frequently as to be waste and unprofitable for use; but the title of the grantee will advance or recede as the line of storm-tide changes from time to time. The Camden and Atlantic Land Company, being the owner of a tract of land bounded on the Atlantic ocean, in 1856 made conveyance to M. of a lot by boundaries extending to storm-tide mark of the Atlantic ocean,' and "thence along said storm-tide mark." After 1856, a large accretion of land occurred in front of the said lot by alluvial deposits, and the line of ordinary highwater mark and also the line of storm-tides were by the accretion carried out a considerable distance further than they were when the deed was made. Held, that the title of M. and those who succeeded to his estate was not restricted to the storm-tide line as it was in 1856, but that it extended to the line of storm-tides as that line was carried out by the alluvial increase. If the words of a grant be ambiguous, the court will call in aid the acts done under it as a clue to the intention of the parties. Tyler on Bound. 124; Adams v. Frothingham, 3 Mass. 362; Stone v. Clark, 1 Metc. 378; Lovejoy v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270: Livingston v. Ten Broeck, 16 Johns. 14--23; Dunn v. English,3 Zab. 126; Jackson v. Perrine, 6 Vroom, 137; 1 Greenlf. Ev., § 293. Camden & Atlantic Land Co. v. Lippincott. Opinion by Depue, J. CONTRACT-EXECUTORY-NOT BARGAIN AND SALE. An agreement for the sale of goods in the following form: "The party of the first part agrees to sell to the party of the second part all the material used in making barrels, at the actual cost price of the same, now in store. The party of the second part agrees to take and use the same as fast as the sugar-house requires the barrels, and to pay for the same in notes, with interest added, running two months from the date of the same, settlements to be made semimonthly." Held to be an executory contract, and not a bargain and sale. The rule that the contract of sale passes the property immediately, before change of possession or payment, so far as the duties and obligations of the vendee are concerned, at least, seems to be well settled. Benj. on Sales, § 318. An agreement for the present sale of specific chattels, without payment or delivery, casts on the buyer the risk of loss. The law fixes the risk where the title resides. Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291; Leonard v. Davis, 1 Black. 476; Bessell v. Balcom, 39 N. Y. 275. The sale of all the vendor's material for making barrels then in store was a sufficient specification of the property to appropriate it to the contract. It was not like a sale of a part out of a bulk. And the price to be paid is sufficiently certain, being ascertainable by reference to an existing fact-their cost. The whole agreement however must be construed together, and the latter clause, which provides that the party of the second part is to take and use the material as fast as the sugar-house requires the barrels, and to pay for the same, etc., is an essential qualification of the first part of the contract, which if standing alone, would import an absolute sale. Brock v. O'Donnell. Opinion by Kuapp, J. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-POWER OF ASSESSMENTBENEFITS. (1) Unless restrained by express words, the authority to impose special assessments for muni cipal improvements is a continuing power. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp., $$ 686, 780; Green v. Hotaling, 15 Vroom, 347. (2) A sewer in the city of Hoboken, for which an assessment had been levied, by reason of the uneven sinking of newly-made land, ceased to conduct sewage toward its outlet, but allowed its contents to flow out upon low lands and become a nuisance. Held, that an assessment for a new sewer to do the work which the old one was intended to do was legal. (3) No person whose lands are not so placed as to permit of a present connection with the sewer can be assessed for benefits. State v. Elizabeth, 11 Vroom, 274. McKevitt v. Hoboken. Opinion by Reed, J. MISSOURI SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.* - NEGLIGENCE-TRAIN NOT STOPPING AT WAY-STAdefendant's road, was told by the ticket agent to take TION. A passenger buying a ticket to D. station on a particular train. She did accordingly. The train proved to be an express, not allowed by the regula tions of the company to stop at D., but she did not know this until informed of it by the conductor after the train had started. She told him of the direction the agent had given her, and insisted on being let off at D. He took up her ticket, but refused to stop at D., and took her to the next stopping place beyond. In an action against the company, held, that the plaintiff ought to have counted on the negligent misdirection of the ticket agent, and not on the refusal of the conductor to stop, for he could not have done otherwise. Marshall v. Railroad Company. Opinion by Hough, C. J. PARTNERSHIP-NOTE MADE IN FIRM NAME.-Money was borrowed on the credit of a firm and used for the the partners was given for it, and by mistake of the purposes of the firm, but the individual note of one of lender was accepted. Afterward when the mistake was discovered, the lender demanded and received from that partner the note of the firm in lieu of his own note. Held, that this was not the giving of a partnership note for an individual debt, and that the latter note was binding on the firm. Distinguishing Farmers' Bank v. Bayless, 35 Mo. 423. Meader v. Malcolm. Opinion by Norton, J. JUDGMENT-APPEAL-ABATEMENT OF ACTION.-(1) The perfecting of an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace divests the judgment of its legal effect, and if the case be one in which the cause of action does not survive, upon the death of the party before the entering of a lawful judgment in the appellate court, the action will abate. Turner v. Northcut, 9 Mo. 252. (2) A prosecution for violation of a city ordinance abates upon the death of the defendant. State v. Perrine, 56 Mo. 602; Kansas City v. Clark, 68 id. 588. Town of Carrallton v. Rhomberg. Opinion by Martin, Comr. (As to first point see ante, p. 57.ED.) PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. MARRIAGE HUSBAND AND WIFE CARRYING ON BUSINESS-ONE DYING-GIFT-TITLE TO FUND IN SAV INGS BANK. The earnings of a wife belong to her husband, save in those exceptional cases specified by acts of Assembly. Such earnings do not therefore belong to the wife unless the husband has made a gift of them to her. A widow, carrying on a butchering business in premises belonging to her late husband, married again. Husband and wife continued to carry on the business, in which the husband was not versed. It was chiefly through her skill, industry and economy that profits were realized. A portion of those profits were put aside in a savings fund in the wife's name, but there was no evidence to show that the husband knew of the existence of such deposit. Immediately after book, and declared that the money was or ought to be the wife's death the husband inquired for the deposit his. On the settlement of the account of the wife's *Appearing in 78 Missouri Reports. administrator: Held, that the profits of the business all belonged primarily to the husband; that there was no sufficient evidence to show that he had made a gift of them to his wife, and that the husband was enti tled to the sum in question accordingly. That the mere possession of money by the wife is not sufficient evidence of her ownership was settled by Parvin v. Capewell, 9 Wr. 89, where it was said: "A mere gift of money to a wife is not a settlement of it as her separate estate, for it may be for safe-keeping and deposit, without any intention to divest the husband's title. And her possession of funds ordinarily implies no more than that she is holding them for her husband." This is settled law, and is peculiarly applicable to this case. There is not a scintilla of proof of any intention of the appellant to make a gift of this money; nothing can be implied from the facts beyond the mere custody thereof on the part of the wife. The cases cited by the learned judge do not sustain his conclusions. Herr's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 494, was a case in which there was strong evidence of a gift, and this court said: "But such gift must be established by clear and convincing proof, not only of the act of donation and delivery, but of her separate custody of it." The same doctrine is held in Tripner v. Abrahams, 11 Wr. 220. In Bachman v. Killinger, 5 P. F. Smith, 414, it was held that the possession by the wife of the husband's moneys, security and property is very slight evidence of the transfer of the ownership, and his possession of her chattels ought to be considered still less evidence of title in him. In Crawford's Appeal, 11 P. F. Smith, 52, the husband informed his wife that he had added $3,000 to her money; he directed his clerk to credit her in his books with the $3,000 as cash received from her, and it was done. He credited her regularly with the interest of that sum in connection with the other sums belonging to her until his death. Held, that this was an executed gift followed by an express trust for his wife, and payable to her from his estate, but that it could not be supported as a debt. In addition it appeared that the husband had that amount of his wife's money in his possession. Here there was a plain intent to make a gift, followed by a positive unequivocal act. But where there is a mere permissive act, such as to allow the wife to be a custodian of his money, I know of no case in which it has been held that a gift can be implied from such act. McDermott's Appeal. Opinion by Paxson, J. [Decided April 28, 1884.] -CREDITORS WILLdied, leaving a wife and son. By his will he devised his real estate to his wife. The real estate was incumbered by a judgment against A. and by debts of A., which upon his death became liens against it. Subsequently the wife died, also indebted. The real estate being sold under order of court for payment of her debts: Held, that the son was entitled to claim the $300 exemption out of the proceeds in priority to the claims of his mother's creditors, but that his father's creditors must be satisfied in full before he could claim such exemption. Interest could not be recovered upon the judgment against A. after the confirmation of the sale in the above case. King's Appeal, 3 Norris, 345; Himes' Appeal, 13 id. 381, distinguished. Wauger's Appeal. Opinion per Curiam. EXEMPTION INTEREST.-A. [Decided Feb. 25, 1884.] WILL-"CHILDREN"-CONSTRUCTION.-When a parent or ancestor, in designating the object of her bounty, speaks of "the children," the more reasonable construction is that children in being, or those likely to be born of an existing marriage, were intended, rather than those who at some remote and indefinite future time might possibly be born of a marriage neither existing nor in contemplation. A testa trix devised certain real estate to her daughtor A. for life, and at her death to A.'s daughter B. in fee simple; and in case of B.'s death "then to be divided amongst the children." A was enceinte at the time of the will, and testatrix knew it. B. was not married until long after the testatrix's death, and then died before A. Held, upon A.'s death that the expression "the children" in the will must be taken to refer to A.'s children, and not to B.'s, and that the former were therefore entitled to the real estate. The inquiry now is, what was the intent of the testatrix? That intent gathered from the whole will furnishes the cardinal rule of construction. When it is not inconsistent with cstablished rules of law, and manifested with sufficient certainty, it must govern. Middleswarth's Admr. v. Blackmore, 24 P. F. Smith, 414; Schott's Estate, 28 id. 40; Reck's Appeal, id. 432. Facts existing and known to the testatrix at the time she executed the will, furnish strong aid in arriving at her intention. When a parent or ancestor in disposing of property, and in designating the objects of her bounty, speaks of "the children," we think it more reasonable to assume that she intended those in being, or those likely to be born of an existing marriage, rather than those who at some remote and indefinite time in the future might possibly be born of a marriage neither existing not contemplated. As then a fair and reasonable intent can be given to the language of the will by applying it to the children nearer to the testatrix, we cannot so construe it as to disinherit them and carry the property to those more remote, and who we think did not enter into the thought of the testatrix. Webb v. Hitchins. Opinion by Mercur, C. J. [Decided March 17, 1884.] IOWA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. JUDICIAL SALE-VOID-GETTING TITLE AT SUBSEQUENT SALE.-A person who is not in possession of real estate, but who claims title thereto under a void tax deed, can become a purchaser at a subsequent tax sale, and claim title by virtue of his purchase. This question was determined adversely to appellant in Mallory v. French, 44 Iowa, 133, which is in accord with Coxe v. Gibson, 27 Penn. St. 165; Bowman v. Corkrill, 6 Kan. 331; and Blackwood v. Van Vleit, 30 Mich. 119. Neal v. Frazier. Opinion by Seevers, J. [Decided April 25, 1884.] COUNTY-CLAIM AGAINST ACCEPTING PART, NO SUIT FOR BALANCE.-Where a claim against a county is presented to the board of supervisors, and they allow a part of it and reject the rest, a claimant accepting the portion allowed, knowing that the rest has been rejected, cannot recover in an action for the portion rejected. Wapello Co. v. Sinnaman, 1 G. Greene, 413. That was a case where a claim was presented against the county, and part of it was allowed and the balance rejected. The court said: "If the plaintiff in this case presented his claim for allowance, and it was in part allowed by the board, and he accepted the amount thus allowed, he should not be permitted to afterward sue for the balance. The acceptance of the part allowed should be considered satisfaction for the whole." It is contended however that a different rule was announced in Fulton v. Monona Co., 47 Iowa, 622. In that case it was not shown that the claimant received the part allowed on the claim with knowledge that the balance had been rejected, and the case is made to him upon this fact. The case is in no manner in conflict with Wapello Co. v. Sinuaman. It is claimed however that the defendant was bound to pay the full amount of the claim, because it had been approved by the board of health. But having held that 1 the plaintiff, by accepting the amount allowed him by ALABAMA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. DISCRETION. -- 2 COSTS-DISMISSAL OF SUIT- Whenever an actor or plaintiff declines to proceed further and dismisses his own suit, he thereby takes on himself the costs he has caused to be incurred. Dan. Ch. Pra., star page, 1376 et seq.; Beames ou Costs (22 law lib.), star page 228; Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. 12, 41; Brooks v. Byam, 2 Sto. Rep. 553; Eastburn v. Kirk, 2 Johns. Ch. 317; Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 259; Due v. Pidcock, 7 Halst. 363; Bruce v. Gale, 2 Beasly (N. J. Ch.), 211; Moses v. Dade, 58 Ala. 211; Wykam v. Wykam, 18 Ves. 395, 423. The present case is presented in a different aspect. After the original bill and the original answers were filed, the defendants purchased their peace, or purchased the complainant's cause of action. One term of the contract was that complainant was to dismiss his suit. This he failed to do, and defendants were forced to set up the release in bar of the further prosecution of the suit. They did this in an amended answer. They probably should have raised it by cross bill; but no objection was made to the form of its presentation. Moses v. Dade, 58 Ala. 211; Jones v. Clark (in MS.), Ala. Being raised by the pleadings and the case going off on that defense, the exercise of the judicial function was necessarily called into requisition. This case is therefore brought directly within the rule which allows to the chancellor a discretion in the imposition of costs; a discretion which we cannot revise. Allen v. Lewis. Opinion by Stone, J. [Decided Jan., 1884.] CRIMINAL LAW. FLIGHT Flight from a charge of crime raises a presumption of guilt; but this presumption may be modified or overthrown by evidence showing that the flight was occasioned by other causes than consciousness of guilt, and when there is such evidence the jury should be directed to consider it and determine how far it tends to rebut the presumption. State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475; State v. Williams, 54 id. 170; State v. Mallon, 75 id. 355. Sup. Ct., Mo. State v. King. Opinion by Hough, C. J. (78 Mo. 555.) [See 7 Am. Rep. 592; 35 id. 69; 119 Mass. 312; 56 Ga. 113. Must be actual, not constructive. 8 Phila. 606.--ED.] PRESUMPTION OF GUILT ARISING FROM. As a INTENT-KNOWLEDGE-CHARGE ERRONEOUS.-On an indictment for selling cattle, knowing them to be under quarantine, evidence was given on the trial of facts tending to create a belief in the mind of defendant that the quarantine had been removed when the sale was made. It was held error in the court to refuse on request to charge for an acquittal if the jury found that the defendant did so believe in those facts. general rule intent and knowledge is of the very essence of crime, and wherever a statute makes a guilty knowledge part of the definition of an offense, knowledge is a material fact to be averred and proved. Rex v. Jukes, 8 T. R.536. And the burden of proof, which in such case does not shift, is cast upon the State. 1 Lead. Cr. Cas. 553. The sale of cattle is in itself an innocent, CORRESPONDENCE. MR. MILLER ON MR. FOWLER'S PAMPHLET. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Will you allow me through the JOURNAL to say a few words on the one sentence of Mr. Fowler's learned and enthusiastic essay on "Codification in the State of New York," which appears to me to bear upon the practical question of the adoption of Mr. Field's Civil Code? On page 66, Mr. Fowler declares that " a poor Code is better than no Code." His idea of a Code may be gathered from what he says on page 16. "A true statement of codification is concerned only with those larger principles indicated; those which have the force of law universally, or independently of the peculiar group of facts to which they have been applied." Is it not conceivable that these "larger principles" should be stated in a statute so imperfectly, that our legal system would be thereby injured, instead of benefited? We all know what work our Legislature makes with very simple principles; by calling a statute a "Code" we cannot secure it any especial immunity, although Mr. Fowler appears to think so. He says on page 52: "But this may safely be claimed for codification. It will tend to certainty in legal administration; it will enable us to remove the enormities of the case law; it will render the frame-work of the law accessible to the unlearned, and mainly it will afford more exact bases for forensic discussion. It will also introduce simpler methods of logic. * * * Another merit may be and is claimed for codification, that it will ultimately necessitate a higher type of legislative activity." Will any statute, no matter how "poor," if called a "Code," necessarily produce any or all of these results? If not, can any one favor Mr. Field's Code, without having convinced himself by an examination that it is not a "poor" Code? That examination is all that the opponents of the Code ask for. But it should be made, not as though a digest were being examined, by taking one or two sections and ascertaining their agreement with the authorities, but by an examination of the whole work and by a comparison of the different parts, so as to ascertain how it will stand the strain which will be put upon it, after it becomes a statute, when immense interests may depend upon the interpretation of any sentence and when every other section will be ransacked to find aid for the various interpretations. Every lawyer of whom I happen to know that he has personally examined this Code thoroughly, agrees with the opinion expressed in my pamphlet of 1882, that is "poor" beyond amendment; and the object of this letter is to emphasize the fact that whatever opinion lawyers may hold on the subject of codification in general, no one should advocate this Code without having examined it thoroughly, and examined it as a statute. THE American Law Review for July-August con Gwful act. The statutory offense is selling in violationtains the following leading articles: A short his of a known interdict. When the case shows that a defendant, on fair and just grounds, believed the legal impediment to be out of the way, guilty knowledge is disproved and a defense is made. Sup. Ct., N J. Hess v. State. Opinion by Knapp, J. (16 Vroom, 445.) [Where intent is an essential element to constitute a crime the defendant may testify as to it. 60 N. Y. 221; 18 Am. Rep. 158.-ED.] tory of the Supreme Court (England) and its procedure, by T. W. Tempany; Injunction against Criminal Acts, by Seymour D. Thompson; Liability of Employer, for wrongful acts of persons serving him in the course of an independent employment, by H. A. Har man. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1884. CURRENT TOPICS. of eating up the oysters whom they had invited to walk, in the immortal verses in "Alice in Wonderland"- a delicious bit of nonsense which every well-educated lawyer should read at once if he has not already done so. - We feel relieved. We have found out the cause of that earthquake the other day. It was the WE have received from Mr. Simon Sterne, and sensation" created by her blessed majesty, the have perused with pleasure and instruction, the paper which he read at the late meeting of the American Bar Association, on Prevention of Defective and Slipshod Legislation. It is an exceedingly able and suggestive production, and was eminently worthy of the discussion which it elicited, and of the reference made of it to the committee on jurisprudence and law reform. We shall give the paper in full week after next, and we hope our State Bar Association will pay heed to its lessons. The reader will find in it an excellent account of the English methods of legislation, which will probably be novel to most of them, and some pregnant comparisons between those methods and our own. This is a most vital topic, and Mr. Sterne has struck it vig- | orously. Perhaps we should not quite agree with him about bi-ennial sessions; that is to say, while we might agree that the reason generally given for them is unsound, yet really there may not be in most States any need of more frequent sessions. We might, perhaps, also consider some of Mr. Sterne's analogies a little out of parallel. We are much impressed by his idea that there is less legislative corruption than there seems, and that most of the attempted corruption reaches not beyond the lobby. Unquestionably, many a good legislator's vote is supposed by promoters or opponents of bills to be bought and sold, without his ever hearing of such a transaction, or even being approached. We would fain believe in Mr. Sterne's theory on this point. We commend his suggestions to our senators, some of whom we know to be genuinely interested in the idea of improving and regenerating our legislative methods and practices. queen's proclamation, "that in all times hereafter the judges of county courts in England and Wales shall be called, known and addressed by the style and title of "His Honour" prefixed to the word "Judge" before their respective names, and shall have "Rank and Precedence next after Knights Bachelors." We hope Henry, Duke of Norfolk, will see to this at once, as the queen commands him. In a Such privileges as the above ought to compensate for some pecuniary disadvantages of the legal profession in England, as for example, the inability of a barrister to compel payment of his fees. recent case the Master of the Rolls said that any agreement as to fees between solicitor and barrister was wholly unprofessional, and equally dishonorable to both parties." The barrister's only safety is in exacting his fees beforehand, and this seems to us an unreasonable requirement. It seems to us a great deal better to let every barrister be his own attorney and solicitor, if he wishes, as is the custom among us. This seems to us as little demoralizing as all this business of retainers, reminders, refreshers, etc. In a notice of Dr. Wharton's "Commentaries on American Law," the London Law Times remarks: "It is a curious point that while the judgment of the Supreme Court of the, United States as to the constitutionality of any given proceeding is decisive as to the case in litigation, neither the executive nor the legislature are concluded thereby from acting directly in the teeth of the court's decision. And we may here note that a description of the executive as he' reads extremely oddly. The striking point about the whole is the excessive deliberation with which over-hasty legislation is guarded against, and the very careful provision made by the various amendments to the Constitution of the United States for the overruling of any legislation, either by Congress or by the several States, oppressive in its character to individuals or classes. And this brings us to a notable decision under the fourteenth amendment, in Kinney's case, 30 Gratt. 858, in which it was held that a State law forbidding marriage between whites and persons of African descent does not discriminate against the latter, because the prohibition applies to both cases alike. Similarly it has been held in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S. 583, that affixing a greater punishment to adultery between a negro and a white than is imposed on adulterers of the same race does not discriminate against persons but against the offense. Logically, it may be allowed, these rulings are defensible, but it is not a little amazing that Dr. Wharton records these decisions without a word of disapproval, and even seems disposed to defend them." It is curious how incapable the English seem to be of comprehending our Federal system and laws. We regret the necessity of dividing Mr. Courtlandt Parker's address, the first installment of which we give this week, but we judged it better to divide it than to give up a whole number to it. It is an important paper, and as it comes but once a year we do not grudge the space. Its history of New Jersey railway taxation is very interesting. of upsetting the testament, and invoked to his aid the old familiar friend of lawyers-"mental incapacity." He filed a bill in Chancery, and by consent an issue devisavit vel non was sent down for trial, and came on for hearing before Cresswell, J., and a special jury at Stafford Assizes on Saturday, March 15, 1856. For the widow, plaintiff on the issue, Sir F. Thesiger, afterward Lord Chancellor Chelmsford, was specially retained to lead, and on the other side appeared the famous Chief Justice Cockburn, then attorney-general. On the first day's hearing the ladies who had written the letters after the son's death were called, and in cross-examination admitted their previous statements as to the old man's incapacity to recognize his loss, he having actually stated to one of them that the person dead was Mrs. Swinfen. A LEGAL ROMANCE, OR THE SWINFEN Other damaging points also were made against the CASES. will, and Thesiger was so impressed that he sent for the widow to his lodgings, and strongly urged OME thirty years ago there dwelt in Stafford- her to leave the matter in his hands to settle as best gentleman judge privately inti mated to Thesiger his opinion that the case was going against him, and Thesiger led the widow to understand that the defendant offered to settle on her an annuity of £1,000 if she would give up the estate. This, with that courage and pertinacity she showed from beginning to end of the litigation, she absolutely refused. She was ultimately prevailed upon to take the night to think the matter over, but next morning saw no change in her determination, and she telegraphed to Thesiger "offer refused." We may judge then her astonishment, when on arriving at court on Monday morning, she was met by her counsel leaving the court room, and coolly informed that he had done the best he could for her, and had settled the matter on the terms originally proposed. Sir H. Burrard was with her, and demanded of Thesiger by whose authority he had acted. "By yours," replied Thesiger. "The deuce you did!" exclaimed Sir Harry. Thesiger, however, marched off, and the widow was left to digest the situation as best she could. Swinfen, the possessor of an estate valued at between £60,000 and £70,000. He had inherited his property somewhat unexpectedly, and was accus tomed to complain of the ruinous condition in which he found it, the Manor House, Swinfen Hall, being so dilapidated as to be almost uninhabitable, and the most valuable article therein being, as he averred, a half barrel of sour beer in the cellar. This state of things he ascribed to the extravagance of his predecessor in the title, and for many years he and his wife passed a secluded life in two rooms of the old mansion on her death in 1848, however, he invited his only son, H. I. Swinfen, to take up his abode with him. This the younger man did, bringing with him his wife, with whom he had contracted a romantic marriage against his father's approval. The old sore was healed, and a complete reconciliation took place. The son set about improving the estate, with marked success, and all went well till the latter's sudden death in 1854. The father was now eighty years of age, and in a state of physical, and as it was then thought, mental paralysis. In fact, friends of the family, writ ing in the widow's behalf in answer to letters of condolence, stated that "old Mr. Swinfen was happily spared the shock, being incapable of understand-occasion like Maria Theresa, and abandoned by all ing the loss he had sustained." Under these circumstances the widow, who, let us state at once, is the heroine of our tale, actually took some steps to test his sanity, but the doctors differing, nothing was done. But if the heir had a verdict, the widow had possession, and to possession she clung. From the beginning she had asserted that she would stand or fall by the will, and at this crisis she rose to the she quietly returned to the Hall, and awaited events. Speedily possession was demanded and refused. The heir's next step was to take a rule nisi for attachment against her. This was quashed on the ground of insufficient proof of disobedience (Swinfen v. Swinfen, L. J. R. 25, C. P. 303), but the court consisting of Cresswell, Williams and Willes all seemed to agree that the compromise was binding. The old gentleman, in fact, was not insane. He knew that in default of a will the estate would pass to the heir-at-law and representative of his predecessor, Captain Swinfen, of the Sixth Dragoon Guards, and after due consideration he Another rule accordingly was taken out (Swinfen gave instructions for, and executed a will, whereby v. Swinfen, L. J. R., 26 C. P. 97), in answer to he devised the whole property to the widow. The which Mrs. Swinfen made an affidavit setting out will was made on July 7, 1854, and on the 26th of all the facts. Fortunately for her Crowder, J., the same month the testator died. happened to be sitting this time, and he held disThereupon, Captain Swinfen cast about for means tinctly that the mere relationship of counsel and |