in the bastardy proceedings. The court held that he was in legal duress at the time of the arrest in the bastardy proceedings, and in that the case is distinguishable from the one before us. The court also held in effect that bastardy was not such an offense as would have authorized extradition. If that was so, it was a strong and additional reason for holding the arrest illegal. U. S. v. Watts, supra. The court also intimated, if it did not hold, that the charge of seduction was resorted to without any legal ground therefor, and in bad faith, merely to get the prisoner within the State. Williams v. Bacon, supra. Here there is no intimation of any bad faith.

Whether obtaining property under false pretenses is a "crime" within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution and laws of the United States is a question properly for consideration. It seems to be settled that the words "treason, felony or other crime," as there used, "embrace every act forbidden and made punishable by a law of the State. The word 'crime' of itself includes every offense, from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offenses, and includes what are called misdemeanors, as well as treason and felony." 24 How. 99; People v. Donohue, 84 N. Y. 438; Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind. 123; In re Voorhees, 32 N. J. Law, 141. This rule was adopted by the present chief justice In re Cooper, 52 Wis. 701, 702, and is abundantly supported by the authorities there cited.

The obtaining of property under false pretenses is clearly a crime in this State (Rev. St., § 4422), and being so, there can be no question but that it is a crime withing the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution and laws of the United States.

It follows that the relator might have been again extradited had he been allowed to go to Indiana, after being discharged on the first offense. This being so, there seems to be no practical reason for holding the relator could not be legally arrested immediately upon the discharge from the first offense, instead of being allowed to escape the State and then brought back on requisition. Such an arrest in such a case was certainly not in violation of any law of the United States. It was not in conflict with any agreement between the States. It was no breach of any executive pledge. It was no interruption of any comity between the States. We must therefore hold that the arrest was not illegal by reason of any of the objections mentioned.

2. It is claimed that although the alleged misrepresentations were made in Columbia county, yet that the arrest was illegal because the property, when obtained, was twenty rods beyond the boundary line of that county. The statute provides that offenses committed within one hundred rods of the dividing line between two counties may be alleged in the information to have been committed in either of them, and may be prosecuted and punished in either county, and the court of either such county, whose process shall have been first served upon the defendant, shall have priority of jurisdiction. Rev. St. 1849, § 7, ch. 141; Rev. St. 1858, § 7, ch. 172; Rev. St., § 4618. It is urged that this statute is in conflict with the provision of the Constitution which secures to the accused the right "to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed, which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by law." Section 7, art. 1. This provision was embodied in the same title of the Revised Statutes of 1849 as the above section. Rev. St. 1849, § 2, ch. 132. Assuming that the obtaining of the property was essential to the completion of the offense, yet it was, in part at least, committed in the county of Columbia. Wilcox v. Nolze, 34 Ohio St. 520. This being so, the constitutional question involved is very much like the one in State v. Pauley, 12 Wis. 537, where

it was held that a statute was constitutional which provided that if any mortal wound be given in one county, by means whereof death shall ensue in another county, the offense may be prosecuted in either county. Rev. St. 1849, § 8, ch. 141; Rev. St. 1858, §8, ch. 172; Rev. St., § 4619. Both of "these sections," said the late chief justice, "were framed by very intelligent gentlemen, some of them being distinguished members of the bar, in the same year in which the Constitution was adopted, and they are plainly founded on the clause of the Constitution in question." In re Eldred, 46 Wis. 549; S. C., 1 N. W. Rep.175. Of course where the offense is partly committed in each county, and wholly in neither, as where it is committed right upon the line between two counties, there must be jurisdiction somewhere, and at common law it seems to have been in either county. 2 Whart. Crim. Law (7th ed.), § 2141.

But assuming that the offense was committed at the place where the horse was obtained, and not where the representations were made, yet we are of the opinion that the courts of Columbia county had jurisdiction. These sections of the statutes having been adopted the same year as the Constitution, and the constitutional clause having been embodied in the same title with these sections by the revisers of the statutes of 1849, and the Legislature which adopted them, show pretty clearly that the words "or district" as used in this clause of the Constitution, were intended by the framers of that instrument, and understood by all at the time, to mean something different from the word "county" as therein used, especially when taken in connection with the words "which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by law." From this it appears to be competent for the Legislature to change the boundaries of the districts without changing the boundaries of the counties. For as observed by Ryan, C. J., in the case above cited, "the words 'county' or 'district,' as used in the clause, must both be held to have a meaning and a use." 46 Wis. 548. Giving to each such distinct meaning and use, there seems to be no difficulty in holding that each criminal district, as ascertained by the laws now in force, extends 100 rods beyond the boundaries of each county.

Whether a juryman residing outside of the county, but within 100 rods of the county line, and hence within the district, would for that reason be incompetent, or a subject of peremptory challenge, is a question not here presented. "This very peculiar language" of the Constitution, said the late chief justice, "is obviously designed to avoid the difficulties which had arisen at the common law, without depriving the accused of trial by a jury of the vicinage." 46 Wis. 548. Of course no one would insist upon a construction which would require every juryman in every criminal case to be a resident of the very place where the crime was committed. On the contrary, most of them must necessarily reside quite remotely from such place. The constitutional right secured is that they shall be taken from "the county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed." This constitutional provision does not undertake to define or limit the jurisdiction of the courts over criminal offenses, but simply defines and limits the locality from which a jury must be taken for the trial of such offenses, and secures to him the right of a trial within the same limits. This has been substantially held in Minnesota. State v. Robinson, 14 Miun. 453 (Gil. 333). See also Wheeler v. State, 24 Wis. 52. In Tennessee the words "or district" in a similar constitutional provision were treated, in view of their prior use, as a mere superfluity. Armstrong v. State, 1 Cold. 338. But for the same reason, we feel bound to give them significance. If the clause in question was intended to absolutely define and limit crim

again, but could have sued without a new request, and all his rights passed to his transferee. So that the question comes back to the necessity of a demand. The case principally relied on by the appellant is Southwick v. First Nat. Bank, 84 N. Y. 432. The case is not at all pertinent. There the defendant had "lawfully and innocently received the draft and the money paid thereon." He was not and could not be put in the wrong until he had refused restoration. This disdinction was drawn in Sharkey v. Mansfield, 90 N. Y., 329; 43 Am. Rep. 161, and the necessity of a demand denied where the receipt of the money was a conscious wrong. The party already in the wrong would only become more so by a refusal. Here the defendant had explicitly disavowed any obligation to H., and denied his ownership, and caused the stock to be sold as the property of S. What had occurred was a distinct denial of H.'s right to the stock or any of the dividends. After such a denial it was not needed that H. should make a demand to put the defendant in the wrong, for it already stood deliberately and defiantly in that attitude. Its action was equivalent to a refusal to pay any one except its own chosen transferee, whose right alone it recognized. H. himself and his assignee were not bound to make a demand. The refusal was already complete by the defendant's own action. It was of no concern to whom H. assigned, for the denial of his right was a denial as to those succeeding to that right. The defendant's complaint comes to no more than this: that having once refused, it ought to have a new opportunity to repent, solely because the right of action had passed to a new owner. Our conclusion does not stand upon any fancied inability of the bank to pay these dividends, or even to issue sixty-one shares of stock, but upon the action of defendant in totally repudiating the whole of H.'s rights. It is further argued that plaintiff's remedy was an action in equity to compel a transfer on the books, or an action against the bank for its wrong, and to recover the damages suffered. That such remedies exist does not alter plaintiff's right to pursue that which he has chosen. Each of those remedies would inevitably fall upon H.'s ownership. To compel the bank to register is to concede the validity of the transfer and found a right upon it, and damages could only be awarded to the extent of the stock and dividends on the same theory. And if, as we have said, H. became the absolute owner as between himself and the bank, he must be awarded the right of an owner, whatever other remedies exist. The condition the defendant may find itself it we need not consider. There are always consequences of a wrong to a wrong-doer. Robinson v. National Bank of New Berne. Opinion by Finch, J. [Decided April 29, 1884.]

MISSOURI SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.*

MARRIAGE WIFE'S PROPERTY-HUSBAND'S DEBTS— CREDITOR. In the absence of evidence that property in the name of a married woman has been paid for by her separate means, the presumption of law is that it was paid for with those of the husband; and in such case it is not within the protection of the statute (Rev. St. 1879, § 3295) securing to the wife the moneys arising from the sale thereof. Gault v. Saffin, 44 Penn. St. 367; Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 580; Weil v. Simmons, 66 Mo. 620; Sumner v. McCray, 60 id. 493. (2) The promise of a husband to repay his wife the proceeds of land which belonged to her, but not as her separate estate, and which has been disposed of and used by him *Appearing in 79 Missouri Reports.

with her consent, is without sufficient consideration to make her his creditor. Tillman v. Tillman, 50 Mo. 40. Sloan v. Torry. Opinion by Hough, C. J.

MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES FROM PATENT DANGERS-DECLARATIONS OF AGENT.-If a servant knows of the danger in prosecuting his master's work, or if it is so patent that an ordinarily observant man would have seen it, and without any assurance from the master he continues at work, he cannot hold the master liable if injury result to him therefrom. Citing Porter v. R. Co., 71 Mo. 67; Flynn v. R. Co., 78 id. 292; distinguishing McGowan v. R. Co., 61 id. 528. Declarations of an agent made one hour after the occurrence to which they related, held, no part of the res geste, and not admissible in evidence against his principal. Citing McDermott v. R. Co., 73 Mo. 516. Aldridge v. Midland Blast Furnace Company. Opinion by Henry, J.

INSURANCE LAW.

LIFE-ALLOWING TO LAPSE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICI. ARIES MAY CHANGE--ADMINISTRATOR.--If the insured, even by collusion with the company, suffers his policy to lapse, with the intention of securing another policy containing the name of a new person as beneficiary, the courts will not regard the second policy as a mere continuation of the first. A policy of insurance may be considered as an inchoate or uncompleted gift from the assured to the beneficiary. The former ought to be able to make it at will, or to change the direction of its benefits. There is no doubt that there is a conflict of authority as to the power of a person to change the direction of the money to accrue in an insurance on his life so as to divert it from the person named as beneficiary in the original policy. The most notable cases, and probably the ones most directly in point, and which have been most generally followed, are the cases of Pilcher v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 33 La. Ann. 332, and Ricker v. Charter O. L. Ins. Co., 27 Minn. 195; S. C., 6 N. W. Rep. 771, where it is held that there is a vested right in the beneficiaries in a policy of life insurance which renders the policy irrevocable as to them. The contrary rule has been held in Wisconsin, Missouri, and Illinois. Clark v. Durand, 12 Wis. 248; Kerman v. Howard, 23 id. 108; Foster v. Gile, 50 id. 603; S. C., 7 N. W. Rep. 555; Charter O. L. Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419; Baker v. Young, id. 453; Gambs v. Cov. M. L. Ins. Co., 50 id. 44; Swift v. R. P., etc., Assn. 96 111.309. Where a question has never been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, and as to which the State authorities are conflicting, this court is at liberty to follow such authority as is deemed most consonant with what seems to be just and equitable. It strikes me very forcibly that this policy, at the time the change was made, was at most, an inchoate or uncompleted gift from Samuel P. Stevens to his wife and heirs. He had the right to change his mind. He was in a position where he could revoke that gift, and di rect that the money secured by this policy should go elsewhere. I can see no reason why he was not as much at liberty to change the direction of the money which would accrue at his death upon this policy, as he was to change his will in reference to the disposi tion of any of his estate at any time preceding his death. If the assured himself appears by name in the policy as the beneficiary, the money accruing on the policy at his death becomes assets in the hands of the administrator. Dist. Ct., N. D. Illinois, Dec., 1883. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stevens, Opinion by Blodgett, J. (19 Fed. Rep.)

The Albany Law Journal.

WE

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1884.

CURRENT TOPICS.

E hope none of our readers will be deterred from reading Mr. Courtlandt Parker's address by its length. It contains references to some curiosities of legislation. One of the most curious is the Kentucky statute, allowing the lawyers in attendance to elect a special judge to hold court when the regular judge is absent. "Not but that it is a very good way to get a good judge," says Mr. Parker. We cannot agree to this; we think it is a very bad way to get any kind of a judge. The lawyers alone should never be suffered to pick the judges. It will be seen, too, that Mr. Parker and Mr. Sterne, whose admirable paper we publish this week, are not of the like mind on bi-ennial sessions of the Legislature. It is a little amusing to hear, at the same convocation, such warm praise, and such unmeasured denunciation of the same system, from two men of such eminence and abilities. But we shall leave them to fight it out. It is a very pretty difference as it stands. By and bye, perhaps, when we have a mind to make up, and time to make it up, we will come in and "settle" it. The Ohio experiment of allowing convicts twenty per cent of their earnings for their families or themselves on release is certainly novel. It sounds well in a humanitarian sense, but our doubts and fears, like our wishes, are as Mr. Parker's. There is such a thing as making the prison too endurable, not to say desirable too much like "an enforced boarding-house," as Mr. Parker aptly calls it. Mr. Parker gives a very eloquent description of the physical characteristics and resources of our country, but we wish he would not, like all "the rest of mankind," misquote Bishop Berkley's line, "Westward the course of empire takes its way." We also I wish that the members of the association would pay serious heed to his sensible suggestions about the usefulness of the association. The members may have thought that we have been at times caustic and satirical in our comments on their meetings. We have at least been honest, and disposed to be friendly, and they should remember that "faithful are the wounds of a friend." A man's portrait frequently looks less beautiful to him than his image in the glass, but it is more apt to be right.

It has lately been held in England, we believe, that an ivory and silver-mounted pistol may be a necessary for an infant. A pistol would certainly be a necessary for a Texas infant, or for the nurslings of the mining countries of the far west, but we can hardly imagine the need of one in England. Certainly the ivory and silver appurtenances might well be considered superfluous. The Law Times remarks in connection with this case: "The Master VOL. 30 No. 12.

of the Rolls has said that any judicial person must look with regret on the defense of infancy when put forward by youths of nineteen or twenty. Mr. Justice Manisty recently expressed very similar views, adding that such a defense appeared to him a very lamentable thing. However, as the law stands, it is a perfectly valid one, and justice bids us blame rather the regulations which afford scope for it. As a general matter of convenience the absolute atmosphere of artificiality which surrounds the idea of a 'necessary' is much to be regretted. It is curious to contemplate the peculiarities of a social status in which an ivory and silver pistol is a necessary, and an air-gun is a mere luxury. Not that it is surprising to find a flaw in the present statutes. A good parliamentary authority stated the other day that of the laws made within his experience only a third were even tolerably good. Of the remainder he reckoned one-half as inoperative, and the other as defeating their own objects. Without going so far as this, it is evident that constant revision is pretty often needful. The rules for the protection of minors have been as carefully considered as any that can be cited. There have been strong principles, both of public policy and of justice to guide the legislator. Yet it only requires one or two cases involving no special features to cast doubt on the expediency of existing regulations. The other day an act of Parliament was required for the satisfactory definition of a rabbit-hole. It is now suggested in legal circles that a stricter definition of what is or is not a 'necessary' would be quite as useful."

A superb portrait of Secretary Folger has been hung in our Court of Appeals room, over the bench. It is by Mr. Eastman Johnson, one of the best artists of the day. It is of life size, three-quarters length, and sitting, and beyond question the best portrait in the room. This and that of Judge Peckham are two very picturesque works, and one cannot look on them without emotion, for the fate of the last departed was only a little less tragic than that of the former. Judge Peckham was the most superb looking man of his day, and his por trait is like a Spanish grandee by Velasquez, or an Italian nobleman by Titian. Judge Folger was also an eminently distinguished looking man, and the firmness of his square jaw, the power and dignity of his forehead, and the mingled sadness, humor and kindness of his beautiful eyes, are happily united with the easy pose so characteristic of the man. But there is one thing, alas! which the accomplished artist could not give us "the sound of a voice that is still"- one of the most melodious and charming that ever sounded in the ear of a friend, but which we seem to hear as we gaze upon the familiar features.

A very experienced law publisher, a man of liberal culture, too, writes us: "Glad to see what you say about the citation 'Oreg.,' which I fixed on in