Underwood, it will be seen, is in direct conflict with the opinion of the President at the time of the passage of the act of 1862. The construction of Judge Underwood, which overruled this opinion of the President and his decree, which seems to disregard the explanatory resolution of Congress, viz.: that "no punishment or proceedings under said act shall be so construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life," would appear to have received the sanction of the Administration, and a great number of cases were decided in conformity with the principles laid down in the Latham case as it was stated about the first of December, as follows: The Hon. John C. Underwood, Judge of the United States District Court of Virginia, has just returned from Norfolk, where he has cleared the docket in three days, five out of the twenty cases upon it being postponed in consequence of the absence of witnesses, Decrees were entered confiscating the personal and real estate of fifteen rebels, of whom three were for: merly in the Union navy, and are now in the rebel navy, viz. Commodore Barron and Capts. Page and Sinclair. Some of the estates confiscated are among the finest in the aristocratic quarter of the town. The fee simple, according to principles laid down in Judge Underwood's decrees at Alexandria, goes to the purchaser from the United States. The court was ad : journed till the third Monday in January, when it is anticipated that about one hundred cases will be disposed of under the confiscation law. Yesterday Judge Underwood opened court again in Alexandria. Of the seventy cases which were on the docket there, about half are yet to be disposed of. Is real estate covered by the act of 1861 ? In November an information was filed in the United States Court, held at Nashville, Tennessce, against the "Republican Banner "printing office and real estate, under the act of August 6th, 1861. A motion was made to quash the information, on the ground that real estate did not come within the provisions of the act, not being property subject to prize and capture. This motion was denied on the 6th of November, by Judge Trigg, with the concurrence of Justice Catron, of the Supreme Court of the United States. The following are extracts from Judge Trigg's opinion: It is not denied that the words of the act, "and property of whatever kind or description," are very comprehensive, and in their terms embrace real as well as personal property. But it is insisted that Congress did not intend to include all kinds of property by the broad and comprehensive language employed, and that this is manifest from the words used in the act denouncing the penalty against the property used or employed, or intended to be used or employed, as therein stated. The act declares that "all such property is hereby declared to be lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found;" and it is argued that the words "prize and capture" are purely technical in their meaning, and apply only to personal property, real estate not being a subject of prize and capture, and that these words, therefore, must be understood to have been used in their technical sense. And the words "prize and capture" being thus technical in their meaning, must control the previous words, and limit and confine their operation to that description of property to which "prize and capture alone are applicable." * * The term prize then would seem to have an exact legal and technical signification, and is appropriate oriy to captures made from an enemy on the high seas in time of war. And if our construction of the statute of August 6th, 1861, is to be limited by the strictly tech. nical sense of the words "prize and capture," it would follow that such property only as might be captured upon the high seas, and which was intended to be used could be the lawful subject of condemnation under sail or employed in aiding or promoting the insurrection, statute. Thus it will be seen that, in the construction of the act under consideration, if we are to be controlled by the purely technical meaning of the words "prize and capture," the operation of the law will be confined to such captures only as may be made upon the high seas, and all property on land would be exempt therefrom, and be not lawful subject of prize. I do not mean to assert that Congress has not the pow be captared from an enemy in time of war, upon the high er to declare any other property, than that which shall seas, a lawful subject of prize; but simply to maintain that no capture of property as prize can be so consider ed technically, unless there be an act of capture on the high seas. In other words, that property captured cr taken on land as prize could not be considered as prize in the technical meaning of the phrase, and that the prize court would have no jurisdiction over it. The question presented to the court is not without difficulty, but it is clear, from what has been stated, that in giving a construction to this statute, it will not do to be limited by the mere technical sense of the words prize and that a large and distinct class of property would be excapture," for in that case it is apparent cluded from its operation. And it is manifest from the reading of the act that property other than such as might be captured upon the sea was intended to fal within its provisions. For the act, independent of the sweeping provision" any property of whatsoever kird or description," expressly declares that "all such prop erty is hereby declared to be lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found." To give a just ce what the Congress intended, and to do this, after look struction, therefore, to the statute we must ascertain ing at the words of the act itself, we may look to the surrounding facts and circumstances which would properly have influenced Congress in its passage. * * The act declares that if "any person or persons, his, her, or their agent, attorney, or employé, shall purchase or acquire, sell, or give any property of whatsoever kind or description, with intent to use or em ploy the same, or suffer the same to be used or en ployed, in aiding or abetting or promoting such insurrection or resistance to the laws, or any person or per sons engaged therein; or if any person or persons, be ing the owner or owners of any such property, shall knowingly use or employ the same as aforesaid, al such property is hereby declared to be lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found; and it shall be the duty of the President of the United States to carse the same to be seized, confiscated, and condemned." The language of this act is broad and comprehensive, and, looking at the surrounding facts and circamstances at the time, there being then a formidable re bellion in progress, the intention of Congress, in er acting this law, must have been to deter persons from so using and employing their property as to aid and promote the insurrection, and thereby to diminish and weaken the power of the rebellion; and perhaps it was also intended, by taking from him his property so lawfully employed, to inflict upon the party a perc for his misconduct in thus aiding and promoting a te sistance to the laws. What, then, is included, it may be asked, under that broad language of the statute, ' any property, of whatsoever kind or description," which is lawful subject of prize and capture, and liable to be seized, confiscated, and condemned? We answer that it is manifestly any property, of whatsover kind, which is capable of being used or employed in aiding, abetting, or promoting the insurrection. The only question, then, is whether real estate can be so used or employed; for if it can, there is no more reason why it should not be seized and confiscated than any other description of property. Certainly the mischiefs to result from such use of it would be as great as those from the use of property of any other kind. Suppose that a person, with the avowed purpose of aiding the insurrection, should purchase a piece of ground suitable for his object, and proceed to erect upon it the necessary buildings and machinery for the manufacture of guns and other small arms, and he does proceed, in accordance with his previous intent, to the manufacture of such weapons of war, to supply the rebel army, can it be contended that such property-real estate, if you choose-is not used, and as effectually used, in aiding, abetting, or promoting the insurrection, as any movable property whatever? And if so, why should it not be as much a subject of confiscation as any other? All property used in its ordinary and legitimate mode is exempt from the operation of the act, but the moment it is purchased or acquired, sold or given, with intent to use or employ it in aiding the insurrection, or if the owner knowingly or intentionally uses or employs his property for such a purpose, it immediately becomes the subject of seizure and condemnation under the act, whether it be real or personal property. The words "prize and capture" in the act were intended to have the same meaning which is given to the word "seizure" in the act of July, 1862, and to apply as well to real as personal property. * * * * * Upon the whole, I am of the opinion that the information filed in this case ought not to be quashed. I concur in the foregoing opinion of the District Judge. J. CATRON, Associate Justice. The Constitutionality of the Acts.-The question of the constitutionality of the act of 1861 was disposed of by Judge Trigg in the opinion in the case of the "Republican Banner," as follows: The question raised by claimant's counsel in the closing argument, as to the constitutionality of the act, was not made upon the original motion as the same was entered,. and was not argued on behalf of the United States. No authority, however, was produced, and it seems to me that the arguments relied on to sustain its unconstitutionality would be as applicable to any other law of Congress imposing the penalty of forfeiture, as to the act we are considering. The constitutionality of the act of 1862 was brought directly in question in proceedings instituted in New Orleans in December. No decision was given during the year, but the following points were made on either side. M. F. Day, Esq., on behalf of the United States, said: When we find terms in that instrument which are not clearly defined in the Constitution itself, we must go to the common law to ascertain the meaning of those terms; and any technical terms in the Constitution, which have a known signification in the common law, are to be understood in the Constitution in the same sense in which they are used in the common law. Section 3, of Article III., of the Constitution, declares that the Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason all work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except daring the life of the person attainted." Now, it has been contended that this provision is a limitation upon the power of Congress for the punish ment of treason. This is an error. This word attainted is not a limitation of the power given by that "The Con portion of the sentence which precedes it. gress shall have the power to punish treason." The whole question turns upon the meaning of the word attainder. There is nothing in the Constitution or laws of the United States that tells us what attainder is. When we fix the meaning of the term it will be easy to fix the power of Congress. Attainder is the resulting consequence of a conviction and sentence of death. Then it was a consequence just as certain to follow, as death is certain to follow when the head is severed from the body. The power is given Congress to declare the punishment of treason, except that no resulting consequence shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the party attainted. The consequences of attainder are the corruption of blood and the forfeiture of estate. On the whole, I conclude that the Constitution means just as though it read: "You may punish treason as you please, but if you make any provision for its punishment, no mere sentence of death shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate beyond the life of the person attainted." The joint resolution in no way limits the operation of the act, except as to any resulting consequences. The next position taken by the claimants is on the right of trial by jury. They rely on the constitutional provision that a man cannot be deprived of life, property, or liberty, without "due process of law," and claim that due process of law means a trial by jury. There are two answers to this argument: First, this procceding can in no case be considered as a criminal proceeding. It is merely a proceeding to enforce a forfeiture, and the universal practice in these cases has been to enforce forfeitures without trial by jury. There is another position that is impregnable-that is the war right. We are in a state of war-a public war on the part of the United States, and a private war on the part of the rebels. The statutes put it on that ground. The property is to be condemned as enemy's property. Congress. There is no power on earth that can dicThe whole war power is vested in the President and tate to Congress what disposition they shall make of the property of enemies, and even when the power is left to the discretion of the President there is no power on earth that can question it. Who is to say to Congress what course they shall pursue, not only toward the rebels themselves, but toward their property, or to attempt to control that body in the exercise of the means which it shall use to prosecute the war. They have an unlimited discretion to do all things necessary to carry out the power given them by the Constitution of the United States, and they are the sole judges of the means necessary to accomplish these purposes, and their judgment is final and supreme. There is no power in the judiciary to limit the discretion of Congress in this matter: whether it is a wise direction or not, they are not responsible to the judiciary. The representatives are only responsible to the people. This grant of power to Congress to conduct the war is as broad as a grant can be. Courts have no power to say how a war should be conducted.. On behalf of the claimants Mr. C. Roselius followed: The protection of life, liberty, reputation and prop erty is, or at least ought to be, a preeminent purpose in every government. The powers of the Government are separate and distinct. Those powers which belong to one department are exercised by officers belonging to that department, who exercise their powers independent of any of the others. Each department is separate, co-ordinate and equal. In this admirable system no majesty is recognized but the majesty of the law. And no man can exercise any power except such as has been delegated to him merely as the servant of the people. Man, individually, is without any power, except that power which under the law he has the right to enjoy and exercise. Under such a government one of the first principles which strikes the reflecting mind is, that no person can be deprived of life, liberty, reputation, or property, without due process of law, or by the law of the land, for these terms are clearly convertible. We hold that everything that belongs to us by the law of the land, is secured to us by the law of the land, and can only be taken away from us by the law of the land, by due process, judgment, and execution. What is the due process of law? That is the point; the whole ease turns upon this single inquiry. In criminal proceedings, the Constitution tells us the prosecution can only be by presentment or indictment of the Grand Jury, and the trial must be by the peers of the party accused, collected in the vicinage where the offence was committed, or in certain other localities where the crime has been on the high seas. The Constitution itself has determined what is due process of law in a criminal prosecution. [Art. 5 of amend ments to Constitution.] The constitution provides that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, and defines due process of law, in a preceding part of the same article, to be presentation and indictment by a grand jury. When we refer to the Constitution, as originally adopted, we find that "all trials shall be by jury." Is this in reality a criminal proceeding?-The answer is found, in the first place, in this paper, which is called a Libel of Information, and which has been presented to this honorable court as if it was sitting in adiniralty. Now, if it does declare such a case as can be proceeded against by the law of nations in an admiralty court, my objections are groundless. It is the facts discovered in the libel that call the court into action to enforce the law, and for this reason the state of facts in this libel impresses its character on the proceedings, I care not by what name he or anybody else may call it. The ground on which we claim is, that they have endeavored to evade the Constitution by giving a wrong name and directing a wrong process to issue in the case. There is no offence against the law of nations set forth in the case. The United States have passed a law for the punish ment of traitors and rebels who have been in arms against the legitimate authorities of the best Government that ever existed. They had a right to do it. No one will question the right of a government to make laws for inflicting condign punishment on traitors, but it does not follow that they have a right to proceed against them with a libel of information. Congress is subservient to the behests of the Constitution. It cannot do any act in violation of the Constitution. Its powers have been restricted in order that it may afford protection to life, liberty, and property, just as the powers of the other departments of the Government have been restricted. You may prosecute traitors before a grand jury and find an indictment. It is not necessary that they should be before the court. It is only necessary that the offence should have been committed within the jurisdiction of the court. My learned friend argues that the clause in the Constitution providing that "no attainder shall work corruption of blood," was intended to prevent the resulting consequences under the common law, of the conviction of treason. By that law, the moment a person was convicted of treason, he forfeited his estate and his blood was corrupted, his children could no longer inherit, and his property went to the crown. The United States goes to the common law for the definition of technical terms and to determine the rules of evidence in criminal cases. It is idle to say that this is intended to guard against the consequences of a conviction at common law, as my friend has attempted to show. It does not fortify the position he has taken. It refers to an offence created by statutes under the Constitution, not to an offence against the law of nations. I do not invoke the law of nations to establish that this offence was against that law. I claim that this offence which has been transcribed in this libel is the very offence to which the Constitution refers, and, therefore, that it is an offence against the laws of the United States, and not against the law of nations. That law had nothing to do with the law of nations. It was enacted for the punishment of treason and the suppression of rebellion. That is a subject of general legislation; a subject regulated by the Constitution in express terms. The Confiscation Act is, in reality, an act for the punishment of treason and rebellion, and every line of the act shows it. Is it not clear that the act is punitive and nothing else, and that is what is limited by the clause in the Constitution providing that "co attainder for treason shail work corruption of blood,” etc. He next proceeded to the argument that had been adduced on the ground that this was a Proceeding in rem,—and argued that a proceeding in rem could only be instituted when a jus in re had been acquired by the act of the thing itself, which, by the use that had been made of it, was forfeited, and that unless it was forfeited by some use to which it was put, it could only be forfeited by the act of the owner, and the proof of that act was the record of his conviction. The Government might confiscate enemies' property. The right existed, but had not been exercised for 260 years. Belligerents had the abstract right and were respon sible to the civilized world for its exercise. It was claimed by his opponents that, by virtue of this law, the property in question was liable to confiscation. But to be liable under the law of nations, as enemy's property it must have been in the enemy's country at the date of the enactment, or it must be the produce of the enemy's country. But the act was passed on the 17th of July, 1962, two months after the United States authority had been reestablished here, therefore, it could not be held under the law of nations, for it was not the produce of the enemy's country, and at the time of the passage of the act it was in New Orleans, which was a part of the United States not under the jurisdiction of the enemy. his argument presented the following propoThe District Attorney, Rufus Waples, in sitions: By the law of nations all the property of enemies is confiscable, including lands in fee simple. Civil wars are governed by the same rules as international wars concerning confiscation of enemies' property; the sovereign-belligerent has the right to contiscate the property of the subject-belligerent. As the right to confiscate enemies' property found on land had grown somewhat into disuse, it was neces sary for Congress to pass a law expressive of the will of the sovereign to exercise the right, and to "make rules concerning the capture" of this species of prop erty, in order to enable the courts to take judicial proceedings. Congress made such rules in the acts of August 6th, 1961, and July 17th, 1862, sections 5, 6, 7, 8; the former act being against property which obtains its enemy character by use; the latter, against property which obtains that character by ownership. Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the act of July 17th, 1962 (bringing into exercise the right of the Government as sovereign-belligerent against subjects-belligerent), are clearly authorized by the Constitution. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the confiscation of enemies' property in the manner and to the extent provided for in the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th sections of the act; that is, absolute forfeiture of all the "right, title, and interest" of the enemy-owner by proceedings in rem. 1. The act does not deny trial by jury in any case in which the Constitution secures it. The first four sections relate to crime, and its punishment is to be by indictment and jury trial, as a matter of course. Con, Art. 3, section 2d and 7th. All forfeitures are to be by "due process of law," but not all by jury trial. 2. No attainder, there being no death or outlawry. 3. No corruption of blood-the capacity of the heirs to inherit is not affected. 4. No remainder or reversionary interest of the heirs forfeited. 5. No working of corruption or forfeiture. 6. No forfeiture after death. Forfeiture, like a sale, is an instantaneous act, and must take place while the owner is alive, if its enemy character is caused by ownership. As the act (sec. 5, 6, 7, 8) provides, without ambiguity, for the absolute forfeiture, the Joint Resolution passed with reference to the act cannot affect it. The belligerent right of the Government to treat rebellious subjects as though they were alien enemies and thus to confiscate their property absolutely, is a constitutional right. Late decision of the Supreme Court in proof sheets of 1 Black's U. S. Supreme Court reports. See PROVISIONAL COURT For La. CONGREGATIONALISTS, TRINITARIAN. The "Congregational Quarterly" for January, 1864, contains full statistics of the Orthodox Congregational churches, as collected in 1863. The number of churches reported is 2,729. Of these 610 are not specified, 830 have pastors, 768 have stated supplies, and 495 are vacant. Of the 2,594 ministers of the denomination, 632 are not in active service. The total church membership (including ministers) is 233,200, of whom 90,163 are males, and 164,037 females; 31,178 are represented as "absent," 6,487 have been received by letter, and 5,576 have been dismissed by letter, leaving an excess favorable to denominational growth of $10. There have been admitted by profession 7,999, while 4,288 have died, and 680 have been excommunicated, leaving 2,931 as an increase, and which, with this 910, will make a total increase in the year in the 2,729 churches of 3.41 members, with no deduction for the 31, 178 absent. sorrow. An interesting case of doctrinal controversy Was tried in July, before a mutual board called by a petition of about one half of the male members of the Congregational church at Georgetown, Mass. The letter of call set forth that the Rev. Charles Beecher, the pastor, did not, in the view of the petitioners, preach according to the creed of the church and of the Orthodox churches generally of New England, especially in presenting his views of the preexistence of man, the condition of souls after death, the atonement and divine With regard to the preexistence of souls, Mr. Beecher was reported to profess to the following effect: "We were all created in a previous world, and were drawn into apostasy by the fallen angels. God then proposed to create this world as a hospital for our race, introduce us here, and heal us of sin. It was proposed to Lucifer to become our redeemer. He refused. God then chose a younger brother, ho proved willing. To him was added the divine nature, and he became among us the Christ. As it seemed doubtful whether Christ ald do this work that Lucifer refused to do, he, Lucifer, remained in heaven after his refsal till Christ's resurrection. Lucifer was not expelled while he could raise a doubt whether redemption could be accomplished." The council adopted, by a vote of 16 yeas against 5 noes, the report of a committee, which found Mr. Beecher guilty of heretical preaching, and recommended the dissolution of pastoral relations between him and the congregation of Georgetown. The latter, however, by a vote of 27 against 21, refused to accept the doings of this ecclesiastical council. Toward the close of the year, Mr. Beecher resigned the pastoral charge of the church. The Canada Congregational Union, at its annual meeting, held in Montreal, on June 15th, passed the following resolution: The ministers and delegates of the Congregational Union of Canada, in annual session of the Congregational Union, beg to express their deep and heartfelt sympathies with brethren in the neighboring republic in the dire calamities of civil war with which their country is afflicted, and their homes desolated. gladly welcome among us, and recognizing, as we do, With them we love to fraternize, their delegates are that slavery is the chief cause of the fearful struggle in which they are involved, our prayers are to the Father of mercies, the great Ruler of the universe, that he would bring hostilities to a speedy and righteous termination, by which the principles of civil and religious liberty, the rights of humanity and universal freedom may be advanced and perpetuated. At the 24th autumnal session of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, which commenced at Liverpool, on October 12th, an interesting paper was read on the bicentenary movement in commemoration of the ejection of Non-Conformist ministers from the Church of England in 1662. It appeared that the Congregational churches up to that time had subscribed £251,568 for the objects in view. Out of the thirty chapels, contemplated by the Lancashire churches, eight capable of accommodating 6,000 persons, had been opened; others were in progress, and sites for thirteen more had been secured. A large educational establishment had been opened at Farnworth, and another at Ashton, involving a large expenditure. Lancashire intended, as it appeared, to expend £150,000 upon these measures; Wales was determined to collect £20,000, to tion of chapel debts, and for other denominafound a college, and £30,000 for the liquidational purposes. The "English Congregational Yearbook" of 1864, gives the following summary of Congregational statistics of England and the Colonies: Number of Congregational Churches. In Great Britain— In ColoniesEngland.. Wales... Scotland ..1,818 93 The Canadas..... 697 103 28 1 out-stations, schoolhouses, &c., in connection with the foregoing churches, amounting probably to double the number of those churches, making a total of some 10,000 places where, statedly or occasionally, the Gospel is preached. In addition to the above, a considerable number of independent churches exist in London and throughout the country, known generally as "High Calvinist," but which, having no organized associations themselves, not being in fellowship with the Congregational body, are not included. Number of churches vacant: in England, 155; Wales, 79; Scotland, 14; Ireland, 4; Colonies, 27-total, 279. Number of Congregational ministers: In England, 1,737; Wales, 361; Scotland, 99; Ireland, 30; Colonies, 216; heathen lands, 168-total, 2,611. Number of students in England, 320; Wales, 90; Scotland, 16; Colonies, 30-total, 456. Of the 2,612 ministers, there are at present without pastoral charges: in England, 387; Wales, 35; Scotland and Ireland, 17; Colonies, 41-total, 480. There are on the Continent of Europe 148 independent churches, in Belgium, France, Geneva, Holland, and Switzerland." (See CONGREGATIONALISTS, UNITARIAN.) CONGRESS, CONFEDERATE. The proceedings of the Congress* at Richmond were so generally conducted in secret session, that their action on only a few subjects of interest is known. In the House on the 19th of Jan. Mr. Clopton, of Alabama, offered a series of joint resolutions relating to the conduct of the existing war and the late proclamation of the President of the United States. Mr. Foote, of Tennessee, preferred in lieu of retaliatory measures, as suggested by the resolutions, that an attempt should be made to stop the shedding of blood by a movement to bring about peace. It would strengthen the friends of peace at the North, and perhaps have the *The following were the members of Congress at the seeond session convened in Richmond on the 1st of December, 1863. For the list of members convened at the first session in December, 1862, see ANNUAL CYCLOPÆDIA, 1562. SENATE. ALEXANDER II. STEPHENS, of Georgia, President. J. II. NASHI, of South Carolina, Clerk. Alabama-Clement C. Clay, Robert Jemison, Jr. Arkansas-Robert W. Johnson, Charles B. Mitchell. Florida-James M. Baker, Augustus E. Maxwell. Georgia-Benjamin H. Hill, Herschel V. Johnson. Kentucky-Henry C. Burnett, William E. Simms. Louisiana-Thomas J. Semmes, Edward Sparrow. Mississippi-Albert G. Brown, James Phelan, Missouri-John B. Clark. North Carolina-George Davis, Williaro T. Dortch. South Carolina-Robert W. Barnwell, James L. Orr. Tennessee-Landon C. Haynes, Gustavns A. Henry. Texas-William S. Oldham, Lewis T. Wigfall. Virginia-Robert M. T. Hunter, Allen T. Caperton. HOUSE. THOMAS S. Bоcock, of Virginia, Speaker. Florida-James B. Dorkins. Robert B. Hilton. effect of producing a state of things so much desired notwithstanding the opposition of the abolition party. Mr. Dargan, of Alabama, took the ground that Powers at war must retaliate. The reso lutions contemplated the turning over of captured officers to State Governments, and to let them be punished according to the laws. He did not think that was correct, but he suggested that the Government should take the responsi bility itself. Mr. Lyons, of Virginia, suggested that the Government had no power to turn these captured officers over to the States. Nor was there any necessity for the resolttions, since the President has said in his message he will do it unless prevented by Congress. He favored the passage of a law prohib iting such a course, and to repose the power of retaliation entirely in the hands of the Government. When an officer was captur cd, if there was cause for retaliation, we might retaliate upon him; if not, we were bound to exchange him. They could not, by any law of nations, when captured by one Government, be turned over to another Government for trial. He would prefer that any officer captured in any State after the promulgation of that proclamation should be instantly hung; not subject him to the uncertainties of a trial by jury. Mr. Kenner, of Louisiana, called the atten tion of the House to the fact that this portica of the President's message was referred to the Committee of Ways and Means. The committe was now prepared to report. He moved, as instructed by the committee, that the House now go into secret session for the purpose of receiving that report. The motion was agreed to. Subsequently the subject came up in the Senate, when Mr. Yancey, of Alabama, offered the following resolution: Keenan, David W. Lewis, William W. Clark, Robert P. Trippe, Lucius J. Gartrell, Hardy Strickland, Augustas R Wright, Kentucky-W. B. Machen, John W. Crockett, II. E Reid, George W. Ewing, James S. Crisman, T. L. Bore, II. W. Bruce, G. B. Hodges, E. M. Bruce, J. W. Moore, J. Breckinridge, John M. Elliott. Louisiana-Charles J. Villers, Charles M. Conred. D can F. Kenner, Lucien J. Dupre, Henry Marshall, Jel Perkins, Jr. Mississippi-J. W. Clapp, Renben Davis, Israel Wele II. C. Chambers, O. R. Singleton, E. Barksdale, John J. McRae. Missouri-Thomas A. Harris, Casper W. Bell, A. H. Corow, George C. Vest, L. W. Freeman. North Carolina-Wm. H. N. Smith, Robert R. Bridges Owen R. Keenan, F. D. McDowell, A. H. Arrington, J. McLean, Thomas S. Ashe, William Lander, Burgess Gaither, A. T. Davidson. South Carolina--John McQueen, W. Porcher Miles, L M. Adger, W. D. Simpson, James Farran, W. W. Boyer, Tennessee-Joseph T. Heiskell, William G. Swan, W. R Tibbs, E. L. Gardner, Henry S. Foote, Meredith P. Gentry, George W. Jones, Thomas Mences, J. D. C. Atkins, Joaa V Wright, David M. Currin. Texas-John A. Wilcox, Claiborne C. Herbert. Peter W Gray, F. B. Sexton, Malcolm D. Graham, William B Vaughn. Virginia-M. R. H. Garnett, John R. Chambers, Jama Lyons, Charles F. Collier, Thomas S. Bocock, John Goods Jr., James P. Holcombe, D. C. De Jarnette, David Fursten Alexander R. Boteler, John R. Baldwin, Waller R. Stapl Walter Preston, Samuel A. Miller, Robert Johnston, Chari W. Russell. |
