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the consciences of sovereigns,) not from their in- federacy of states, be strong enough to overwhelm ternal reasonableness or justice, for many of them the rest. The objects of just war, are, precaution, are perfectly arbitrary, nor yet from the authority defence, or reparation. In a larger sense, every by which they were established, for the greater just war is a defensive war, inasmuch as every part have grown insensibly into usage, without just war supposes an injury perpetrated, atany public compact, formal acknowledgment, or tempted, or feared. even known original; but simply from the fact of The insufficient causes or unjustifiable motheir being established, and the general duty of tives of war, are the family alliances, the personal conforming to established rules upon questions, friendships, or the personal quarrels, of princes; and between parties, where nothing but positive the internal disputes which are carried on in other regulations can prevent disputes, and where dis- nations; the justice of other wars; the extension putes are followed by such destructive conse- of territory, or of trade; the misfortunes or acci. quences. The first of the instances which we have dental weakness of a neighbouring or rival nation, just now enumerated, may be selected for the illus There are two lessons of rational and sober tration of this remark. The nations of Europe policy, which, if it were possible to inculcate them consider the sovereignty of newly-discovered coun- into the councils of princes, would exclude many tries as belonging to the prince or state whose of the motives of war, and allay that restless amsubject makes the discovery: and in pursuance of bition which is constantly stirring up one part of this rule, it is usual for a navigator, who falls upon mankind against another. an unknown shore, to take possession of it, in The first of these lessons admonishes princes the name of his sovereign at home, by erecting to "place their glory and thcir emulation, not in his standard, or displaying his flag upon a desert extent of territory, but in raising the greatest coast. Now nothing can be more fanciful, or less quantity of happiness out of a given territory. substantiated by any considerations of reason or l'he enlargement of territory by conquest is not justice, than the right which such discovery, or only not a just object of war, but in the greater part the transient occupation and idle ceremony that of the instances in which it is attempted, not even accompany it, confer upon the country of the dis- desirable. It is certainly not desirable where it coverer. Nor can any stipulation be produced, adds nothing to the numbers, the enjoyments, or by which the rest of the world have bound them- the security, of the conquerors. What comselves to submit to this pretension. Yet when we monly is gained to a nation, by the annexing of reflect that the claims to newly-discovered coun. new dependencies, or the subjugation of other tries can hardly be settled, between the different countries to its dominion, but a wider frontier to nations which frequent them, without some posi- defend; more interfering, claims to vindicate; tive rule or other; that such claims, if left un more quarrels, more enemies, more rebellions, to settled, would prove sources of ruinous and fatal encounter; a greater force to keep up by sea and contentions; that the rule already proposed, how- land; more services to provide for, and more ever arbitrary, possesses one principal quality of a establishments to pay? And, in order to draw rule, determination and certainty: above all, from these acquisitions something that may make that it is acquiesced in, and that no one has power up for the charge of keeping them, a revenue is to to substitute another, however he might con- be extorted, or a monopoly to be enforced and trive a better, in its place : when we reflect upon watched, at an expense which costs half their these properties of the rule, or rather upon these produce. Thus the provinces are oppressed, in consequences of rejecting its authority, we are led order to pay for being ill-governed; and the orito ascribe to it the virtue and obligation of a pre- ginal state is exhausted in maintaining a feeble cept of natural justice, because we perceive in it authority over discontented subjects. No assignthat which is the foundation of justice itself, - able portion of country is benefited by the change; public importance and utility. And a prince who and if the sovereign appear to himself to be en should dispute this rule, for the want of regularity riched or strengthened, when every part of his in its formation, or of intelligible justice in its dominion is made poorer and weaker than it was, principle, and by such disputes should disturb the it is probable that he is deceived by apppearances. tranquillity of nations, and at the same time lay Or were it true that the grandeur of the prince is the foundation of future disturbances, would be magnified by those exploits; the glory which is little less criminal than he who breaks the public purchased, and the ambition which is gratified, by peace, by a violation of engagements to which he the distress of one country without adding to the had himself consented, or by an attack upon those happiness of another, which at the same time national rights which are founded immediately in enslaves the new and impoverishes the ancient the law of nature, and in the first perceptions of part of the empire, by whatever names it may be equity. The same thing may be repeated of the known or flattered, ought to be an object of unirules which the law of nations prescribes in the versal execration ; and oftentimes not more so to other instances that were mentioned, namely, that the vanquished, than to the very people whose the obscurity of their origin, or the arbitrariness of armies or whose treasures have achieved the their principle, subtracts nothing from the respect victory. that is due to them, when once established. There are, indeed, two cases in which the ex
tension of territory may be of real advantage, and to both parties. The first is, where an empire
thereby reaches to the natural boundaries which War may be considered with a view to its divide it from the rest of the world. Thus we accauses and its conduct.
count the British Channel the natural boundary The justifying causes of war, are, deliberate which separates the nations of England and invasions of right, and the necessity of main- France; and if France possessed any countries on taining such a balance of power amongst neigh- this, or England any cities or provinces on that, During nations, as that no single state, or con- side of the sea, recovery of such towns and districts
to what may be called their natural sovereign, | suit of honour, when set loose from the admonitions though it may not be a just reason for commencing of prudence, becomes in kings a wild and romantic war, would be a proper use to make of victory. passion : eager to engage, and gathering fury in its The other case is, where neighbouring states, being progress, it is checked by no difficulties, repelled by severally too small and weak to defend themselves no dangers; it forgets or despises those considera against the dangers that surround them, can only tions of safety, ease, wealth, and plenty, which, in be safe by a strict and constant junction of their the eye of true public wisdom, compose the objects strength: here conquest will affect the purposes to which the renown of arms, the fame of victory, of confederation and alliance; and the union which are only instrumental and subordinate. The purit produces is often more close and permanent than suit of interest, on the other hand, is a sober princithat which results from voluntary association. ple; computes costs and consequences; is cautious Thus, if the heptarchy had continued in England, of entering into war; stops in time: when regulated the different kingdoms of it might have separately by those universal maxims of relative justice which fallen a prey to foreign invasion: and although belong to the affairs of communities as well as of the interest and danger of one part of the island private persons, it is the right principle for nations were in truth common to every other part, it might to proceed by: even when it trespasses upon these have been difficult to have circulated this persua- regulations, it is much less dangerous, because sion amongst independent nations, or to have much more temperate than the other. united them in any regular or steady opposition II. The conduct of war.-If the cause and end to their continental enemies, had not the valour of war be justifiable; all the means that appear and fortune of an enterprising prince incorporated necessary to the end, are justifiable also. This the whole into a single monarchy. Here, the con- is the principle which defends those extremities quered gained as much by the revolution, as the to which the violence of war usually proceeds : for conquerors. In like manner, and for the same since war is a contest by force between parties who reason, when the two royal families of Spain acknowledge no common superior, and since it were met together in one race of princes, and the includes not in its idea the supposition of any conseveral provinces of France had devolved into the vention which should place limits to the operapossession of a single sovereign, it became unsafe tions of force, it has naturally no boundary but for the inhabitants of Great Britain any longer to that in which force terminates,—the destruction remain under separate governments. The union of the life against which the force is directed. Let of England and Scotland, which transformed two it be observed, however, that the license of war auquarrelsome neighbours into one powerful empire, thorises no acts of hostility but what are necessary and which was tirst brought about by the course or conducive to the end and object of the war. of succession, and afterwards completed by amica-Gratuitous barbarities borrow no excuse from this ble convention, would have been a fortunate con plea: of which kind is every cruelty and every inclusion of hostilities, had it been effected by the sult that serves only to exasperate the sufferings, operations of war. These two cases being ad- or to incense the hatred, of an enemy, without mitted, namely, the obtaining of natural bounda- weakening his strength, or in any manner tending ries and barriers, and the including under the same to procure his submission; such as the slaughter government those who have a common danger of captives, the subjecting of them to indignities and a common enemy to guard against; I know or torture, the violation of women, the profanation not whether a third can be thought of, in which of temples, the demolition of public buildings, the extension of empire by conquest is useful even libraries, statues, and in general the destruction to the conquerors.
or defacing of works that conduce nothing to anThe second rule of prudence which ought to be noyance or defence. These enormities are prorecommended to those who conduct the affairs of hibited not only by the practice of civilized nations, nations, is, "never to pursue national honour as but by the law of nature itself; as having no proper distinct from national interest." This rule ac- tenden to accelerate the termination, or accomknowledges that it is often necessary to assert the plish the object of the war; and as containing that honour of a nation for the sake of its interest. The which in peace and war is equally unjustitiable, – spirit and courage of a people are supported by ultimate and gratuitous mischief." flattering their pride. Concessions which betray There are other restrictions imposed upon the too much of fear or weakness, though they relate conduct of war, not by the law of nature primarily, to points of mere ceremony, invite demands and but by the laws of war, first, and by the law of attaeks of more serious importance. Our rule nature as seconding and ratifying the lawsrt war. allows all this; and only directs that, when points The laws of war are part of the law of nations ; of honour become subjects of contention between and founded, as to their authority, upon the same sovereigns, or are likely to be made the occasion of principle with the rest of that code, namely, upon war, they be estimated with a reference to utility, the fact of their being established, no matter when and not by themselres. "The dignity of his crown, or by whom; upon the expectation of their being the honour of his flag, the glory of his arms," in mutually observed, in consequence of that estathe mouth of a prince, are stately and imposing blishment; and upon the general utility which terms; but the ideas they inspire, are insatiable. results from such observance. The binding force It may be always glorious to conquer, whatever of these rules is the greater, because the regard be the justice of the war, or the price of the vic- that is paid to them must be universal or none. tory. The dignity of a sovereign may not permit The breach of the rule can only be punished by the him to recede from claims of homage and respect, subversion of the rule itself: on which account, the at whatever expense of national peace and happi- whole mischief that ensues from the laws of thoso ness they are to be maintained ; however unjust salutary restrictions which such rules prescribe, is they may have been in their original, or in their justly chargeable upon the first agsressor. To continuance however useless to the possessor, or this consideration may be referred the duty of remortifying and vexatious to other states. The pur- fraining in war from poison and from assassina
tion. If the law of nature simply be consulted, excess of numbers, and a ready supply of recruits it may be difficult to distinguish between these may sustain a defensive or a flying war against and other methods of destruction, which are prac- regular troops: it is also true that any service, tised without scruple by nations at war. If it be which keeps soldiers for a while together, aná lawful to kill an enemy at all, it seems lawful to inures them by little and little to the habits of war do so by one mode of death as well as by another; and the dangers of action, transforms them in efby a dose of poison, as by the point of a sword; fect into a standing army. But upon this plan it by the hand of an assassin, as by the attack of an may be necessary for almost a whole nation to go army: for if it be said that one species of assault out to war to repel an invader; beside that a peoleaves to an enemy the power of defending itself ple so unprepared must always have the seat, and against it, and that the other two does not; it may with it the miseries, of war at home, being utterly be answered, that we possess at least the same right incapable of carrying their operations into a foreign to cut off an enemy's defence, that we have to seek country. his destruction. In this manner might the ques From the acknowledged superiority of standing tion be debated, if there existed no rule or law of armies, it follows, not only that it is unsafe for a war upon the subject. But when we observe that nation to disband its regular troops, whilst neighsuch practices are at present excluded by the usage bouring kingdoms retain theirs; but also that and opinions of civilized nations; that the first re- regular troops provide for the public service at the course to them would be followed by instant re- least possible expense. I suppose a certain quantaliation; that the mutual license which such tity of military strength to be necessary, and I say attempts must introduce, would fill both sides with that a standing army costs the community less the misery of continual dread and suspicion, with-than any other establishment which presents out adding to the strength or success of either; to an enemy the same force. The constant that when the example came to be more generally drudgery of low employments is not only incomimitated, which it soon would be, after the sentí- patible with any great degree of perfection or exment that condemns it had been once broken in pertness in the profession of a soldier, but the proupon, it would greatly aggravate the horrors and fession of a soldier almost always unfits men for calamities of war, yet procure no superiority to the business of regular occupations. Of three inany of the nations engaged in it; when we view habitants of a vilfage, it is better that one should these effects, we join in the public reprobation of addict himself entirely to arms, and the other two such fatal expedients, as of the admission amongst stay constantly at home to cultivate the ground, mankind of new and enormous evils without ne- than that all three should mix the avocations of a cessity or advantage.—The law of nature, we see camp, with the business of husbandry. By the at length, forbids these innovations, as so many former arrangement, the country gains one comtransgressions of a beneficial general rule actually plete soldier, and two industrious husbandmen; subsisting
from the latter it receives three raw militia-men, The license of war then acknowledges two limi- who are at the same time three idle and profligate tations: it authorises no hostilities which have not peasants. It should be considered also, that the an apparent tendency to effectuate the object of the emergencies of war wait not for seasons. Where war; it respects those positive laws which the there is no standing army ready for immediate custom of nations hath sanctified, and which service, it may be necessary to call the reaper from whilst they are mutually conformed to, mitigate the fields in harvest, or the ploughman in seed the calamities of war, without weakening its ope- time; and the provision of a whole year may rations, or diminishing the power or safety of perish by the interruption of one month's labour. belligerent states.
A standing army, therefore, is not only a more effectual, but a cheaper, method of providing for the public safety, than any other, because it adds
more than any other to the common strength, and Long and various experience seems to have takes less from that which composes the wealth of convinced the nations of Europe, that nothing a nation,-its stock of productive industry. but a standing army can oppose a standing army, There is yet another distinction between standwhere the numbers on each side bear any mode-ing armies and militias, which deserves a more atrate proportion to one another. The first stand- tentive consideration than any that has been ing army that appeared in Europe after the fall of mentioned. When the state relies, for its defence, the Roman legion, was that which was erected in upon a militia, it is necessary that arms be put France, by Charles VII. about the middle of the into the hands of the people at large. The mififteenth century: and that the institution hath litia itself must be numerous, in proportion to the since become general, can only be attributed to the want or inferiority of its discipline, and the imbesuperiority and success which are every where ob- cilities or defects of its constitution. Moreover, as served to attend it. The truth is, the closeness, such a militia must be supplied by rotation, allotregularity, and quickness, of their movements; the ment, or some mode of succession whereby they unreserved, instantaneous, and almost mechanical, who have served a certain time are replaced by obedience to orders; the sense of personal honour, fresh drafts from the country; a much greater and the familiarity with danger, which belong to number will be instructed in the use of arms, and a disciplined, veteran, and embodied soldiery, give will have been occasionally embodied together, such firmness and intrepidity to their approach, than are actually employed, or than are supposed such weight and execution to their attack, as are to be wanted, at the same time. Now what not to be withstood by loose ranks of occasional and effects upon the civil condition of the country may newly-levied troops, who are liable by their inex- be looked for from this general diffusion of the perience to disorder and confusion, and in whom military character, becomes an inquiry of great fear is constantly augmented by novelty and sur- importance and delicacy. To me it appears doubtprise. It is possible that a militia, with a great ful whether any government can be long secure,
where the people are acquainted with the use of ours, if the direction and officering of the army ames, and accustomed to resort to them. Every were placed in the hands of the democratic part of faction will find itself at the head of an army; the constitution, this power, added to what they every disgust will excite commotion, and every already possess, would so overbalance all that commotion become a civil war. Nothing, perhaps, would be left of regal prerogative, that little would can govern a nation of armed citizens but that remain of monarchy in the constitution, but the which governs an army,—despotism. I do not name and expense; nor would these probably mean that a regular government would become remain long, despotic by training up its subjects to the know Whilst we describe, however, the advantages of ledge and exercise of arms, but that it would ere standing armies, we must not conceal the danger. long be forced to give way to despotism in some These properties of their constitution,--the solother shape; and that the country would be liable diery being separated in a great degree from the to what is even worse than a settled and constitu- rest of the community, their being closely linked tional despotism—to perpetual rebellions, and to amongst themselves by habits of society and subperpetual revolutions; to short and violent usur-ordination, and the dependency of the whole pations; to the successive tyranny of governors, chain upon the will and favour of the prince, – rendered cruel and jealous by the danger and in- however essential they may be to the purposes for stability of their situation.
which armies are kept up, give them an aspect in The same purposes of strength and efficacy no wise favourable to public liberty. The danger, which make a standing army necessary at all, however, is diminished, by maintaining, on all make it necessary in mixed governments, that occasions, as much alliance of interest, and as this army be submitted to the management and much intercourse of sentiment, between the milidirection of the prince : for however well a popular tary part of the nation and the other orders of the council may be qualified for the offices of legisla- people, as are consistent with the union and distion, it is altogether unfit for the conduct of war : cipline of an army. For which purpose, officers in which, success usually depends upon vigour of the army, upon whose disposition towards tho and enterprise ; upon secrecy, dispatch, and una- commonwealth a great deal may depend, should nimity ; upon a quick perception of opportunities, be taken from the principal families of the country, and the power of seizing every opportunity and at the same time also be encouraged to estaimmediately. It is likewise necessary that the blish in it families of their own, as well as be adobedience of an army be as prompt and active as mitted to seats in the senate, to hereditary distincpossible ; for which reason ought to be made an tions, and to all the civil honours and privileges obedience of will and emulation. Upon this con- that are compatible with their profession: which sideration is founded the expediency of leaving to circumstances of connexion and situation will give the prince not only the government and destina- them such a share in the general rights of the tion of the army, but the appointment and pro- people, and so engage their inclinations on the motion of its officers: because a design is then side of public liberty, as to afford a reasonable sealone likely to be executed with zeal and fidelity curity that they cannot be brought, by any promises when the person who issues the order, chooses of personal aggrandizement, to assist, in the exethe instruments, and rewards the service. To cution of measures which might enslave their which we may subjoin, that, in governments like posterity, their kindred, and their country.
THE SCRIPTURE HISTORY OF ST. PAUL EVINCED.
TO THE RIGHT REVEREND JOHN LAW, D. D.
LORD BISHOP OF KILL ALA AND ACHONRY, As a testimony of esteem for his virtues and learning, and of gratitude for the long and faithful friendship with which the Author has been honoured by him, this attempt to confirm the Eridence of the Christian History is inscribed, by his affectionate and most obliged Servant,
W. PALE Y.
3. The history and letters may have been Exposition of the Argument.
founded upon some authority common to both; as
upon reports and traditions which prevailed in the The volume of Christian Scriptures contains age in which they were composed, or upon some thirteen letters purporting to be written by St ancient record now lost, which both writers conPaul : it contains also a book, which, amongst sulted; in which case also, the letters, without other things, professes to deliver the history, or ra- being genuine, may exhibit marks of conformity ther memoirs of the history, of this same person with the history; and the history, without being By assuming the genuineness of the letters, we true, may agree with the letters. may prove the substantial truth of the history: or, Agreement, therefore, or conformity, is only to by assuming the truth of the history, we may ar-be relied upon so far as we can exclude these gue strongly in support of the genuineness of the several suppositions. Now the point to be noticed Petters . But I assume neither one nor the other. is
, that in the three cases above enumerated, conThe reader is at liberty to suppose these writings formity must be the effect of design. Where the to have been lately discovered in the library of the history is compiled from the letters, which is the Escurial, and to come to our hands destitute of any first case, the design and composition of the work extrinsic or collateral evidence whatever; and the are in general so confessed, or made so evident by argument I am about to offer is calculated to show, comparison, as to leave us in no danger of conthat a comparison of the different writings would, founding the production with original history, or even under these circumstances, afford good rea- of mistaking it for an independent authority. The son to believe the persons and transactions to have agreement, it is probable, will be close and uniform, been real, the letters authentic, and the narration and will easily be perceived to result from the inin the main to be true.
tention of the author, and from the plan and conAgreement or conformity between letters bear- duct of his work.- Where the letters are fabriing the name of an ancient author, and a received cated from the history, which is the second case, history of that author's life, does not necessarily it is always for the purpose of imposing a forgery establish the credit of either; because,
upon the public; and in order to give colour and 1. The history may, like Middleton's Life of probability to the fraud, names, places, and cirCicero, or Jortin's Life of Erasmus, have been cumstances, found in the history, may be stuwholly, or in part, compiled from the letters; in diously introduced into the letters, as well as a genwhich case it is manifest that the history adds no eral consistency be endeavoured to be maintained. thing to the evidence already afforded by the let- But here it is manifest that whatever congruity ters; or,
appears, is the consequence of meditation, artifice, 2. The letters may have been fabricated out of and design. The third case is that wherein the the history; a species of imposture which is cer- history and the letters, without any direct privity tainly practicable; and which, without any acces- or communication with each other, derive their şion of proof or authority, would necessarily pro materials from the same source; and, by reason duce the appearance of consistency and agree of their cominon original, furnish instances of acment; or,
cordance and correspondency. This is a situation