the Provincials had returned, they would still have 12 or 14,000 men, and consequently the superiority in the field, and would be at liberty to do what they pleased in their country.... The Marquis de Vaudreuil will find in my observations some distrust of him; this will never prevent me applying myself to the good of the service and of the Colony without embarassing myself with what people might write against me, either directly or indirectly. But I do not conceal from the Marquis de Vaudreuil, that I shall be able to demonstrate to him on my return to Montreal, that, if he has had the goodness in his despatches of last year to pay me some euloguims which I cannot merit, he did not omit persuading the Minister of Marine that he had supplied me with the means of laying siege to Lydius.... Were I so fortunate, Sir, as that your important occupations would permit you to be at the head of the army, you would see everything yourself, and I should have the satisfaction to receive clearer and less embarrassing orders, and you would have judged that I have combined boldness, prudence and some activity.

All this however did not prevent the Colony being played for on the eighth of July, odd or even (de pair ou non)........M. d'Aillebout is arrived this moment and hands me the letter you have done me the honor to write me on the 15th. As it generally contains only the same things you have done me the honor to write me on the 12th, I have already answered them, whereunto I shall add, that I shall not be able to send large detachments by Lake St-Sacrement until I have reestablished my camps at the Falls and Portage, and sent over bateaux

and canoes, a manoeuvre which is done only when executed, and advances less expeditiously in fact than in theory. Up to this time I have done impossibilities in Canada with my slender means. I shall endeavor to do my best and require no spur...... To profit by the fear of enemies, would require to be in a condition to pursue them the very next day. An army that can be pursued only by detachments ten or twelve days afterwards, gets rid of its fright" (")

During all this correspondence, Montcalm's temper ran high. We read in his Journal: "A letter from the Marquis de Vaudreuil; a sequel to the captious dispatches; a snare unskilfully laid, because I was prepared for it. Ononthio (Vaudreuil) says: "That victory must yield great results, I send you all the troops. Rather safe occasion to expulse the enemy from lake St-Sacrement, to make the colony rich with artillery, barges," etc. What means does Ononthio give to drive away from their position 15,000 men who are getting intrenched, and are well supplied for two months? No doubt he gives an army superior in numbers, well supplied with victuals, artillery, etc. No: neither victuals, nor the necessary outfit for portage. What do the Marquis de Vaudreuil's letters mean? and why, laboring under the scarcity of victuals, does he send obstinately that number of men who will serve only in eating our provisions? It is for the purpose of being

(1) On the 8th of July Montcalm had no Indians and few Canadians. That was the reason why he did not pursue Abercromby. "If I had had two hundred Indians to head a detachment of one thousand picked men, under M. de Lévis' command, not many of the enemy would have escaped." Montcalm à Doreil, 8 juillet, 1758.)

(2) Paris Documents, pp. 757, 758, 759.

enabled to write to the Court: "The Marquis de Montcalm had beaten the enemy; they had retreated to the bottom of lake St-Sacrement, dispirited, and in great confusion; immediately I had sent to him all the forces of the colony so that he could drive them from their position and profit by his own victory. He could do it, but he did not do it." Here is the motive; here is the secret thrust of this year. That of last year was: "He could take Fort Edward; I have supplied him with means to do it; but he would not do it." (1)

Nothing could be more unfortunate than this quarrel between the two leaders. No doubt, Montcalm was not faultless during all these squabbles. He was too touchy, too impulsive, too easily irritated., But we must state frankly that Vaudreuil's conduct was exasperating. Montcalm was on the frontier, overladen with heavy cares and dreadful responsibilities, facing boldly a formidable enemy, giving his nights and his days to the work of checking invasion, spending his strength, his brains, his health to that purpose, risking his life and, more than his life, his fame to save New-France, and achieving glorious victories amidst awful odds and perils. And at the same time, Vaudreuil, who had absolutely no experience nor instruction in war matters, comfortably seated in his château at Montreal, eighty leagues from the enemy, pretended to teach the brilliant general his own art, and to show, with pen and ink, how military wonders could be accomplished and miracles be realized. There may be strategists in

(1) Journal de Montcalm, pp. 407, 408, 409.

chamber. Moltke was one of them; he could, from his private office at Berlin, direct the moves of big armies and lead them to success. But Vaudreuil was no Moltke. He was a man of slender parts and was not luminous enough to shed his spare light on others. Instead of dictating war plans, he should have limited his ambition to the task of helping the military chiefs and seeing, as far as possible, that they were not hampered for want of means.

This epistolary war raged for three weeks. Vaudreuil's parting shot was that Montcalm had ill treated the Indians and that they would not serve any more under him. Montcalm's answer was that his only crime had been to try to prevent them from pillaging the provisions of the hospital and of private persons, and of refusing them brandy. "Facts, said he, ought to be believed in preference to words. Indians you are aware, do only what they like; but evil spirits often suggest to them and make them say in councils things they do not think of. The respect I owe you, Sir, has prevented me writing to you that they have, in full council, complained of you having detained them whilst wishing to fly to our succor. They stated so both in public and in private. I made the public keep silent." (1)

Montcalm felt however that matters could not continue in this way. He was really devoted to the public good, and saw very well that these dissensions were fatal to Canada. So he generously made an effort towards conciliation. On the second of August he sent to the Governor

(1) Paris Documents, p. 811,

a long letter which deserves to be quoted at some length: "Be assured, Sir," he wrote " that the personal matters of which I complain, and which I really impute to the composers of your letters, to the turbulent and mischief-making spirits who are seeking to estrange you from me, will never diminish either my zeal for the public good, nor my affection for you, nor my constant attention to write nothing but good of you and your brother, and not to speak of, nor afford a favorable coloring to things on which I think you have not fully determined. Wherefore should you not act in the same manner by me. Why not alter your secretary's style. Why not give me more of your confidence? I dare say the King's service would gain thereby, and we should not have the air of disunion, which transpires to the degree that I send you a New-York newspaper which mentions it.

"You believe, Sir, you are not to blame; I, that I am not; for I think I have always been prodigal of advances to you, and have given way more than any other man in order to agree in opinion with you on all occasions. But false reports are made to you, efforts are made to embitter you; for myself, I shall forget, although what you have written last year pain me; I think you have not weighed its consequences, and I flatter myself, you will never have reason to suspect my military conduct, when I do all that I know how.... Those who approach you have the ill address to endeavor, contrary to your intentions, to engage you to mortify, without wishing to do so, the General, the troops of the line and all that. What need have you, Sir, after my three years service under your orders, to prescribe