hath fo greatly obfcured. The like may be faid of Leibnitz, the comprehenfiveness of whofe genius, was perhaps never paralleled fince the days of Ariftotle: but, corrected both by Newton and Locke, his glory was in like manner bedimmed by their united and more dazzling luftre. Are we therefore to conclude, that his monads were the fantaftical production of a vifionary brain? By no means. The monads of Leibnitz have their foundation in nature, as well as the vortices of Des Cartes, and may in time be received, with fome modification indeed, into a fyftem of philofophy reconcilable to the mathematical principles of a Newton. At the fame time, however, the material elements of the latter must be new modelled alfo; for, though Newton had the advantage in the mathematical conclufions he drew from ftated afluniptions, his phyfical elements were equally imaginary with thofe of Leibnitz and Des Cartes. The latter had alfo this advantage on their fide, that, if they were mifled by conjecture, they were misled in attempting to account for that which Newton was contented to know to be true, or took for granted. The difcoveries of Galileo, Kepler, and Gaffendi, very naturally fuggefted the principle of univerfal attraction, conceived as an effect: but the affumption of folid, inert, impenetrable maffes of matter, as primary elements or phyfical first principles, would have been as exceptionable as any thing offered by Des Cartes or Leibnitz, had not the great founder of the Newtonian philofophy confined it folely within the limits of mathematical fcience. A mathematician finds no difficulty in conceiving the infinite divifibility of matter, because, he imagines it to be fomething neceffarily extended: nor, indeed, does a Newtonian philofopher, who fuppofes all bodies. compounded of extended impenetrable elements, find any difficulty in conceiving the poffibility of their being divided into fuch primary elements: but a philofopher, who would go deeper into the fecrets of nature, and account for the phenomenon of extenfion itself, could never be fatisfied with fuch kind of, reafoning. It would be no folution to his query, to tell him that a congeries of invifible elements formed a visible body; for this would only be faying, that a number of fmall bodies joined, together made a great one: and would be taking that for granted which is the object fought. The monads of Leibnitz, therefore, are at worst no ill-managed expedient to account for the extenfion of body. The misfortune is, that Leibnitz should have affumed none but phyfical elements, and he has taken up with thofe which are metaphyfical or imaginary: for certain it is, that Wolfius was by no means fingular, when he profeffed, his doubt concerning the reprefentative influence of fuch fimple, elements. This doctrine of the monads has been fo long exploded indeed, especially in this country, that perhaps yery few

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of the rifing generation of metaphyficians perfectly understand it. We fhall quote, therefore, Mr. Kaetfner's explanation of it in few words: Mr. Leibnitz does not pretend that body is compofed of fimple unextended elements: he endeavours only to account for the phenomenon of extenfion; by faying that in the perception of extended objects we have a confufed reprefentation of a great number of beings not extended. Thus a telescope discovers to us a cluster of ftars, which appear to the naked eye only as one confufed fpot of light. Now this fpot is not compofed of stars, as a whole is of its parts; it is only a phenomenon that prefents itfelf to organs of fight, too weak to diftinguifh the ftars.' Such, fays Mr. Kaetfner, are the elements of Leibnitz. But the difficulty lies here: how do fuch elements, if perfectly fimple, affect the fenfes; the operations of which are fo extremely complicated? We agree with Mr. Kaetfner, that thefe principles are not to be combated by geometrical arguments; and yet they are evidently defective; though perhaps a very little improvement might ferve to reftore them to that re fpectable rank they once held in phyfical science.

Having admitted this, in favour of Mr. Leibnitz, Profeffor Kaetfner will please to reflect on the injustice he hath been guilty of, in throwing out that national farcafim he hath couched under his penitus toto divifos orbe Britannos; as if real philofophers were of any country, or could refufe to embrace and applaud the truth, wherever and by whomfoever difcovered!

The pieces contained in this pofthumous publication are fix in number, and are entitled as follows: 1. New effays on the human understanding. 2. Remarks on the opinion of Father Malbranche, concerning our feeing every thing in the deity, and on Mr. Locke's examination of that opinion. 3. A dialogue concerning the connection fubfifting between words and things. 4. Remarks on fome peculiar difficulties in logical ratiocination. 5. A difcourfe on the art of invention, and the method of arriving at philofophical certitude. 6. An account of an univerfal language and character, recommended as ufeful both for the purpofes of invention and judgment.

1

The first of thefe performances, of which much the greater part of this volume confifts, was spoken of by Mr. Leibnitz, in a letter to Mr. Remond, publifhed in Des Maizeaux's collection of our Author's mifcellaneous pieces: the reafon there affigned, by this great philofopher, for not publifhing them, being the death of Mr. Locke. I like not, fays he, to publish a refu tation of the works of deceafed authors, even though written with a view to make its appearance, and to be communicated to them, during their lives. How different was the noble and difinterefted delicacy of this author to the more prudential tendernefs affected by certain modern writers!

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It is poffible, however, as Mr. Rafpe fuggefts, that he might have other motives befide. The important occupations in which he was engaged during the latter part of his life, might contribute not a little to the fuppreffion of these papers. Add to this, that he had already two controverfies on his hands, the one with the Royal Society, and the other with Dr. Clarke; with which he was too fully engaged, to think of drawing upon himself another with the partizans of Mr. Locke; who would certainly have defended their master, had he been then attacked. At prefent, indeed, metaphyfical enquiry is at fo low an ebb, and the delicacy of a Leibnitz fo little known, particularly in England, that the fentiments of Mr. Locke may be controverted, and even his memory difrefpectfully treated with impunity. Mr. Rafpe exults on the revolution, which he pretends hath been effected in the philofophical world fince that time, by the writings of Wolfius and others; in confequence of which the fyftem of Leibnitz hath triumphed, and ftill triumphs in its turn. This, therefore, he hath judged a favourable opportunity, it feems, for the publication of thefe effays, in order, no doubt, to compleat .the imaginary downfall of Mr. Locke's system.

We do not apprehend, however, notwithstanding the fanguine hopes of this Editor, that matters are as yet quite fo defperate with the influence and reputation of our late celebrated English philofopher. It is true, indeed, that metaphysical learning is become greatly neglected, and in fome degree despised, from the prevailing tafte for physical experiment; which, however useful in its proper place, hath given rife to fuch a multiplicity of mere mechanical obfervers, and at the fame time hath invested them with fuch importance, that we could mention many perfons dignified with the title of philofophers, whofe fole accomplishment is the manual excrcife of a mathematical or optical inftrument. But, if these are philofophers, how many different claffes muft there be in the fcale of gradation, between them and a Locke or a Leibnitz!It is certain also that the application of real genius, either to mathematics or to lighter ftudies, hath rendered metaphyfics of late a barren field. Nay, fo much is English philofophy degenerated fince the time of Locke, that, in confirmation as it were of Mr. Rafpe's obfervation, the notions of Leibnitz himself, refpecting innate ideas, have been recently revived in a treatife which hath already undergone two impreffions. But notwithstanding all this, we have reafon to believe there are ftill remaining a fufficient number of advocates for Mr. Locke's opinions; who, though they do not pefter the public with a fubject at prefent unpopular, are to a man, capable of juftifying him in most points against the arguments of any living writer, or even of the immortal Author of the effays before us.

That

That we may not be accufed, however, of partiality to Mr. Locke, or his followers, we fhall give a fpecimen of the arguments comprized in this work, regarding feveral points, in which Mr. Leibnitz differs from the author of the Effay on the Human Understanding.

6

After paying the latter a very high compliment, on his writings in general, he thus fpeaks of the difference between their two fyftems: The author of the Eflay on the Human Underftanding, has undoubtedly faid a number of good things which I admire and approve; there is a confiderable difference, however, between his fyftem and mine. His refembles that of Ariftotle, mine that of Plato; although both of us depart, in many inftances, very far from the doctrine of those two ancients. Mr. Locke writes in a popular manner, while I am fometimes obliged to be more deep and abftrufe, which is by no means an advantage on my fide.' As to the fubjects of our difference, they are of fome importance. The first relates to the questions, Whether the foul is originally a tabula rafa, according to Ariftotle and Mr. Locke; every fentiment impreffed thereon being the mere effect of fenfe and experience? or, Whether it is not primarily invested with the principles of feveral notions and doctrines, which are only occafionally revived by external objects? as I conceive it, together with Plato, with the fchools, and with all those who conftrue that paffage of St. Paul to the Romans; where he obferves that the law of God is written in our hearts. In the folution of thefe queftions arifes a third, viz. Whether all truths depend on experience; that is to fay, on induction and examples; or whether there may not be fome which are deduced from fome other fource? For if there be any kind of event whatever, which may be forefeen antecedent to any experiment, it is manifeft that fuch foreknowledge is in fome degree inherent in ourfelves. The fenfes, however neceffary to the acquifition of all actual or experimental knowlege, are not capable of furnishing us with every kind of intelligence; for the fenfes furnish us only with examples or experiments of particular truths. Now the experiments, ferving to confirm a general truth, however numerous, are not fufficient to establish the univerfal neceffity of it: for it does not abfolutely follow, that what hath happened under certain circumftances, though it may have happened ever fo often, will always continue to do the fame.-Hence it appears that fuch neceffary truths as are inveftigated in pure mathematics, particularly in arithmetic and geometry, must be founded on principles; the proof of which doth not depend on experience, nor of courfe on the testimony of the fenfes, although without the fenfes it is certain we fhould never have thought about them. This is a very neceflary diftinction, and is what was fo perfe&ly comprehended by Euclid,

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who demonftrated by reafon what is confirmed by the evidence of our fenfes, in our experience of perceptible objects.'

The fuccefs of experiments, continues our philofopher, ferves to confirm the fuggeftions or conclufions of reason; even as the methods of proving the truth of arithmetical operations. ferve to detect and prevent error, when the calculations are tedious and intricate. It is this circumftance alfo which includes the difference between the knowlege of men and brutes. The knowlege of the latter is purely empirical, and is founded on mere experience; for, as far as we are able to judge of their intellects, they feem incapable of forming neceffary or abstract propofitions. Whereas the human understanding is, on the contrary, qualified to invent hypothefes and form fyftematical plans of abftracted science. The inferences deduced by the brutes, are like those of mere empirics, who prefume that whatever hath fometimes happened, muft happen again in circumstances that appear to them the fame, without knowing whether the fame caufes fubfift. Hence it is that mankind find it fo eafy to deceive the brutes, and that empirics are fo liable to commit blunders. And hence it is, alfo, that perfons, whofe knowlege depends merely on age and experience, are not exempt from the like fallibility; efpecially when they depend too much on paft experience, as if what hath once happened in civil and military affairs, must neceffarily happen again. Whereas they should confider how much the world is fubject to change; and that mankind, every day growing wifer, or at leaft more knowing and artificial, difcover numerous methods of counter-action and prevention, which were unknown to their ancestors. In the mean time, it is certain that the brutes of the present times are no more artful or preventive than thofe of antiquity. The logic of the brutes, is but the mere fhadow of reafoning; it is the fimple connection of ideas, or the tranfition from the perception of one image to that of another: for, in any new fituation, bearing refemblance to a preceding one, they expect of courfe the former event to follow, as if things in themfelves were thus actually connected, because the ideas of them are fo connected in their memory. It is certain that reafon directs us, in the common courfe of things, to model our future expecta tions from the outlines of paft experience; but we are not thence to conclude that fuch experience involves a neceffary and infallible truth. On the contrary, it is poffible that our moft

*It is our bufinefs here fimply to exhibit, and not to controvert, the arguments of the Author. We cannot help obferving, however, that thi fentiment is by no means applicable to particular animals, efpecially thofe of the domeftic kind; notwithstanding it be true with regard to the comparative knowlege of men and brutes in general.

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