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L. R., 9 Eq. 28; Lytton v. Great N. R. Co., 2 Kay & J. 394; Hood v. North-East. R. Co., L. R., 8 Eq. 666; L. R., 5 Ch. App. 525; Wilson v. Northampton & Banbury Juuc. R. C., L. R., 9 Ch. App. 279. In the last mentioned case, a railroad company agreed, for valuable consideration, with the land-owner to erect and fit up a station on certain lands which they had bought from him; but the agreement contained no further description of the station, nor any stipulation as to the use of it. The company refused to erect the station in the specified place, but substituted one at a distance of two miles therefrom. This substituted station the landowner refused to accept in lieu of the one to which he was entitled under the agreement. And the court upon application for specific performance, while holding that the case was fully within the jurisdiction for specific performance of the agreement, concluded that because of the indefinite character of the agreement, more complete justice could be done by awarding compensation, by way of damages, under the Stat. 21 & 22 Vict., known as Lord Cairn's Act, which only applies in cases where the court has jurisdiction to entertain the application for specific performance. But as in this case the specific execution of the covenant would be attended with no little difficulty, and as the relief prayed by the bill was in the alternative, she was entitled to receive a sum of money equivalent to the value of such house in lieu thereof. 2 Story Eq., § 799; Rider v. Gray, 10 Md. 282, 300; Bowie v. Stonestreet,6 id. 419,431. This case would seem to fall within the reason and scope of the principle upon which compensation may be awarded. Busey v. Curley. Opinion by Alvey, C. J.

JURISDICTION-OVER PERSON WAIVED BY APPEARANCE. Where the subject-matter of the suit is one over which the court has jurisdiction, the appearance of the defendant by attorney waives the objection to the jurisdiction. In Oulton v. Radcliffe, L. R., 9 Com. Pleas, 195, Denman, J., says: "Actual service of the writ is not essential. If the defendant appears, that gives the court jurisdiction to proceed, provided the subject-matter of the action is one over which the court has jurisdiction." Keating, J., says in the same case: "The question is, whether the fact of the writ having been served out of the jurisdiction makes the subsequent proceedings void; in other words, whether the appearance of the defendant by his attorney, though the service was such that he was not bound to appear, gives the palatinate court jurisdiction. I am of opinion that the appearance did waive the objection to the jurisdiction." After an appearance it is too late to object to any infirmity in respect to the service of the writ or summons, except where the appearance is made for the special purpose of raising the objection. Ireton v. Mayor, etc. Opinion by Irving, J.

WILL-OBLITERATION---INOPERATIVE ALTERATION— STATUTE MUST BE FOLLOWED.-A testator cannot by the obliteration of certain words in his will, convert a life estate into a fee simple. A testator left ten children--seven sons and three daughters. By his will he directed that his estate be divided into ten equal parts or shares, and he gave to all his children life estates in their respective shares, with remainders over to their children, except his sons J. E. and L., to whom he gave their respective shares absolutely and in fee. Some time after the execution of the will, the testator erased or obliterated the names of his sons J. E. and L., wherever they occurred by drawing a line through them with his pen, but leaving the names legible. The erasures operated to confer estates in fee simple on all the sons. Held, that the attempted obliterations were inoperative, and the will should be read as it was originally written and executed. Any alteration in a will by interlineation or obliteration, whereby a dif

ferent disposition of the estate is sought to be made, will be held void, and the will will operate as originally executed. Every alteration in a testamentary disposition of real estate must be authenticated in the manner prescribed by the statute. Eschbach v. Collins. Opinion by Yellott, J. Alvey, C. J., concurs. [All the authorities including those cited by the court are collated in 45 Am. Rep. 327, note.-ED.]

MARRIAGE-ANTE-NUPTIAL DEED-CONSTRUCTIONINTENTION.—Whenever it appears from the face of a deed executed in contemplation of marriage, and as an ante-nuptial settlement of the property of the woman, that the intention is to carry the title to the property beyond the period of the wife's death, and to exclude the husband, that intention must prevail, and the court will give a liberal construction to its language in order to discover and effectuate such intent. Ward v. Thompson, 6 G. & J. 349; Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. 291; Townshend v. Matthews, 10 id. 251; Hutchins v. Dixon, 11 id. 29; Denton v. Denton, 17 id. 403; Marshall v. Beall, 6 How. 70. In some of these cases the provisions of the conveyances are very similar to those in the present deed, while in others the intention to exclude the husband is much less apparent; but the rule of decision is the same in all. A deed executed in contemplation of marriage conveyed certain property in trust, the grantor to be permitted to take and receive during her life the net income and profits thereof, to her sole and separate use, full power to dispose of the same by deed or will being reserved, and failing so to do, and dying intestate, the same to be held for her children or their descendants if she left any, if not, for her heirs-at-law. The intended husband was one of the witnesses to the deed, which was placed on record after the marriage. The grantor died intestate without issue, leaving her husband surviving her. Held, that the intent of the grantor to carry the title to the property beyond her life and to exclude her husband, was plainly manifest, and he was not entitled to any interest or share therein. Moody v. Hall. Opinion by Miller, J.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS-MEMORANDUM-TIME OF DELIVERY-CUSTOM-INSTRUCTION MUST PREJUDICE TO REVERSE. It is not necessary in the written note or memorandum of the sale of goods, required by the Statute of Frauds, that the time of the delivery should be stated, provided no time was fixed in the parol agreement. But if a time for the delivery of the goods be fixed in the verbal agreement of sale, such time must be incorporated in the written note or memorandum thereof. 1 Benj. on Sales, 277. If no time be fixed in the agreement, for the delivery of the goods sold, the law will imply that it is the duty of the seller to deliver them in a reasonable time, and what is a reasonable time must depend upon the circumstances surrounding the case, and the character of the goods dealt in. If there be an established custom among merchants who deal in the particular goods sold, regulating the time of such delivery, the deliv ery will be regulated and controlled by such custom. 2 Benj. on Sales, 891; Williams v. Woods, Bridges & Co., 16 Md. 220; Salmon Falls Manf. Co. v. Goddard. 14 How. (U. S.) 446. Before a case will be reversed, it must appear, not only that the instruction complained of was erroneous, but that the appellant was preju diced thereby. Young v. Mertens, 27 Md. 114; Parker v. Wallis, 60 id. 15. Kriete v. Myer. Opinion by Stone, J.

CRIMINAL LAW.

LARCENY-PRESUMPTION FROM POSSESSION.-A pris oner's exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen

property, recently after a theft, raises a presumption that he is the thief, and such presumption takes the burden of proof from the prosecution and lays it upon the prisoner. Roscoe Crim. Ev. 18; 2 Russ Cr. 338. To the same effect see Phil. Ev. (7th ed.) 186; Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177; People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156; State v. Brady, 27 Iowa, 126; State v. Creson, 38 Mo. 372; State v. Turner,.65 N. C. 592; Walters v. People, 104 Ill. 544; Sahlinger v. People, 102 id. 242. Aud so far as we have been able to discover, the California courts (18 Cal. 383; 48 id. 253) stand almost alone in the modification of the doctrine. Sup. Ct. Arizona, Jan., 1884. Territory v. Casio. Opinion by Penney, J. (2 Pac. R. 755.) [See 58 Ind. 340; 56 N. Y. 315; 6 Neb. 102; 52 Miss. 695; 114 Mass. 299; 1 Hun, 670; 54 Ill. 405.-ED.]

ACCESSORY-RECORD OF CONVICTION-REMARKS OF PROSECUTING OFFICER-WHEN NOT ERROR.-The statute authorizes the charging of an accessory before the fact as a principal. State v. Cassady, 12 Kas. 550. Upon the trial of an accessory before the fact, the record of the conviction of the principal is proof prima facie of that fact; but this is not conclusive, and other evidence of the commission of the crime by the principal is admissible. Levy v. People, 80 N. Y. 327; Arnold v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. App. 435. (2) Upon the trial of a defendant charged with a criminal offense, the latter rested without testifying. The State introduced a witness and offered to prove certain facts, to which the defendant objected as not being proper rebuttal. Thereupon the county attorney said to the court, in the hearing and presence of the jury: "Your honor, we had a right to presume that the defendant would testify as a witness in his own behalf, in which case this evidence would have been proper rebuttal, and we having failed to do so, we claim the right to introduce it now." Held, that these remarks to the court were not such an infringement upon the statute forbidding the prosecuting attorney to refer to the fact that the defendant did not testify in his own behalf as requires us under the circumstances of this case to grant a new trial. We understand the statute is explicit that when a defendant in a criminal cause declines to testify in his own behalf, absolute silence on the subject is enjoined on counsel in their argument on the trial, and that the courts will hold prosecuting attorneys to a strict observance of their duty in this respect. State v. Graham, 17 N. W. Rep. 192; Long v. State, 56 Ind. 182; 26 Am. Rep. 19; Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239; 25 Am. Rep. 87. Yet we do not think the incidental allusion to the court by the county attorney, under the circumstances, was such misconduct as requires us to grant a new trial. The remarks of the county attorney were not made in an address to the jury, were not directed to the jury, nor intended for the jury. It is possible and more than probable that the members of the jury heard the remarks, as they were uttered in their presence, but the county attorney evidently did not intend to infringe upon the provision of the foregoing statute, and we cannot regard his remarks, made as they were, as material error.

Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio St. 366. Sup. Ct. Kansas, Jan., 1884. State v. Mosley. Opinion by Horton, C. J. (31 Kans. 355.) [See 2 Pac. Rep. 609; 61 Iowa, 559; 32 Eng. Rep. 277-9.—ED.]

EVIDENCE-POSSESSION OF STOLEN GOODS.-On an indictment for stealing goods, and also for receiving ing them knowing them to have been stolen, under section 19 of the Prevention of Crimes Act 1871, evidence of other stolen goods being found in the possession of the prisoner is not admissible unless they are found in his possession at the same time; that is, at the time he was found in possession of the goods he is indicted for stealing Reg. v. Drage, 14 Cox C. C. 85;

28 Eng. Rep. 534; per Bramwell, B., followed. Cir. Cas. Res., April 5, 1884. Reg. v. Carter. Opinion by Coleridge, C. J. [50 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 596.]

JUROR-DISQUALIFICATION- NEW TRIAL-VIEW WAIVER.-A petition for a new trial on the ground that one of the jurors was disqualified by a relationship of consanguinity is addressed to the discretion of the court. Such a petition will not be granted when the relationship was by consanguinity in the sixth degree, was probably unknown to the juror, and was not shown to have injuriously affected the accused. "A new trial will not be granted in a criminal case," says the Supreme Court of West Virginia, in a case similar to the case at bar, "for matter that is a principal cause of challenge to a juror, which existed before he was elected and sworn as such juror, but which was unknown to the prisoner until after the verdict, and which could not have been discovered before the juror was so sworn by the exercise of ordinary diligence; unless it appears from the whole case that the prisoner suffered injustice from the fact that such juror sat upon the case." State v. Williams, 14 W. Va. 851, 869; State v. McDonald,9 id. 456; McDonald v. Beall,55 Ga. 288, 293. When a view is had in a criminal case the accused may waive his right to be present at the view. Such a waiver is presumed when he does not ask to be present and makes no objection in the course of the trial after the view; and when the view was allowed at the request of his counsel, who stated that the health of the accused precluded his attendance. A reporter who was present at the trial, whose occupation would naturally lead him to note and remember the incidents of it, makes affidavit that the court spoke to one of the counsel for the prisoner in regard to what was to be done with him, and that the counsel replied that his health was such that it would not be prudent for him to go with the jury on such a severe day. We think that under these circumstances the prisoner must be held to have waived his privilege, which in our opinion it was competent for him to do. State v. Adams, 20 Kans. 311, 323; United States v. Sacramento, 2 Mont. 239, 241; People v. Murray, 5 Crim. Law Mag. 223; State v. Polson, 29 Iowa, 133; Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 31; Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 697; Fight v. State, 7 Ohio, 180; McCorkle v. State, 14 Iud. 39. Sup. Ct. Rhode Island, April 4, 1884. State v. Congdon. Opinion by Durfee, C. J. (As to first point see 6 Allen [N. B.], 389. [14 R. I.]

EVIDENCE-LEADING QUESTION-ASSUMING FACT.A question which assumes the existence of a fact essential to a conviction, where there was no evidence that the fact existed, is entirely inadmissible. The question is leading, as are all questions to a witness which assume the existence of facts material to the issue, which have not been proved. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 434; 1 Starkie Ev. (10th ed.) 197; Turney v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 104. Hence the specific objection was well taken and ought to have been sustained. But it is sometimes said that it rests in the sound discretion of the trial court to allow leading questions to be put to witnesses, and that error cannot be assigned on the rulings in that behalf. It is undoubtedly the law that if a witness appears to be hostile to the party producing him, or unwilling so give evidence, it is in the discretion of the court to allow leading questions to be put to him, and in such cases error cannot, in general, be assigned upon the ruling. 1 Greenl. Ev., § 255. But here the witness does not appear to have manifested any hostil. ity to the prosecution, or any unwillingness to testify. Under all the circumstances of the case, we think the ruling of the court permitting the above question to be put to the female witness was not a proper exercise of the discretion of the court, and that such ruling may be assigned as error. See opinion by Chief Jus

tice Sharkey in Turney v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 120; Gunter v. Watson, 4 Jones (La.), 455. Because the error may have prejudiced the plaintiff in error, it is fatal to the conviction. Sup. Ct. Wis., May 15, 1884. Klock v. State. Opinion by Lyon, J. (19 N. W. Rep. 543.)

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE-DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES-WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS-MATERIALITY--CONDITIONS WORK

ING FORFEITURE-WAIVER.-(1) Where in an application for insurance whereby the assured agrees that the application is a just, full and true exposition of all the facts and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value and risk of the property, so far as the same are known to him, and are material to the risk, it is immaterial whether the statements are regarded as warranty, or merely as representations of the truth of the statement, because the applicant only assumes responsibility for their truth so far as the facts are known to him and material to his risk. Houghton v. Manufacturer's Ins. Co., 8 Met. 114. The application and the policies are to be read together, and it is a familiar rule in the interpretation of conditions which work a forfeiture that they are not to be extended by construction, and being inserted for the benefit of the insurer, they are to be liberally construed in favor of the assured. No effect can be given to the covenant on the part of the applicant at the end of the application, unless it is construed as restricting his undertaking and holding him accountable for the accuracy of his statements so far only as the facts stated are material to the risk. If every statement and the truth of every answer were to be treated as material, there would be nothing upon which the restriction could operate. In this application the assured represented by his answer to the eighteenth question that there was no planingmachine upon the premises, but the premises to which the question and answer refer are the insured premises, not the adjuncts or adjoining premises. Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Germania Ins. Co., 40 Wis. 446; Carlin v. Western Assurance Co., 57 Md. 515. There was therefore no misrepresentation. (2) When a question is not answered it is not to be inferred that there was nothing which required an answer, and in such case, if the answer is not responsive or satisfactory, the insurer waives a full answer. Higgins v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 74 N. Y. 6; Carson v. Jersey City Ins. Co., 43 N.J. L. 300; Com. v. Hide & Leather Ins. C., 112 Mass. 136. (3) Conditions that work a forfeiture are not to be extended by construction. Being put into the policy for the benefit of the insurer, they will be construed most liberally for the assured. (4) The materiality of the representation is a question of fact. The test is the probable effect of the representation upon the judgment of the insurer. Cir. Ct., N. D. N. Y., March 4, 1884. Mulville v. Adams. Opinion by Wallace, J. (19 Fed. Rep.)

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

14TH BRADWELL. Reports of the Decisions of the Appellate Courts of the State of Illinois. By James B. Bradwell, vol. xiv. Containing all the remaining opinions of the first district up to, and including a portion of those filed on the 20th day of May, 1884, and all the remaining opinions of the second and third districts, up to June 19, 1884, and all the remaining opinions of the fourth district, up to the 15th day of July, 1884. Chicago, Chicago Legal News Company, 1884. pp. 723.

The reporter's work on this series, which is now so well known in the profession, has always been and continues to be admirably done; indeed some engaged in the same work might study them as models. He makes a head-note, and does not make it a mere reiteration of the words of the opinion, with the aid of the scissors. The present volume is well printed and has a good index. We note the case of Johnson v. Van Epps, p. 201, holding that the beneficiary in a life policy where the insured retains the control thereof may be changed with the consent of the insurer. The court discusses the cases at length. In St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hill, p. 579, the court discusses the question of discrimination by carriers regarding freight.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, Oct. 14, 1884:

Order of General Term affirmed-People v. William Couraly. Motion to put on preferred calendar grauted without costs-People ex rel. Alfred Lawrence, respondent, v. Elias Mann and another, appellants; George Mark and another, appellants, v. State of New York, respondent.- -Motion to put cause on preferred calender granted, with costs-People, respondents, v. Western Union Telegraph Company, appellants; People v. Gold and Stock Telegraph Company.-Motion for this court to request Supreme Court to return remittitur denied, without costs-Charles Wager and others, respondents, v. Eliza H. Wager, appellant.Motion for re-argument denied, without costs-John D. McLean, respondent, v. Andrew McLean, appellant.. -Motion to dismiss appeal denied with $10 costs-John A. Hurron, respondent, v. William G. Oppenheim, appellant.

NOTES.

The American Law Register for September contains a leading article on Railway Insurance by Adelbert Hamilton, and the following cases: Queen v. Price (Eng.), on cremation as a nuisance, with note by Marshall D. Ewell; Ort v. Fowler (Kans.), on negligent signing of a promissory note, with note by Henry Wade Rogers; Davis v. Duncan (U. S. Circ.), on liabil ity of receiver for torts of employees, with note by Charles L. Billings; Railroad Co. v. Gallagher (Ohio), on liability of master to one summoned by his servant to assist bim, with note by John F. Kelly. "Life" wants to know if a blind man can maintain an action on a draft at sight. The late Mr. Beavan, the most voluminous reporter of his day, was a generous son of the Middle Temple. A silver snuff-box presented by him has for years lain on the polished oak of the senior bar mess, and is during term duly sneezed over night after night by barristers who never take snuff out of hall. One of the items of his will is a bequest of " my gold répoussé snuff-box" to the benchers," over which they will in the future have an opportunity of blessing one another."-London Law Journal. (Referring to the classic custom of saying "God bless you!" whenever any one sneezes.)

The Albany Law Journal.

OUR

ALBANY, OCTOBER 25, 1884.

CURRENT TOPICS.

UR reminiscences of Judge Folger have awakened considerable interest among our readers. One of them early discovered that the judge was wrong in attributing the poem, "The Auld Ash Tree," to Motherwell, and we are indebted to another for information of the authorship and a copy of the poem. The poem was written by Thomas Davidson, a young Scotch clergyman of a good deal of promise, who died about 1870. The poem has a sad significance when read in the light of Judge Folger's last letter to us. It is as follows:

THE AULD ASH TREE.

There grows an ash by my bour door,
And a' its boughs are buskit-braw

In fairest weeds o' simmer green,
And birds sit singing on them a'.

But cease your sangs, ye blithesome birds,
An' o' your liltin' let me be;

Ye bring deid simmers frae their graves
To weary me, to weary me!

There grows an ash by my bour door,
And a' its boughs are clad in snaw;
The ice drap hangs at ilka twig

And sad the nor' wind soughs thro' a'. Oh, cease thy mane, thou norlan' wind And o' thy wailin' let me be ;

Thou brings deid winters frae their graves To weary me, to weary me!

Oh, I wad fain forget them a';

Remembered guid but deepens ill As gleids o' licht far seen by nicht

Mak' the near mirk but mirker still.
Then silent be, thou dear auld tree-
O' a' thy voices let me be;

They bring deid years frae their graves
To weary me, to weary me!

Other correspondents have conjectured the meanng of the word "bin" in the poem of "De Massa ob de Sheepfol'," which puzzled Judge Folger. One writes us: "I may be wrong, and certainly would not fancy I could ever understand a word that Judge F. did not, but is not this word clearly the old fashioned bin, of corn-bin and coal-bin? There is in this poem a repetition, as 'sheepfol' is a more correct expression than sheep-bin, though the latter is not incorrect, and sheep fol' bin is simply the expressive poetic repetition that yearned after more rhythm." Two others write to the same effect. One says "sheep bin" and "sheepfold bin" are common expressions in the south.

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boy of sixty or seventy years ago, I think, I remember that we had a bin, or sheep-bin, as we called it, built within the general enclosure for the flock, in which we put sheep about to lamb, sheep that had just lambed, with the little tender lambs themselves, for the purpose of giving them better care and attention than the general flock required. Am I right? I do not think I have heard the word for fifty years, used in that way, but your letter calls it up from the shadowy past, and I more than half think that was the sense in which the poet used it. I am confirmed in this opinion, that it is put in the mouth of "de black and thin" negro, who makes the nice distinction between the divine 'massa' who watches the 'sheepfol'-bin,' where his lambs, and the weak and the old of his flock are specially cared for, and the 'hirelin' shepa'd' who only cares to bring the fat and the thrifty ones into the fold." We ourselves suggested to the judge, at the time of his letter, that bin" must mean a pen or enclosure, but the conjecture of our correspondent last quoted gives a deeper meaning to the expression. We are sure our readers will thank us for dropping into literature sufficiently to put before them two such exquisite poems.

The judges have several bad habits which ought to be corrected, and we are sure they will be glad to have them pointed out by a disinterested party. In some States, especially the western, there is a tendency to cite too many authorities. We have repeatedly found of late from twenty to thirty citations on a single page. This is "damnable iteration." If it is essential to refer to the authorities of all the States on a vexed question, it certainly is not necessary to cite the whole line in each State; the latest or the earliest, or both, would answer every purpose. The judges ought not to degenerate into digest makers or digest transcribers - for that is about all there is of this habit. What adds to the annoyance is that in many instances the citations are incorrect; it is bad enough to be superfluous without being mistaken.

Another bad habit is citing reports by the name of the reporter. We have spoken of this before. It is of course unavoidable to refer to the early reporters in this way, but where the reports have begun to be numbered as State series they should be cited by the number of that series, as in Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, etc. In Pennsylvania the judges persist in the most annoying manner in citing "P. F. Smith," "Outerbridge," etc., instead of the numbers of Pennsylvania State. At all events there should be some uniform system, and the system of citing by the number of the State series seems to us by far the best. In Massachusetts and New York the reporters' names have long since been sunk, as they ought to be, and we wish the Pennsylvania judges would follow the example. The most obvious advantage of the new plan is that it avoids confusion.

The last bad habit to which we refer is the habit of reporting nasty cases in detail. We are sure this is generally the fault of the judges, and not of the reporters, although the latter usually get the blame. The details of all sexual cases ought to be suppressed. There is a case of this sort in 48th Georgia (covering more than one hundred pages) that is a disgrace to the reported jurisprudence of the State, and the same may be said of one in 53 Missouri. We have been told by reporters that judges insisted on the reporting of such cases. If this goes on we shall be obliged to have expurgated editions of State reports for the chaste youth of our profession to study. The reports ought not to be loaded with such filth.

Of codes he says: "Codes are undoubtedly useful for the purpose of settling disputed and doubtful points, and giying to the citizens the ordinary rules of law in a compact and intelligible form; but they should not be allowed to usurp the prerogatives of justice itself, seated in man's bosom, by giving to the letter of the code the inexorable fixity of a statute, and thus reducing the exposition of the law to a question of philology and verbal criticism, instead of a question of reason and justice. Used as a statement of principles and rules applicable to cases clearly within their scope, and not as restraints upon the judge in reference to other cases which are not provided for, and which require a new application of principles, i. e., the principles of right and justice governing analogous cases, codes may not | only be admissible, but may be of great service in systematizing and perfecting the law. They should never be employed for the purpose of giving to the law a cast-iron fixity of form, and thereby repressing all progress and imposing a deleterious and smothering restraint upon society itself."

He pays the following tribute to one of the great" est lawyers whom our country has ever produced, but one almost unknown to fame: "One of the greatest, if not the greatest, of forensic speakers, as well as lawyers, that I ever knew, was the late Mr. George Wood, of New York -in his early days a leader of the bar of New Jersey. His discourse to the court was always grave, dignified and commanding; his diction was chaste and pure, and his style was rich in correct legal phraseology; so that he seemed when speaking to be the personification of the law itself. He made no gestures, and but few references to author

We have had great enjoyment in reading Mr. Justice Bradley's recent address delivered before the law department of the University of Pennsylvania, as we always have in reading any thing from the pen of this most admirable of judicial writers. Two or three extracts will serve to show its quality. Of the influence of law he says: "At first view, when we walk about amongst our fellow men, we may not observe the omnipotent influence and controlling effect of the law. Its power is so subtle and all-pervading that everything seems to take place as the spontaneous result of existing conditions and circumstances. It is like gravitation in the natural world, which, whilst it governs and controls every movement, and produces all the order of the Universe, is itself unseen. It must be studied in its effects in order to understand its power. So with law in civil society. It is over, under, in, and around every action that takes place. Its silent reign is seen in the order preserved, the person and property protected, the sense of security manifested; in the freedom of intercourse, in the cheerful per-ities; he did not need authorities; you knew as he formance of labor, in the confidence with which business is transacted, and trust is reposed by one man in another; in the peaceful and contented pursuit of trades and occupations, and the bestowal of services; all goes on cheerfully and smoothfully, working out and interworking the constant evolution of human happiness. because of the ever-existing (though generally unrecognized), conscious-chained attention, even when opposed to him in ness of the presence, the watchfulness, and the allsufficient protection of the law. In ordinary conduct, conformity to its rules and requirements is pursued almost as a second nature; but in transactions requiring authentic evidence, greater knowledge, perhaps professional skill, is required; and when questions of ambiguity, complexity and difficulty arise, which the parties themselves cannot amicably solve, then of course the skill of the lawyer, and perhaps the wisdom and authority of the judge, must be resorted to. But compared with the millions of transactions which take place, these ripples on the surface do not often occur. The mighty river of things generally moves on with an undisturbed current; but only because it is kept in its banks and regulated in its course by the power of law."

spoke that what he said was the law. All was reduced to such plain and simple principles, and enforced with such logical clearness of argument, in the chastest, as well as the richest and most appropriate legal diction, that he compelled the closest attention and carried conviction along with him to the end. I have often hung upon his lips with

the case, and can truly say that I never enjoyed a greater intellectual treat than in listening to his arguments."

Kentucky forever! This time it is ex-Chief Justice Hargis who has been distinguishing himself. Our readers will have seen in the daily press the account of his gallant encounter with another lawyer at the bar, and how the grave ex-chief condescended to throw a pair of law books at his antagonist's head. It is to be hoped that wounded honor is now satisfied, and that nobody will kill himself or any body else. The only mistake the ex-chief made was in not selecting heavier missiles of the like kind. A volume of Louisiana Annual in bulk or of West Vir ginia in quality must inevitably have done for his enemy if it had hit him.

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