denied, is a true knowledge, that is, it represents the objects on which it is set as they really exist, pierces into their very essence, and comprehends all their qualities. To confine ourselves, then, to man's actions, let us ask what relation does God's foreknowledge bear to them. It is their exact representation in the Divine mind, it being a true knowledge, is a knowledge of the actions as they are, it comprehends them in themselves and in all pertaining to them. It bears to them no such relation as that of a cause, inasmuch as power to cause belongs to the will of God. Will is the source of power, knowledge is the representation in the mind of objects in consciousness or in the external world. To suppose, therefore, that God's foreknowledge necessitates human actions is to commit a metaphysical blunder, and to attribute to one department of mind that which belongs to another. If human acts are necessitated by a foreign power, that power can originate only in the will of God, but God's foreknowledge is not God's will, therefore God's foreknowledge does not necessitate human acts. In support of this opinion it were an easy matter to quote a host of passages from the Christian Fathers. The author of the Questiones et Responsiones in Justin Martyr's Works says, 'Foreknowledge is not the cause of that which is future, but that which is future is the cause of foreknowledge.' And Joh: Damascenus, writing on the true faith, says, 'It is necessary to know, that though God foreknows all things, he does not predestinate all things.'

Let us suppose that God knows that at a time yet future I will do a certain thing-say that I will eat. What in this case does God's knowledge comprehend? The act as connected with a chain of antecedent and consequent circumstances. If, for instance, we trace this act to its source we have-the feeling of hunger, and the perception of this by the mind-a deliberation as to whether it is better to remain hungry or to satisfy the cravings of appetite-a preference of the latter-a determination to eat-the fulfilling of this determination in the act of eating. These, we may suppose, are some of the things known by God in connection with my foreknown act. But is this all? By no means; for God not only knows that I will feel, perceive, judge, prefer, determine, and act, but he knows exactly what is the nature of these things-that is, since God's is a true knowledge it represents to him each of these acts and feelings correctly. This being the case, whatever else we may be able to say of the Divine knowledge, we can most confidently say this-that it leaves its objects as to their nature entirely unaltered. But we can go further than thiswe can analyse these various states of mind, and so learn the real character of each, and thus learn what God's knowledge of them is. And, as at present we are most concerned with man's freedom, we shall consider them with reference to it. We may pass over all these states until we come to the volition, for there is no element of freedom in any of them up to that point. The feeling and its perception are beyond the control of our will, the deliberation is a mere consideration with doubt, the preference is the verdict of the intellect in the matter, and is devoid of real power; but in the next step a new and hitherto unknown element comes before us. The volition is wholly free. We are in this state conscious of the ability to eat or not to eat; of the power in the same circumstances to feast or fast. The act proper is the issuing of the will's power through the physical organisation into contact with the external world. These things, at least, are comprehended in God's foreknowledge of my act of eating. He foreknows, then, among other things, that I do it freely, unnecessitated by any foreign power whatever. If God's foreknowledge does not include this, it is an incorrect knowledge, that is, it is no knowledge. In other words, if God's forekhowledge does not include among other things the fact that I act freely, he either tells me through my consciousness what he does not know as existing--that is, my freedom; or he deceives me by telling me what he knows as not existing. I am, yours respectfully, J. M.

Our Open Page.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE DEFENDER.

DEAR SIR, The correspondent to the open page' of the Defender labours under great disadvantage, when the editor does not insert the whole article sent, which is a reply to what had been previously stated by him to his readers. Such was the case in an article from me, part of which appeared in No. 18, of the Defender. Upon what was sent, or was inserted, the editor says:-'All that you have written is an entire evasion of our argument.' But, it substantiates my own argument, and that was intended, by the part inserted. It is also said, the five premises that I laid down do not warrant my conclusion. I believe my conclusion to be in strict accordance with the premises stated; and what you have asserted does not invalidate either the premises or the conclusion, as given by me. Again it is said-'We have not denied, and we do not deny, the existence of circumstances likely to influence human volitions; but we have denied, and do deny, that these circumstances necessitate man's choice.'

Here you seem to use the word circumstances in a more limited sense, upon this subject, than I do. Upgrown men and women are circumstances, that influence children and young persons, by instruction and habits, from which children become creatures of such circumstances that surround them, while they have everything to learn, before they can be useful themselves, or to others in society. The organization, with all its faculties or qualities possessed by the infant, is a circumstance over which the infant has no control, either at birth, or in the early part of its life after birth.

It is only through repeated efforts that we obtain command over our bodily powers, and the same process is necessary for the acquisition of intellectual strength and moral excellence.' The constitution of the individual I never overlook, as a circumstance in the formation of character, which grows with the individual as habits and affections are acquired, and help to make him what he is known to be, in the estimation of himself and others. Man, as a being, is an effect originally, but he afterwards becomes a cause to other effects. This cannot be denied, because facts establish its truthfulness to all who see their own species continued.

I have already proved my position, although nothing specially has been said about the will, by me. I consider will in its primary character to be an effect, induced or brought out by a previous motive; but after the individual has obtained knowledge from experience or education, then will may be a cause in command, or desire, from which certain effects must follow, either to himself or others, when the command or desire is obeyed. That man should have free agency, it were needful that he should be able to will or choose without motive. Action always being the effect of his will, once determined; but by a motive, which is not in his own power, it follows, that he is never, the master of the determination of his own peculiar will; that consequently he never acts as a free agent. Indeed man passes a great portion of his life without even willing. His will attends the motive by which it is determined. It is only by the aid of experience that man acquires the faculty of understanding what he ought to love, of knowing what he ought to fear.'

The free agency doctrine may be tested thus: can man act without motive? He that acts without motive is considered beside himself, not fit to be trusted, or else pitied for his ignorance, or his simplicity. It is as necessary for society to restrain the individual, whose acts are injurious or unjust to others, as it is

for the individual to obey the strongest motive that moves him into action. But society should give the best motive to all, in surrounding its members with the best influences by example in every part of the commonwealth.

Individual interest is opposed to this, as it engenders selfishness by its class institutions or divided arrangements, for party-purposes and individual gain. This system gives its character to all that grow up with it.

Where the effects from the system are bad, it would be the best policy to change the cause-system, and commence on an entire new principle, in order that we may produce better effects.

With respect to the Turk not embracing the truth, when presented to him by the Christian missionary: it is easily accounted for,-the Turk thinks he has the truth from the Koran, and therefore he believes the Christian's truth to be error, where it does not agree with his truth. Only reverse the case, and what would the Christian think; if the Turk told him that he required to be converted to the true faith of Mahomet, before he could be saved. Yours respectfully,

WILLIS KNOWLES:

Hyde, May 23rd, 1855.

AN OPPONENT AT LAST.

SIR,

TO THE EDITOR OF THE DEFENDER.

My attention has been called to an article in the 'Defender' of May 20th, by Observer,' purporting to give an account of his advertisement for an intelligent Infidel' to discuss his principles without indulging in offensive personalities,' and my application for the situation. Permit me to observe that when I saw the advertisement of 'Observer,' and replied to it-it was with the understanding that an 'intelligent Infidel' was wanted to explain the views of his party, and defend them from the attacks of 'Observer.' In this, it appears I was disappointed, for the advertiser declines entering into such a controversy, and hands me over to the tender mercies of the editor by usurping the editorial functions of informing me "that the editor would insert in extenso any article he (I) would send him (Editor) against Christianity, and reply to it." I mentioned to Observer' my willingness to commence a series of articles against Christianity, beginning with the question of the "Existence of God, and ending with that of responsibility." I am prepared to discuss the whole range of difference betwixt the Christian and the Atheist, in a series of connected letters in the 'open page' of the Defender, providing that an opponent on the side of Christianity shall reply to my letters in the same number of the Defender, so that the statement and the refutation may appear simultaneous, and the whole controversy be conducted with good-feeling on both sides. For myself, I shall not introduce any isolated texts from the Bible, but will devote my attention to the leading principles of Christianity; if those be not sufficient for the Atheist to refute his opponent's creed, I for one would give in the palm of victory to the Bible, and I have observed with pain, that the communications which have already appeared in the Defender' from men calling themselves Atheists, must have done their cause great harm by the apparently trivial objections they have made towards Christianity. I would therefore, propose, that the

following leading doctrines of Christianity be comprehensively treated. 1st-"The existence of God." 2nd-" The immortality and immateriality of the soul." 3rd-"The fall of man." 4th-"The atonement."

5th

"The evidence and truthfulness of miracles." 6th-"The truth of prophecy, &c." I am prepared to enter into and discuss the truth or falsity of those doctrines, my only aim being to come to a solution of those problems whether on the affirmative or negative position. I have devoted years of study to overturn (what I now consider) the false teachings of my Christian educators, and conscientiously believing that there is not the slightest foundation in facts or human stature for the claims of Christianity. I am ready to support my belief to the best of my ability, in advocating what I believe to be true, and opposing what I think is false.

I shall neither attempt to be witty nor sarcastic, for the honor of Christianity cannot be shaken by a sneer, or be overturned by a bon-mot. My principles I will unfold, (with the editor's permission) and if they are defensible, I will defend them; if not, I will own myself unable to successfully fight against that Old Tree which has braved the blasts of • near 2000 years.

W. H. J.,

Secretary Huddersfield Secular Society.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL.

We are thankful that there is now a prospect of having a thorough discussion of the question in our open page.' We shall leave Mr. Johnson to choose for himself the course that he deems best; and we shall secure a combatant who will reply in the same number in which his communications appear.

MAN AND CIRCUMSTANCES.

DEAR SIR,

TO THE EDITOR OF THE DEFENDER.

Mr. Willis Knowles complains that his last communication was not inserted in full in the pages of tke "Defender." He surely cannot expect that in your limited space you will insert more than is relavant to the point under discussion. This I suppose you did; and I doubt not that Mr. K. will be satisfied when he considers that to fill up pages with irrelavant matter not only makes a periodical unreadable; but deadens the power of any writer's article.

In his letter of this week Mr. K. most seriously contradicts himself, and as we shall see faults all that the most strenous advocates of the will's freedom can desire. As it is impossible for one to notice every point in your correspondent's letter, perhaps I may be permitted to criticize some of its statements, without seeking to obtain any advantage in the way of making unfair selections. Mr. K. still asserts, what no one would think of denying, that circumstances influence human condition; and says that you used circumstances in a more limited sense than he. To all this we say the question at issue is not, do circumstances influence, but do they necessitate man's will? Until Mr. K. proves this latter point, he fails to establish his assertion that man is not a free agent.

66

But, strange to say, it is granted that man is a free agent, for after being an effect, he becomes a cause; if so then, man being the cause of his acts, motives cannot be the cause, nor can circumstances, nor anything else; this is all we contend for, and this is what Mr. K. says cannot be denied, because facts establish its truthfulness." After making this most satisfactory admission, Mr. K. says he has proved his position! Proved it, that is the freedom of the will, although nothing specially has been said about the will by him! Next in order is his definition of will. Will in its primary character is an effect, induced or brought out by a previous motive, but after the individual has obtained knowledge from experience or education, their will may be a cause in command or desire, from which certain effects must follow either to himself or others when command or desire is obeyed.' Shade of Aristotle listen to that definition! Will is an effect, will is a cause, a cause which when obeyed produces effects. We have read and heard several definitions of will, but this is unlike them all, it is singularly original.

Kant defines will, as that kind of causality attributed to reasonable beings, differing wholly from causality as found in the material universe.

Locke defines will. The power which the mind has to order the consideration of any idea, as the forbearing to consider it, or to prefer the motive of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa in any particular instance. Locke on the Human Understanding Book, ch. xxi., 85.

Cousin says: "For you the will is not only a mere act without efficiency, it is a productive energy, a cause. History of Philosophy, vol. ii., p. 217. The definitions we can understand. Mr. K.'s we confess is beyond all comprehension. He would much like to know how much knowledge is requisite to trace the will from an effect to a cause; and what process it goes through in being thus wonderfully changed.

to

An action is always an effect of which the will is the cause, and yet, strange say, this cause is determined by a motive, although beyond man's reach. One would suppose that in this case the motive was the cause, and not the will; that the will was only the instrument through which the causal motive reaced the action which is its effect. But, passing this contradiction, we have the whole matter brought to a test. "The free-agency doctrine may be tested thus can man act without motive?" Now this if a true test seems to Mr. K. as a likely way to settle the dispute; and certainly all must admit that it is of the greatest importance to have some such decisive test as that here afforded us. But we submit that this is no test at all, that indeed it could only be proposed as a test by one who does not know what freedom of will is. By freedom, it is meant, that while, on the one hand, in the material universe, events are determined by foreign causes operating externally on their object; the will, on the other hand, is itself a cause determining its own acts, without the aid of any external power; and, also that, that it can not only determine itself without external aid, in any particular case, but in the general life, can also choose the law according to which it will act in general. If this be a true definition, freedom does not consist in the absence of motives, and therefore the test proposed is a useless one, and Mr. K. has entirely failed to bring the matter to a point.

We are glad in being able to agree with our friend in his conclusion. He says, "Society should give the best motive to all, in surrounding its members with the best influence by example in every part of the community;" although we fail to see how this depends upon the principle that is necessary for the individual to obey the strongest motive that moves him into action. The only society we ever heard of that surrounded all its members with the best influences, is a church, in which the influence of God's love and man's brotherhood is continually exerting its ennobling and purifying power in all. We are