faith, the trial court properly held that they were en- which he testifies; but that as respects this matter of titled to recover, in addition to the dawages for the time, it is for the court to receive or reject the proloss of their bargain, the amount expended in making | posed impeaching testimony, in the exercise of a sound such improvements. The contract itself provides that discretion. Teese v. Huntingdon, 23 How. 2; Sleeper the plaintiffs should build a house upon the lot within v. Vau Middlesworth, 4 Denio, 431; Kelly v. State, 61 three months; and his loss in consequence of such ex- Ala. 19; Rathbuu v. Ross, 46 Barb. 127 ; Snow v. Grace, penditure is the natural and legitimate result of the 29 Ark. 131. There may be cases where it would be unauthorized acts of the defendaut. Skaaraas v. Fin- held that the trial court abused its discretion, but we negan. Opinion by Vanderburgh, J. perceive no occasion for so holding in the present in[Decided May 17, 1884.] stance. · Buse v. Page. Opinion by Berry, J. SALE-WHEN CONDITIONAL AND NOT MORTGAGE [Decided May 22, 1884.] IMPEACHING WITNESS.—Where A. conveys land to B. by absolute deed, and B. at the same time executes to NEW JERSEY COURT OF CHANCERY ABA. a bond or agreement conditioned to reconvey the STRACT.* laud to A. upon payment of a certain sum of money at a time specified, the transaction between the parties upon this simple stato of facts purports to be, and MARRIAGE-SETTLEMENT — POWERS OF TRUSTEEprimu facie is, what is called a couditional sale and REVUCATION CLAUSE.-Where a marriage sttlement not a mortgage. Except in Pennsylvania, where a authorizes and empowers the trustee to sell and invest somewhat peculiar doctrine appears to prevail, an ex and re-invest the trust property at the direction of amination of the adjudged cases will generally show the wife, and to pay over the income to her, with a that where a deed absolute and a simultaneous bond provision that if she survives her husband the trustee or agreement for reconveyance have been held to con- is to re-convey the property to her, and it contains no stitute a mortgage, other facts have appeared in addi revocation clause, she can not, during her husband's tion to the simple facts of a deed and bond or agree lifetime, require of the trusstee the payment of the ment. Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22; Haynie v. proceeds of the sale of the trust property. Buchanan Robertsou, 58 Ala. 37; 1 Jones Mortg., § 260 et seq. v. Paterson. Opinion by Runyon, Chancellor. A mortgage is a security for something to be paid or TRUST-COURT WILL FOLLOW FUNDS.-On October performed; hence facts showing that a deed upon its 26, 1881, one Baldwin, who was one of the executors face absolute is really intended as a security, show it and the general financial manager and custodian of to be a mortgage. Instances of this are where it ap- the securities of an estate, and also the cashier of a pears that there is a loan of money by the grautee to National bank, purchased four bills of exchange for the grantor, whether evidenced by the grantor's notes $6,535 each, dated October 16, 19 21 and 24, 1881, payaor by other express obligation, or even without any ble in six months, which had been accepted by the personal obligation of payment on the part of the drawees, and were made payable to the drawers and grantor, and the purpose of the transaction embodied indorsed by them. Baldwin, to pay for the bills, drew in the deed and bond or agreement for reconveyance from the bank on his check as executor $25,000 from is the repayment of a sum loaned, with or without in the deposit of the credit of the estate, and placed in terest. Belote v. Morrison, 8 Minn. 87 (Gil. 62); Hill the box containing the papers of the estate, usually v. Edwards, 11 Minn. 22 (Gil, 5); Holton v. Meighen, kept in the cashier's desk in the bank, the four crafts, 15 Minn. 69 (Gil. 50); Fisk v. Stewart, 24 Minn. 97; with this memorandum attached : “Est. W. James, Benton v. Nicoll, id. 221. And see Flagg v. Maun, 14 loan $25,000, October 26, 1881. C. Nugent & Co." The Pick. 467; Alstin v. Cundiff, 52 Tex. 453. So also if the proceeds of the drafts were applied to the drawer's indeed was given for purposes of indemnity. Archam- debteduess to the bank. The bank failed on October bau v. Green, 21 Minn. 520. In such cases the boud or 31, 1881, and the defendant was appointed receiver on agreement for reconveyance is considered a defeas- November 2, 1881. He gave to the executors the box ance, so that the transaction Is a mortgage, within the and all its contents, except the four drafts, which he definition given by Chief Justice Shaw in Bayley v. kept, claiming that they were the assets of the bauk. Bailey, 5 Gray, 505, as a “conveyance of real estate, or He refused to deliver them ou demand, and collected some interest therein, defeasible upon the payment of them at maturity, but kept the proceeds separate. Held, money or the performance of some other condition." that Baldwin, in the purchase of the drafts, acted as In considering whether a transaction by absoluto deed, the agent of the drawers and as executor and not as and simultaneous bond or agreement for recouvey- cashier, and though the drafts were paid for by law auce, is a mortgage or a conditional sale, the import with funds which the estate had on deposit in the aut question is, what was the intention of the parties? bank, and though Baldwin knew at the time that the Did they intend security or sale? This intention is to bank was insolvent, yet the transaction being a bona be ascertained by looking at the written memorials of fide purohase, and not a plan to secure preference of the trausaction, and its attendant facts and circum the estate over other depositors, the transaction was stauces. Cornell v. Hall, 22 Mich. 377; Aistin v. Cud- not in violation of section 5242 of the Revised Statutes liff, supru; Smith v. Crosby, 47 Wis. 160; S. C., 2 N. of the United States, which forbids the transfer of any W. Rep. 104; Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22; Edrington bills of exchange, eto., owing to any National bank v. Harper, 3 J. J. Marsh. 353; Hill v. Edwards, supra; * after the commission of any act of insolvHolton v. Meighen, supra. (2) There are authorities ency, or in contemplation thereof; and further, that holding that impeaching witnesses must speak from this court bas jurisdiction to follow the proceeds of the their kuowledge of the reputation, at the time of the drafts as trust property so long as they are identifiatrial, of the witnesses sought to be impeached. Chance ble, and to decree their payment to the estate. Tutv. Iudianapolis, etc., Co., 32 Ind. 472; Rawles v. State, tle v. Frelinghuysen. Opinion by Runyon, Chancel56 id. 433; Mitchell v. Com., 78 Ky. 219. But the better lor. doctrine, and that supported by the weight of author MORTGAGE-PURCHASE-MONEY-SECOND LIEN. • Α ity, and in our opinion by considerations of practical good sense, is that there is no inflexible rule confining purchase-money mortgage may be made a second lien the reputation (for truth and veracity) which may by an agreement made after the sale between the venproperly be given in evidence to impeach a witness, to dor and another mortgagee of the premises, where the his reputation at or very near the time of the trial at *Appearing in 58 N. J. Eq. Reports. * * * agreement has been consummated by recording the feated by the death of the child in testator's life-time. other mortgage before the vendor's, and by the ven- In Clayton v. Lowe, 5 B. & Ald. 636, a testator, after dor's knowingly acquiescing therein for several years. bequeathing a specific legacy, devised all and every Mutual Loan, Savings and Building Association v. El- other part of his real and personal estate to be equally well. Opinion by Runyon, Chancellor. divided between his three grandchildren, share and WILI. — LEGACIES ADEMPTION.- A testator by share alike, forever, and provided that if either of them his will made in 1863 gave to his wife for life the use should happen to die without child or children lawfully of his homestead farm, together with the furniture, begotten, then such part or share of the one so dying etc., excepting the house then occupied by his son should be equally divided among the survivors; but if Abraham, with certain appurtenances. Hegave to his any of them should die and leave child or children law. son David the land whereon David then lived, and for fully begotten, such child or children should have their which he had given David a deed in 1858, and also $800 parent's share equally divided amongst them, share which he had given David in 1863 as David's full share. and share alike. It was held that under that devise the He gave his daughter Dorothy for life, after his wife's grandchildren took an estate in fee simple as tenants death, if Dorothy should survive his wife, the use of in common. In Gee y. Corporation of Manchester, 17 the house, garden, etc., and also $3,000, to be invested by Ad. & E. (N. S.) 737, where a testator devised and behis executors, the interest to be paid to her annually, queathed his real and personal estate to be divided and if insufficient for her support then a specified part | equally amongst his children in manner followof the principal yearly, and if Dorothy should die ing, viz.: “I will and bequeath to my eldest son “ witho heirs,” her share was to be equally divided A. one-seventh share of my property to A.'s heirs, exbetween David and Abraham. He then gave Abra ecutors and administrators." And in liko terms he ham his homestead farm after the death of his (testa- gave a like share to each of his six other children, and tor's wife, excepting Dorothy's right therein. He also added : “And in case any of my sons or daughters die gave to his three grandchildren $1,000 each when they without issue that their share returns to my sons and should arrive at the age of twenty-five years. Testator daughters equally amongst them; and in case any of died in 1881, and his wife predeceased him. He had my sons and daughters die and leaving issue, that they no real estate other than that devised, and his personal take their deceased parent's share, share and share estate is not sufficient to pay the debts and legacies. alike." All the children survived the testator. It was Held, that the legacies are not charged on the land, and held that the word “die” in the provision just quoted must abate proportionally, and that testator did not must be construed to mean death in the testator's lifedie intestate as to the amount of the legacy given to time, and consequently that each of the testator's chilone of the grandchildren, which was adeemed during dren took a fee simple in one-seventh of the real estestator's life-time. Brands v. Hartung. Opinion by tate, and an absolute interest in one-seventh of the Runyon, Chancellor. personal. So too in Lifford v. Sparrow, 13 East, 359; Edwards v. Edwards, 15 Beav. 357; Slaney v. Slaney, BANK- RECEIVER — SET-OFF BY DEPOSITOR.-The 33 id. 631; Home v. Pillaus, 2 Myl. & K. 15; Da Costa capital stock of the bank is the trust fund for the se v. Keir, 3 Russ. 360; and Ware v. Watson, 7 De G. M. curity and payment of the creditors, and it is the duty & G. 248; and in this state in Pennington v. Vau Houand legal obligation of the stockholders to pay it in ten, 4 Halst. Ch. 272; S. C., on appeal, id. 745; Wilaccording to their agreement, in order that it may be liamson v. Chamberlain, 2 Stockt, 373; Wurts v. Page, applied to the payment of the debts. A stockholder 4 C. E. Gr. 365; and Baldwin v. Taylor, 10 Stew. Eq. is not relieved from that duty and obligation by the 78. In the last named case the provision was as folfact that he is a creditor. To permit him to set-off the lows: “In relation to the several gifts and devises to debt due him would, where the corporation is insol. my children in this, my last will and testament, it is vent, manifestly give him a preference as a creditor. To this he is not entitled. It is the right of the other leaving heirs their portion shall go to such heirs ; if my will, and I do direct that if any of them shall die creditors to have him pay in the money due from him not it shall be divided equally among my surviving for stock as part of the fund for the payment of the children." It was held that the contingency of death debts. The principle has frequently been enunciated, was that of death before vesting. Barrell v. Barrell. and is established. Stockton v. Mechanics and Lab. Opinion by Runyon, Chancellor. MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. MASTER AND SERVANT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT PARTNERSHIP-DAMAGES-DOCTOR S BILL.— (1) In an WILL,"DIE LEAVING LAWFUL ISSUE"-CONSTRUC- action against a master for an injury done by his serTION.--A testator gave his residuary estate to his four vant while driving a wagon, evidence that the master's children, George, Mary, Henry and Charles, to be name was upon the wagon used at the time of the acequally divided among them, and in case of the death cident is admissible to show the relationship of master of any one or more of my children without leaving and servant. (2) Evidence of the continued and notolawful issue, it is my will, and I direct that the share rious habits of a servant in doing bis master's business or shares of the one or more so dying shall go to the tends to show the master's knowledge of the acts and survivor or survivors of my children; but if any of my permission to do them, and is competent to show that children shall die leaving lawful issue living, such issue the servant was acting within the scope of his employto take the share his, her or their parent would have ment. (3) Matters of belief are admissible in evidence taken, share and share alike.” The will was dated to show the existence of a partnership, that question May 10, 1869, and testator died February 11, 1870. At being material. (4) A married woman may recover the his death he had the four children mentioned, and they amount of a doctor's bill and the expenses of her sickare still living. George and Henry have children; ness in an action against a master for an injury done Mary and Charles are unmarried. Held, that the in- / by his servant. Schulte v. Holliday. Opinion by tention of the testator was to give each of his children Sherwood, J. an absolute estate in the residue, subject only to be de- [Decided June 11, 1884. ] re NEGLIGENCE-SEARCHER OF TITLE-PLEADING-AL- ance thereunder, must be definite and unequivocal, in WILL-CAPACITY—UNDUE INFLUENCE — CONFIDENfailure result in damages to the plaintiff, she is enti TIAL ADVISER - TESTATRIX'S DECLARATIONS. - The tled to recover. Chase v. Heaney, 70 Ill. 268; Clark v. fact that a testatrix, a married woman, at and immeMarshall, 34 Mo. 429; Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195; diately before the signing of her will (which had been Shear. & R. Neg., $ 288; Warvelle, Abst. 7. The use in previously written), was in a state of intense nervous the complaint of words imputing fraud, in connection excitement and apprehension of death, caused by her with others imputing negligence, the latter being the being about to submit to a dangerous surgical operagravamen of the complaint, does not make it essential tion, and aggravated by a quarrel with a member of for the plaintiff to prove fraud in order to recover. In her family, is not sufficient to warrant the court in arriving at what the grievance complained of is, and awarding an issue devisavit vel non, on the allegations the manner in which the wrong was inflicted, the of testamentary incapacity, and that the testatrix was whole count must be taken and construed together. unduly influenced by prejudice and passion; especThe facts and circumstances alleged show that there ially where, as in this case, the testatrix recovered was no intent to do a wrongful act, or to omit the per from the surgical operation and afterward made no formance of a duty, but the absence of the proper at change in her will. The fact that by said will the tention, care or skill. It alleges strictly non-feasance testatrix's confidential legal adviser, who wrote it, was and not a misfeasance, which marks the distinction made one of the executors thereof (but not a devises between negligence and fraud. Gardner v. Heartt, 3 or legatee thereunder), is not sufficient, under the Den. 232, 236. Smith v. Holmes. Opinion by Cham above stated circumstances, and upon his propoundplin, J. ing the will for probate after retaining it for four (Decided June 11, 1884.] years after the testatrix's death, to cast upon him the burden of proving testamentary capacity aud the abREPLEVIN-WHEN DEMAND NECESSARY.- The sence of undue influence. Boyd v. Boyd, 16 P. F. moval into shelter of an article apparently abandoned Smith, 283; Cuthbertson's Appeal, Out. 163; Wilson's to the weather, the custody of it for some months, and Appeal, 3 id. 545, distinguished. The seventh section then the loan of it to another party, does not establish of the act of April 11, 1818, requiring that a will by a in the party last named such a wrongful possession as married woman shall “ be executed in the presence of entitles the rightful owner to sue in replevin without two witnesses, neither of whom shall be her husband," first making demand. Becker v. Vanderkook. Opin must be read in connection with the general act of ion by Campbell, J. 1833. The word "executed,” in the act of 1848, refers [Decided June 11, 1884.] to the formality of making a will required by the act of 1833, with the additional requisite that it shall be done in the presence of the two witnesses. Hence all PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT that is necessary to the execution of a valid married ABSTRACT. woman's will is that two witnesses, neither of whom shall be her husband, shall be present when the testaMASTER AND SERVANT-RISKS-DUTY OF MASTER mentary paper is signed by her, and either see her NEGLIGENCE. --(1) A servant, who voluntarily accepts a sigu it, or receive the acknowledgment of the genuine. dangerous employment, assumes all the patent risks ness of her signature thereto. It is not necessary that incident thereto, and his master is not liable for dam the subscribing witnesses should be able to testify afages in case of an accident, occurring from such risk,in firmatively that the testatrix knew that the instruthe course of such dangerous employment. (2) It is ment which she signed was her will, or that she fornot negligence in a master to fail to provide against a mally published or declared it to be her will in any patent risk unless he has been requested to do so by other way than by siguing it, and requesting them to his servant, or has induced his servant to believe that attest her siguature. Lenton's Appeal. Opinion by he would do so. (3) Unless there is evidence of a re. Sterrett, J. quest by a servant to provide against a patent risk, the [Decided Jan. 7, 1884.] jury cannot consider the question whether it was the PARTNERSHIP-WHEN PROPERTY OF IS PERSONAL ESduty of his master to remedy it or not. (4) A master TATE-STIPULATIONS AS TO DISSOLUTION.- The curis not liable for injuries to his servants, if they have rent profits of a partnership busiuess are personal beeu guilty of contributory negligence. Marsden v. property and descend as such, whether the property of Haigh. Opinion per Curiam. the firm be real or personal. During the continuance [Decided Feb. 25, 1884.] of a partnership agreement all the property of the ADVERSE POSSESSION-PAYMENT OF TAXES-STAT- firm, including real estate acquired with partnership FRAUDS-PAROL CONTRACT AS TO LAND. funds and used for partnership purposes, must be re- An entry upon land is not adverse which garded as personal estate. Stipulations in articles of is made under a license to Jay water pipes to copartnership for the continuance of the partnership springs thereon, and to change the effect of this entry after the death of a member are valid and binding, and make the holding adverse it is not enough to drive and prevent a dissolution. Under such stipulations, stakes around the springs to keep cattle off, but the the interest of a deceased partner, and the profits aristenant must keep up the fences and prevent the land ing therefrom, are personal property, and descend as from being turned into common. Stephens v. Leach, such under the intestate laws. The decision in Fos7 Har. 262. Payment of taxes assessed upon real es- ter's Appeal, 24 P. F. Smith, 391, much relied upon for tate without the requisite possession cannot make the appellants,is predicated of a dissolved firm with all title under the statute. Sorber v. Willing, 10 Watts, its debts paid and a residuum of unconverted land re141. Where title is claimed under a parol contract of maining in specie for mere purposes of distribution. sale, the evidence of such contract, and of perform- But there are no such facts here. It cannot now be UTE OF known that the real estate will not be required for the compelled discovery and performance of the promise, payment of debts. The firm still continues its busi- treating it as a trust binding the conscience of the do. ness under a lawful agreement to that effect. When- nee, on the ground that otherwise a fraud would be ever a dissolution shall be established and a final set- committed; because it is to be presumed that if it had tlement of accounts shall take place, the positions con- not been for such promise the testator would not have tended for, and the reasoning by which they are en- made or would have revoked the gift. The princi. forced, will become entirely applicable, and will ex- ple of these decisions is precisely the same as in the ercise a very potent and possibly a controlling influ- case of an beir who has induced a testator not to make ence upon the questions which will then arise between a will devising the estate away from him by a promise the present litigants or those who may succeed them. that if the estate were allowed to descend he would But upon the present state of the record, we think the make a certain provision out of it for a named person. appellee is clearly entitled to the dividend in question, Stickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves. 516; Wallgrave . as the successor to his deceased wife's title. Leaf's Tebbs; and McCormick v. Grogan. But no case has Appeal. Opinion by Green, J. ever yet decided that a testator can, by imposing a [Decided April 28, 1884.) trust upon his devisee or legatee, the objects of which evade the statute of wills by declaring those objects in an unattested paper found after his death. The esCORPORATION-SECRETARY -- FORGED sence of all those decisions is that the devisee or legaCERTIFICATE tee accepts a particular trust, which thereupon beOF STOCK-ESTOPPEL-LIABLE TO TRANSFEREE.--The comes binding upon him, and which it would be a plaintiff, having purchased for value shares in the de fraud in him not to carry into effect. If the trust was fendant's company, discovered, upon application for not declared when the will was made, in order to make registration, that his vendor's name was not registered it binding, it is essential that it should be communifor the shares, and his transfer and certificate had cated to the devisee or legatee in the testator's lifeboth been forged by the company's secretary. It was part of the secretary's duty to receive and exam time, and that he should accept that particular trust. It may possibly be that he would be bound if the trust ine transfers and certificates, to have trans had been put in writing, and placed in his hands in a fers registered, to procure the preparation, exe sealed envelope, and he had engaged that he would cution and signature of certificates with all requi hold the property given to him by the will upon the site and prescribed formalities, and thereupon to issue trusts so declared, although he did not know the actthem to the persons entitled to receive them. One of ual terms of the trust. McCormick v. Grogai. But the prescribed formalities was the signature of a direc che reason is that it must be assumed that if he had tor as well as tbat of the secretary. Held, that the not so accepted the will would be revoked-suppose the company had authorized their secretary to warrant the genuineness of certificates, and were estopped from case of an engagement to hold the property, not upon the terms of any paper communicated to the legatee, disputing their liability upon a certificate issued by or put into his hands, but of any paper that might be him, notwithstanding his forgery of the document. found after the testator's death. The evidence iu this Q. B. Div. May 19, 1884. Shaw v. Port Philip Co., Limited. Opinions by Stephen and Matthews, JJ. (50 law would intervene, which prevents a testator from case does not amount to that, but if it did, the rule of L. T. Rep. [N. S.) 685.) declering trusts in such a manner by a paper which WILLY UNEXPRESSED TRUST--LETTER FOUND AFTER was not executed as a will or codicil. The legateo TESTATOR'S DEATH.-If a trust of property given by a might be a trustee, but the trust declared by such an will is not declared when the will is made, in order to unattested paper would not be good. For this pur. make it binding it is necessary that it should be com pose there is no difference whether the devisee or legamunicated to the devisee or legatee in the testator's tee is declared to be a trustee on tbe face of the will, life-time, and that he should accept that particular or by an engagement with the testator not appearing trust, or possibly it might be sufficient that the trust on the will; the devisee or legatee cannot, by acceptshould be put in writing, and placed in his hands in a ing an indefinite trust, enable the testator to make an sealed packet, and that he should undertake to hold unattested codicil. I cannot help regretting that the the property upon the trusts so declared, though he testator's intention of bounty should fail by reason of did not know wbat they were. A testator cannot, by an informality of this kind; but in my opivion it imposing an indefinite trust upon a devisee or legatee, would be a serious innovation upon the law relating to the objects of which he does not communicate to him, testamentary instruments if this were to be estabmake a valid declaration of trust of the property given lished as a trust in the favor of Mrs. Brown. The de. by a letter, not executed as a testamentary instrument, fendant however having admitted that he is only a found amongst his papers after his death, and not trustee, I must hold, on the authority of Mucklestono placed by him in the hauds of the devisee or legatee. v. Brown, 6 Ves. 52; Briggs v. Penny, and Johnson 5. In such a case the deviseo or legatee, admitting him- Ball, that he is a trustee of this property for the next self to be a trustee, will be beld to be a trustee for the of kin of the testator. Chy. Div. March 29, 1884. testator's next of kin. Kay, J., said: “If it had been Matter of Boyes. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 582.) expressed on the face of the will that the defendant was a trustee, but the trusts were not thereby declared, it is quite clear that no trusts afterward de CORRESPONDENCE. clared by a paper, not executed as a will, could be binding. Johnson v. Ball; Briggs v. Penny, 3 Mac. & MR. BACON SAYS HE IS NOT CATO. G. 546; Singleton v. Tomlinson, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) | Editor of the Albany Law Journal : 653; 3 App. Cas. 404. In such a case the legatee would Do not imagine that I undervalue the honor of being be trustee for the next of kin. There is another well- mentioned in your pages. Even to be evil spoken of known class of cases where no trust appears on the by you is not without advantage, for you will surely face of the will, but the testator has been induced to speak of me again when you are called upon to set me make the will, or baving made it, has been induced right. not to revoke it by a promise on the part of the devi. Permit me then to say that I have not, as you imply, see or legatee to deal with the property, or some part arrogated to myself the functions of a permanent cenof it, in a special manner. In these cases the court has sor of my fellow lawyers' morals. Under invitation 03 PT ligu from the American Social Science Association, I read discrimination to classify and arrange it properly. The CHURCH ON HABEAS CORPUS. A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, including jurisdic tion, false imprisonment, writ of error, extradition, manpressed your soul no more profoundly than is usual damus, certiorari, judgments, etc., with practice and with sermons; for when the Century, to no one's as forms. By William S. Church, San Francisco, A. L. tonishment more than mine, exhumed it from the Bancroft & Co., 1884. Pp. lx, 702. sepulchre of oblivion, you forgot that you had ever This seems to be a judicious treatise on a subject abstract certain inferences as to my opinions which I fully deserving special treatment. The subordinate think the paper hardly warrants. Accept the new subjects specified on the title page are of course only copy I send herewith; and when, after another two subordinately treated. But on the principal topic the years, you are ready to review it again, please read it practitioner will fiud all the law, very well arranged first. You will then discoyer that I have not said and expressed, with references to all the decisions of what you sadly judged I must have said. importance. The recent case of Farmer v. Lewis, in Yours with sincere respect, Indiana, was probably too recent to be included, and THEODORE BACON. 80 of the decision of the Federal Supreme Court, in the ROCHESTER, N. Y., November 1, 1884. which is adverse to the author's opinion expressed on page 625. The book is well printed, and is likely to prove an important addition to every practicNEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. ing lawyer's library. Robb case, GI HAMILTON ON FRACTURES. TAYLOR ON CORPORATIONS. We have delayed speaking of this book in order to This work, for so many years' recoguized as the have an opportunity of giving it the careful examinastandard, and carefully revised and enlarged by its tion wbich the importance of the subject warrants,and author, who stands in the foremost rank of his profes- now we shall be forced to content ourselves with a sion, will recommend itself to all medical men, and to mere notice when a review would be well deserved, all lawyers needing information on this subject. The especially in cousideration of the fact that the subject publisher's part has been well done. has recently been treated by Mr. Morawetz in an ex cellent manner. The present treatise is remarkably DESTY ON TAXATION. compact and logically constructed, although in these The American Law of Taxation, as determined in the points we do not think it superior to Mr. Morawetz.' courts of last resort in the United States. By Robert L. Its superiority, if any, is in the fact of its more numDesty. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1884. 2 vols. erous citations, including some of importance which Ivii, 610, Ixxvi, 611-1477. Mr.Morawetz missed. It can be recommended as a use ful manual. This is an exhaustive and well arranged work by an The publisher's work has been handeditor of practical views and experience. Mr. Desty somely done. will hardly expect his work to supplant or even rival Judge Cooley's as an authority, but it will prove of HOWELL'S MICHIGAN NISI PRIUS CASES. practical use, and has some advantages over its cele- Michigan Nisi Prius Cases, decided by the State and Federal brated predecessor. The arrangement is in one re courts in Michigan. To which are added brief biographispect novel and commendable. Each section has its cal sketches of the judges of Michigan, past and present, authorities appended to it in the body of the page, so law anecdotes and reminiscences. Also law miscellathat they do pot in any instance form a feuilleton run nies. Edited and compiled by Charles B. Howell. Dening along the bottom of several pages. The indexes, troit, Richmond, Backus & Co., 1884. Pp. xxv, 384. which are copious, are separately paged in each volume, The author says in his preface, “For lack of space I but we do not perceive any advantage in that. The have left out of the book at least double the amount of text is classified in the form of italicised propositions, matter found in the book." His main error was concise and clear, and the commentary is in larger type in not leaving out half as much more. The book is utunder each proposition. We regard this as the model terly worthless, made up of memorandums of useless way of writing a law book, and on the whole we think cases, reports of “highfalutin" arguments, meager biMr. Desty has produced an admirable work. It is well ographies, and stupid anecdotes, couched in a ridicuprinted. lous style. We are glad we do not live among lawyers such as one described, who was apt, “like an anRORER ON RAILWAYS. gry lion, to lacerate bimself and his anditors by his A Treatise on the Law of Railways. By David Rorer. Cal own violence of language." It is no pleasure to us to laghan & Co., Chicago, 1884. 2 vols. cxis, 739-1618. be called on to notice such books as this, and we someThe death of the author of this work is to be regret times say nothing rather than condemn, but if we do ted, especially because we believe he could aud would speak we will tell the truth, although Mr. Bishop have improved it if he had lived. As it stands it is thinks that is what no editor can do. We had omitted not well classified or arranged, and its style is ery to say that the book is coarsely printed and abomina“Onto" is more than we can bear. And yet, bly padded. PREBLE'S PATENT CASE INDEX. bad. |
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