the enemy. In the open field the very reverse would be the case, and those sudden impulses are what is most to be dreaded with raw troops, where these mistakes may be fatal. As in most military matters, the First Napoleon appreciated this distinction with wonderful clearness. But how,' he says, is it possible to fortify places having a circuit of 12,000 to 15,000 toises? Such a place would require 80 to 100 fronts, a garrison of 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers, and from 800 to 1000 pieces of artillery on the ramparts. But 60,000 soldiers are an army; would it not be better to employ them in the field? This objection is continually urged against the fortification of large cities; but it is false, as it takes no account of the distinction between a man and a soldier. It would of course require 50,000 or 60,000 men to defend a great capital, but not 50,000 or 60,000 soldiers. When misfortunes and great calamities fall on a nation it may find itself without soldiers, but never without men sufficient for its internal defence. 50,000 men, of whom 2000 to 3000 are artillerymen, are sufficient to defend a capital, and to prevent the entry of 300,000 to 400,000 men; while these 50,000 men in the open country, if they are not disciplined soldiers and commanded by experienced officers, would be thrown into disorder and ridden over by a charge of 3000 cavalry.'* We need not point out how truly prophetic all this is of the state of affairs in Paris at the present moment, though it is strange to observe how enormously the scale of warlike operations has increased since even his day. Instead of 300,000 or 400,000 attacking a capital, practically a million of Germans are engaged in that and the indispensable subsidiary arrangements, and half a million, at least, are engaged in defending it, either behind the walls or in the field-the latter, however, most of them only raw recruits or untried levies. Had the Commentaires de Napoleon I.,' vol. i. P. 107. regular army of France been able to make good its retreat to Paris, its siege might have proved a task even beyond the strength of Germany. Had her capital not been fortified, France would have been at the mercy of the German armies after the fall of Sedan. As it is she has had time to make a heroic effort to beat back the invader, and whatever the result may be, its effect on the ultimate position of the country, after peace is made, cannot fail to be most beneficial to France. Had we been allowed such an opportunity, either it is that we have totally miscalculated the patriotism or power of organisation which we have assumed we possess, or we should have freed the country from any army that we can at present see would be likely to be landed on our shores. Eleven But can London be fortified? years ago an attempt was made in this Journal* to take stock of the various propositions that had then been put before the public in answer to this question, and none of them appeared to be satisfactory. In 1804 the problem might have been solvable owing to the comparatively restricted space then occupied by the capital and the lesser range of incendiary projectiles. In 1859 a circle of forts, 30 miles in extent, was deemed necessary, and since that time not only has the population increased immensely, but the area covered by inhabited houses has extended in a far greater ratio. The tendency of the population, both rich and poor, has been to get out of town as far as possible, and the railroads have afforded facilities for this in a manner quite unprecedented. Thirty miles were then thought sufficient for the extent of the circle of forts; now 40 or 45 would at least be required. It would be necessary to run a line of defences, tolerably thickly strewn, from Kingston-on-Thames, so as to cover the water-works, to beyond Woolwich, a distance of 22 miles, and though it might suffice to establish camps in some of the more important strategical points on the north, not less than 45 or 50 works would be required, and to garrison them efficiently not less than 150,000 to 200,000 men would suffice. If the army were unable to maintain itself in the field, there ought to be no difficulty on the score of men; the real difficulty is the expense. To purchase the quantity of land for the erection of the works so near the metropolis, and clearancerights over a zone sufficiently extensive to prevent buildings and obstructions growing up around them, would require a very large sum of money. The victualling, too, of London is another question that would re * Quarterly Review,' July, 1859. quire very careful consideration before it was ever determined to fortify it. Not only is it the largest city in the world, but it draws its supplies from a larger area, both by sea and by land, than any other city. It must also be borne in mind that we have no such control over the butchers and bakers and other tradesmen in London as is possessed by the municipal authorities in Paris, for instance, and other Continental cities; and, with our institutions, such an interference with free trade would be warmly resisted. It would consequently be almost impossible to establish such a control over our stores of provisions as to make them suffice for anything like the same proportionate time as could be done in most Continental cities, where all trades are, more or less, subjected to the control of the police. The supply of fuel, too, would be an enormous difficulty if the railways to the north were cut, and the navigation of the Thames stopped. On the other hand, however, it would be more difficult, owing to its extent, effectually to blockade London than any other city. Its circumference would be at least 45 miles, as compared with the 35 of the circuit of the forts of Paris, and 200,000 men certainly could not do it and keep up the necessary communication with the coast, nor probably 300,000. If an armed nation were poured into our island, as Germany has been into France, the struggle might be hopeless, and even the fortification of London insufficient to save us; but the question is certainly worth inquiring into, for such a fortification would be a shield over the heart of England that might render her invulnerable. No one can contemplate the enormous advantages the fortifications of Paris have given to the French in their present struggle without feeling how important such auxiliaries might be to us if in a similar situation. If Paris had not been fortified, as we have already said, nothing could have saved France from being overrun, while, whatever may be the result, these fortifications have given her a chance. On the one hand, had the Prussians suspected that Paris could or would have held out so long, they would have concluded a peace after Sedan. Neither they, however, nor indeed any of the leading men of the day quite appreciate the part which fortification may be made to play in future wars. On the other hand, the stupid pedantry of the military engineers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and on the other the brilliant strategy of the First Napoleon in our day, brought the art into disrepute. Its prestige was partly restored by the siege of Sebastopol. Had Bazaine not thrown himself with his whole army into Metz, it would neither have been bombarded nor taken to the present day, for it alone, of all the fortresses of France which have hitherto been taken, was provided with detached forts, the use of which is the most important discovery made in modern times in the art of fortification. Paris, too, is provided with them, though imperfectly, and to them and her rifled cannon she owes her power of resistance and her immunity from bombardment. Had she possessed only her enceinte without the advanced forts, or had the Prussian batteries been consequently able to get within range of the town, it probably would have been in ruins long ago. Still it is a question, and a very grave one, and one that was warmly debated when the fortification of Paris was determined upon, and more recently when it was proposed to fortify Antwerp, whether great populous cities ought to be fortified at all and their inhabitants exposed to the horrors of a siege. In the case of Antwerp it was contended that a fortified camp, à cheval,' on the river above the town, would be a stronger strategical position than a fortified city, containing a vast civil population and a number of very combustible buildings and stores. But against this it was argued that a merely military position must be kept stored and provisioned during peace, and that even with the utmost care stores and provisions will spoil, and their constant renewal involves enormous expense. Should this not be carefully attended to, there arises the danger to an army, when forced back into such a fortress, of finding that its commissariat has acted as such bodies have generally done in similar circumstances, and it has only insufficient or rotten stores with which to stand a siege. On the other hand, in such a town as Antwerp there are always large supplies of grain and groceries of all kinds and stores of provisions and forage kept continually renewed by the agency of commercial enterprise, without the expense of a penny to government, besides horses and furniture and fifty other requisites, all of which are at the disposal of a national army defending the town. Though it is true that the civil population must also be fed, it is easier to get rid of a considerable number of the non-effectives than suddenly to import provisions, while the able-bodied lation may all be turned to use in the event of a siege. If towns were merely to be enclosed by ramparts, however strong, as was the case with all the fortified places of the last century, these arguments would not stand examination for a moment; but it seems to be otherwise where the detached forts suffice to keep the besieger beyond bom popu |
