« السابقةمتابعة »
Mild Solitude, in veil of rufset 'die,
Her fylvan spear with moss-grown ivy bound ; And Indolence, with sweetly languid eye,
And zoneless robe that trails along the ground. But chiefly Love Thou, whofe gentle mind
Each soft indulgence nature framed to share ; Pomp, wealth, renown, dominion, all resign'd,
Ohafte to Pleasure's bower; for Love is there. , Love, the desire of Gods! the feast of heaven!
Yet to earth's favourid offspring not denyd!
Enllave to fame, or sacrifice to pride.
1 hat cup is death, if he wich-hold applause. Far from thy haunt be Envy's baneful fway,
Add Hale that works the harrass'd soul to storın;
form. No savage joy th' harmonious hours profane !
Whom love refines can barbarous tumult please? Shall rage of blood pollate the syivan reign?
Shall keisuie wanton in the spoils of Peace? Free let the feathery race indu!ge the fong,
Inhale the liberal beam and mele in love; Free let the fieet hind bound her hills along,
And in pure freams the watery nations rove. To jcy io Nature's univerfal finile,
Well suit:, O Man, thy pleasurable sphere; But'why should Virtue doom, thy years to toil!
Ah, why should Virtue's law be decni'd severe ! What meed, Beneficence, thy care repays ?
What, Sympathy, thy ftill returning pang? And why his generous arm should justice raile,
To dare the vengeance of a tyrant's fang?
Or froward wish of discontent fulni,
Bút blames with keen reproach thy partial wil.
Of human woes, how impotent thy lirile! High 'o'er thy mounds devouring furges ride,
Nor reck thy bafiled loili, or javiind life.
The bower of bliss, the smile of love be thine,
Unlabour'd ease, and leisures careless dream.
And own her charms beyond compare supreme !"
The Laws agains Ingrossing, Forestalling, Regrating, and monopo
lizing. Containing all the Statutes and adjudged Cases concerning
HE laws against the above-mentioned offences are here,
stated in a very full and accurate manner; and notwithAtanding they may, in some particulars, be deemed defective, yet such as they are, were they but vigorously put in force, there would not be so many grievances resulting from the pernicious practices, which have larely more than ever been the subject of universal complaint.
The policy of all well-governed states has eyer been directed to check the rapacity of tradesmen, whose self-interest prompts them to use every artifice for obtaining inordinate profit : and the Athenian laws were so strict in this respect, that they even made it penal in a trader to sell a commodity at a less price than was at first offered him.
With regard to our laws respecting the above offences, they labour under one disadvantage which is common to all penal laws, that is, the odium attending the character of an informer. But instead of punishing the breach of the law, the best policy would be, if possible, to prevent the offence : and perhaps it would contribute greatly to this end, if farmers, &c. were put under an obligation of bringing their goods to an open market: which might be done by abolishing the offices of falesinen, factors, and all intermediate agents, who only serve to enhance the price of commodities; for the greater number of hands they
pass through, the dearer they must come to the consumer, as a profit must be made by every one concerned.
We are sensible, however, that this would be a nice experiment to make, and such a one as should not be attempted per
Letters, on the Force of Imagination in Pregnant IV omen. Wherein
it is proved, by incontestille A.guments, drawn both from Reason and Experience, that it is a ridiculsus Prejudice to suppose
. it poffible for a pregnant Woman to mark her Child with the Figure of any Object fe has longed for. 12mo. Griffin. HE academy of sciences at Petersburg proposed, among
their prize questions a few years ago, the following query ; · Whether the imagination of pregnant women did really affect the fætus ; if so, how far, and what were the phyfical causes of such affection ?' Whether the letters before us were written in consequence of this academical prize, we know not; but we are much mistaken if they were penned originally in English ; the philosophy of them being evidently much superior to their style.
Many persons of learning, fays the Writer, have endeavoured to overturn the common prejudice of the force of imagination in pregnant women, but with little fuccess ; some of them denying or concealing the facts which seem to authorize it; while others have treated the subject in too abstruse a manner, and in too technical a stile to instruct or convince those who are principally interested in its investigation. Whether our Author hath fucceeded better than his predeceffors, the effect his letters may have on the fair sex will probably soon determine.
The propofitions, which the Letter-writer undertakes to prove, are, that pregnant women cannot mark the infant in the womb, with the figure of those things which particularly affect them, or for which they are said to long; because the mother cannot communicate her ideas, her apprehenfio:is, or fears, to the infant; and that even if this communication were poflible, and the infant fendible of the mother's paflions, yet the child could not experience any other effects therefrom, than those which the mother herself experienced; and fince there never was an instance of the mother's being marked herself with the figure of what the longed for, or was particularly affected by, it is equally impossible for the child to be marked with those objects: all the external marks, which have been ridiculoufly ascribed to the force of imagination, being the consequences of the mechanism, which fecundaces the egg, that incloses the first rudia ments of the infant,
In regard to the communication of ideas between the mother and child ; the Writer enters into metaphysical arguments A priori, in order to disprove the supposition of Malbranche on this head. We conceive, however, that not only the principles he advances, are justly controvertible; but that even bis reafonings are sometimes false. Not that we mean to say, they affect the main design of the Author's argument; which is sufficiently supported by practical reasons deduced more certainly a pofteriori. We judged it not amiss, however, to put him in mind, that the poftulata he assumes respecting the foul, the animal spirits and the mechanism of thought, are by no means universally allowable; so that his deductions from such principles have not that demonstrative force he pretends. But, be this as it may, we conceive the Writer hath undertaken a very superAuous and unnecessary task, in endeavouring to disprove the communication of ideas to the mind, or as he calls it, the soul of the foetus. It had been excusable to have disputed this point with Malbranche before the days of Mr. Locke; but the absurdity of the supposition is sufficiently obvious to all, who have learned any thing from that great philosopher, of the nature of our ideas, and the manner of acquiring them.
Admitting, however, that a child in the womb has not, nor can acquire any ideas, by communication from those of the mother, it does not, in our opinion, necessarily follow, that it cannot be affected by her pallions. Our philosopher says every pollion fupposes an idea; fo that if the mother cannot communicate her passions she cannot communicate her ideas.' We are afraid there is some want of accuracy in this reasoning; as there is a very wide difference betweeen pafion and intellect, nor do our affections and our ideas proceed from the same source. But even this point is not altogether necessary to be insisted on. It may be admitted that the passions and affections of the mother have an influence on her child, without concluding that the body of an infant must be marked with the determinate figure of the object, which might excite such passion or affection. We need not go so far as to assert with our Author, that the union bea twixt the mother and child is entirely corporeal, in which the foul has not the least share ; the arguments he adduccs in support of his main point, are sufficiently cogent without it. “The imagination of the mother, says he, could not mark the child with the figure of any object but through the means of the blood or animal spirits ; to mark the child by means of the blood, the general movement of the mass of blood, and the particular motion of its component particles, must be entirely subservient to the infiuence of the soul. Reason and experience convince us of the contrary, the blood circulates, the particles of the blood are divided, are reunited, and distributed to different parts, the
body receives its nourishment and growth from it: different parts of the body are deprived of it and perish, independent of our will. The imagination of the mother is equally weak with regard to the blood which passes to the body of the child, she can neither regulate the motion or quantity of it, she cannot ftop those particles from passing, which occasion diseases or death to the infant. Every thing is according to the laws of circulation entirely mechanical : hence it appears that the imagination of pregnant women cannot by means of the blood mark the bodies of their infants with the figures of those things which they longed for.'
As a farther confirmation of the mere corporeal and mechani. cal connection between the mother and child, the Author enters into an examination of the power of the mother's imagination over the body of the infant, in regard to the addition of any new parts, or the destruction of those already formed. It hath been advanced, he says, that the mother's being frightened at the fight of the claw of a lobster is the reason of an infant's being born wanting some of its fingers, that the meeting a maimed person is the cause of an infant's being born without an hand; by having heard speak of a monster with many heads, the imagination of the mother has occasioned another head to grow on the neck of the child ; in short the unexpected meeting of an animal which has surprized and frighted the pregnant woman, has occasioned the child to resemble that animal. But, fuppose the imagination of the mother can mark the infant with the resemblance of what particularly affected her, its power must be consequently confined to represent those objects only of which she can have an idea : I observed in the preceeding letter, that the mother can have a knowlege of the external surfaces of objects only, that she neither has nor can have any knowlege of their internal structure, their connexions, nor proportions. The parts added to the body of the infant have an internal arrangement which the mother cannot be acquainted with. Can the imagination of the mother then produce that which she is igno. rant of,, which never struck her fancy, and which she cannot have any idea of? This is certainly impossible. These parts are organized, have a form and internal disposition of parts like the other parts of the infant; they must then have the same origin. The mother who cannot by the force of her imagination create an infant, cannot by the same effort create the least part of one: but can the efface and destroy those parts which are already formed? If the mother could by the force of imagination de
Atroy a part of an infant, she could by the same effort of her imagination destroy an whole infant. Were this the case how efficacious then would remorse and shame be to preserve female honour)