439

W

HETHER we are to live in a fu-DISS. ture State, as it is the most important I. Question which can poffibly be afked, fo itn is the most intelligible one which can be expreffed in Language. Yet ftrange Perplexities have been raifed about the Meaning of That Identity or Sameness of Perfon, which is implied in the Notion of our living Now and Hereafter, or in any two fucceffive Moments. And the Solution of thefe Difficulties hath been stranger, than the Difficulties themfelves. For, perfonal Identity has been explained fo by Some, as to render the Inquiry concerning a future Life, of no Confequence at all to Us the Perfons who are making it. And though few Men can be misled by fuch Subtleties; yet it may be proper a little to

confider them.

Now when it is afked, wherein perfonal Identity confifts, the Anfwer fhould be the fame, as if it were afked, wherein confifts Similitude or Equality; that all Attempts to define, would but perplex it. Yet there is

Diss. no Difficulty at all in afcertaining the Idea. I. For as, upon two Triangles being compared Nor viewed together, there arifes to the Mind the Idea of Similitude; or upon twice two and four, the Idea of Equality: fo likewise, upon comparing the Confcioufneffes of ones felf or ones own Existence in any two Moments, there as immediately arifes to the Mind the Idea of perfonal Identity. And as the two former Comparisons not only give us the Ideas of Similitude and Equality; but alfo fhew us, that two Triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal: fo the latter Comparison not only gives us the Idea of perfonal Identity, but also fhews us the Identity of ourselves in those two Moments; the prefent, fuppofe, and that immediately past; or the prefent, and That, a Month, a Year, or twenty Years past. Or in other Words, by reflecting upon That, which is my Self now, and That, which was my Self twenty Years ago, I difcern they are not two, but one and the fame Self.

But though Confcioufrefs of what is past does thus afcertain our perfonal Identity to Ourselves, yet to fay, that it makes perfonal Identity, or is neceffary to our being the fame Perfons, is to fay, that a Perfon has not exifted a fingle Moment, nor done one Action, but what he can remember; indeed none but

what he reflects upon. And one should really D I s s. think it Self-evident, that Consciousness of I. perfonal Identity prefuppofes, and therefore cannot conftitute, perfonal Identity; any more than Knowledge, in any other Cafe, can conftitute Truth, which it presupposes.

This wonderful Mistake may poffibly have arisen from hence, that to be indued with Consciousness, is infeparable from the Idea of a Perfon, or intelligent Being. For, this might be expreffed inaccurately thus, that Consciousness makes Perfonality: And from hence it might be concluded to make personal Identity. But though present Confcioufness of what we at prefent do and feel, is neneffary to our being the Perfons we now are ; Yet prefent Consciousness of past Actions or Feelings, is not neceffary to our being the fame Perfons who performed those Actions or had thofe Feelings.

The Inquiry, what makes Vegetables the Same in the common Acceptation of the Word, does not appear to have any Relation to This of perfonal Identity: because the Word, Jame, when applied to Them and to Perfon, is not only applied to different Subjects, but it is alfo ufed in different Senfes. For when a Man fwears to the fame Tree, as having stood fifty Years in the fame Place, he

means

~

I.

DISS. means only the fame as to all the Purposes of Property and Ufes of common Life, and not that the Tree has been all that Time the fame in the strict philofophical Senfe of the Word. For he does not know, whether any one Particle of the prefent Tree, be the fame with any one Particle of the Tree which ftood in the fame Place fifty Years ago. And if they have not one common Particle of Matter, they cannot be the fame Tree in the proper philofophick Senfe of the Word fame: it being evidently a Contradiction in Terms, to fay they are, when no Part of their Subftance, and no one of their Properties is the fame : no Part of their Subftance, by the Suppofition; no one of their Properties, because it is allowed, that the fame Property cannot be tranfferred from one Substance to another. therefore, when we fay the Identity or Samenefs of a Plant confifts in a Continuation of the fame Life, communicated under the fame Organization, to a Number of Particles of Matter, whether the fame or not; the Word fame, when applied to Life and to Organization, cannot poffibly be understood to fignify, what it fignifies in this very Sentence, when applied to Matter. In a loofe and popular Senfe then, the Life and the Organization and the Plant are juftly faid to be the fame, notwithstanding the perpetual Change of the Parts. But in a strict and philosophical Man

And

ner

ner of Speech, no Man, no Being, no Mode Diss. of Being, no Any-thing, can be the fame I. with That, with which it hath indeed No- n thing the fame. Now Sameness is used in this latter Senfe when applied to Perfons. The Identity of these, therefore, cannot fu fift with Diversity of Substance.

The thing here confidered, and, demontratively, as I think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in thefe Words, Whether it, i. e. the fame Self or Perfon, be the fame identical Subftance? And he has fuggefted what is a much better Anfwer to the Question, than That which he gives it in Form. For he defines Perfon, a thinking intelligent Being, &c. and perfonal Identity, the Sameness of a rational Beinga. The Question then is, whether the fame rational Being is the fame Subftance which needs no Answer, because Being and Substance, in this Place, ftand for the fame Idea. The Ground of the Doubt, whether the fame Perfon be the fame Subftance, is faid to be This; that the Confciousness of our own Existence, in Youth and in Old-age, or in any two joint fucceffive Moments, is not the fame individual action, i. e. not the fame Consciousness, but different fucceffive Consciousneffes. Now it is ftrange that

a Locke's Works, Vol. I. p. 146.

Locke, p. 146, 147.