the not inglorious rule of Plantagenets and Tudors, as has been truly said, generally thought first of England and afterwards of themselves. To this indeed succeeded a period during which every man, if he was not a soldier, had at least so many of a soldier's instincts that it grew into an article of the national faith -irrational perhaps, but not wholly without advantage-that an Englishman might accept with confidence any odds that the fortune of war might array against him. It was this spirit on the part of the people which supported the steady policy of an aristocratic government, and which carried the country with success and honour through some very dark and trying hours of national history. Now, for the first time, a change is evident. The making of money, the increase of social comforts, the almost exaggerated sanctity set upon human life, seem in a great measure to have absorbed the rougher qualities, and with them the hitherto incalculable reserve of fighting power in the nation. Doubt at least now exists where once there was no room for it, men are perplexed by the conflict of seeming duties, and an irresolution-which in principle may not be immoral, but which politically is very mischievous-is the result. How far the country at large is answerable for this it is unnecessary here to inquire. Perhaps no class or party is free from responsibility, though the Free-trade school, the political economists, and a very large proportion of the Radical section have unquestionably given the main impulse to it. But, after all, the chief blame must rest with the present Government. If the country has been perplexed, the Government have only given them unmeaning platitudes, instead of a distinct scheme of military organisation; if the country has been apathetic, the Government, whose duty it was to guide others, have eagerly sheltered themselves behind that apathy. They have, in truth, never been in earnest; their heart has been wandering far away in very different fields of political activity or pastime, and throughout last autumn and winter, whilst everyone watched with feverish anxiety the chances of foreign complication, they seemed as if only intent upon discouraging each rising impulse of national self-defence. Nor when the time came for explaining their policy in Parliament were they more fortuTheir utterances were vague, and their legislation combined the double demerit of being empirical and partisan. It was empirical in sweeping away, together with the anomalies of the Purchase system, its equally certain advantages without providing any equivalent or substitute for the arrangements that gave us young officers, and that saved us from the stagnation which exists in our own non-purchase corps, and which is found to be inconvenient even in the highly-trained Prussian service. It nate. was was empirical in adopting a wholesale principle of selection, instead of, as now, a combination of seniority, selection, and purchase, with no safeguards upon the political jobbing which must either exist, or be suspected to exist, in a Parliamentary Army. It was empirical in placing upon the public finances a heavy and practically unestimated charge, in order to accomplish a result which, after all, must be pronounced to be one of very doubtful policy. On the other hand, it was partisan in its unprecedented exercise of the Prerogative; it was partisan in the temper and attitude displayed; and it has even received a still more partisan complexion from a subsequent speech made by Mr. Gladstone, in which he is reported to have said that, 'wealth which is concentrated in London, had taken desperate offence because the Government had recommended that power in the English Army should no longer be the prize of wealth, but the reward of merit.' It is unnecessary to comment on such an extraordinary remark. We only note it with regret, as an illustration of the difficulty of securing a fair discussion of this question, when the Prime Minister himself, in the quiet atmosphere of a country meeting, and long after the close of Parliamentary controversy, can condescend to such an argument. But whilst Government and People must, though in different degrees, share the responsibility of our present condition, it is also clear that the system under which our army is administered is in some essential respects accountable. When armies and military resources were comparatively small, when campaigns were protracted, and when the Government of England, being more aristocratic in its character, was more under the influence of a consistent and traditional practice, army administration was conducted without practical inconvenience and in harmony with Parliamentary institutions. We are now attempting-if, indeed, the laissez aller fashion in which these political problems are allowed to work themselves out deserves the name of an attempt to administer an army of regular troops, volunteers and militia under conditions which exist in no other country in Europe. Our War Ministers are generally civilians, ignorant of the requirements and capabilities of an army, unfamiliar even with its technicalities and terminology, and almost invariably selected for Parliamentary qualifications, independent of military experience or ability. Their short tenure of office, which does not much exceed an average of two years, and the overpowering business of the House of Commons, from which-to make the difficulty even more hopeless-they are generally selected, make it almost necessary that they should be either timid or rash or blind instruments in the hands of the permanent and professional authorities on whom they must lean for guidance. To these difficulties difficulties must be added those arising out of the criticisms and questionings of a body constituted as is Parliament, where special and local details possess a far greater interest than the larger considerations of permanent policy; and above all where each item of the Estimates is dependent on the exigencies of Parlia mentary tactics, or where their vital principles are at the mercy of some popular debater. A man of exceptional genius or of strong military tastes, might perhaps break through the great difficulties of such a position, though probably at the cost of many mistakes; but in the vast majority of cases the result can only be as we have described. It is likely even to be aggravated by the recent changes which have so greatly subor dinated the position of the Commander-in-Chief to that of the Secretary of State; though, it should be added, the changes made in this sense and with the intention of transferring the management of the army from the Crown to Parliament seem to contain some elements of self-destruction. For, on the one hand, in proportion as the Secretary of State gives effect to the popular doctrine that the army is the creature of Parliament, and conformably with that principle brings it under the direct control of the House of Commons, so the qualities which are necessarily inherent in such a body and which are not favourable to efficient military administration, as understood everywhere out of England, must be expected to exercise their natural influence. On the other hand, as the Minister, feeling his own ignorance and helplessness, resigns himself to the guidance of his professional advisers, so must official irresponsibility and routine predominate. Even now, in Parliament, the accountability of a Minister often becomes a fiction, when every criticism on his procedure is treated by his colleagues as an attack upon themselves collectively; but henceforward, within the four walls of his office, concurrently with a nominal increase of authority, his sense of responsibility is likely to grow less. It perhaps will be said that the blessings of a Parliamentary Government are so great that the principle must not be disturbed in its least detail, and that even military mismanagement, with all its attendant risks, is not too heavy a price to pay. not here argue the question, except perhaps to recall Lord Bacon's famous saying, that where one nation devotes itself to the accumulation of gold and another to the use of iron, the former must expect to see its much-prized possessions change hands. We need For many years the evil which we have indicated has grown steadily, though during Mr. Cardwell's tenure of office it has come to a head, and from it flow much of the failure and mismanage ment which has, in a more or less degree, disfigured our military operations of recent years. The late Lord Herbert, on a memorable memorable occasion in the House of Commons, said that he did not know an instance in which England had been plunged into war in which she had not met with reverses,'* and the historian of the Sepoy Mutiny has dwelt in vigorous language upon our systematic refusal to see danger, even on such a soil as that of India undermined with disaffection, and the habitual unpreparedness of our War Department for the very contingencies for which it exists. It is a complaint unhappily verified in every page of our military history from the Commissariat of the Duke of Marlborough to that of Lord Raglan. The dead carcases embalmed in the forage, the horses gnawing each other's tails from starvation, the green coffee served out to famishing troops, the six shirts which were washed during one whole month in the hospital where there were two thousand patients, the confusion of stores, the waste of life, the narrow escape from signal discomfiture during the earlier part of the Crimean war,-have faded from the unretentive memory of the British public into the shadowy domain of History. But they are none the less true; and the following record of mismanagement, which we have disinterred from the Blue Books and Reports of that time, may be even now read with interest, not less for the dreary light which it throws upon our Parliamentary war administration, than for the vigorous language in which it is expressed : The troops were too few for the work they had to do; weakness induced by privations rendered the men very susceptible of disease; and sufficient hospital accommodation was not supplied. The more sickness prevailed, the more work was required of those who remained fit for service, who in turn gave way under the increased pressure. The reinforcements sent out were principally levies of mere boys too young to bear fatigue and exposure. No reserve was provided at home adequate to the greatness of the undertaking, and the Militia, from the ranks of which it might have been drawn, was not called out in time to be available. The obvious inadequacy of all means induced the general belief that the Government never seriously contemplated a war.... The Government of England, which is in the hands of a dozen civilians, did not know the difference between a number of well-disciplined regiments and an army. They were ignorant of the necessary means of moving the food and baggage of troops, they forgot to be as well prepared for the failure as the success of a military operation. . . . The troops sent were too few, the Commissariat was inefficient, no depôts were provided, the hospitals were inefficient, and those at the head of them overwhelmed with labour.'† A ghastly story-but who doubts that it would be repeated in any future war conducted under our present system? And if repeated, who doubts that the results would be of a more serious *Hansard,' Jan. 26, 1855. + Draft Report, by Mr. H. Drummond, M.P. Sebastopol Committee.. character character both from the gigantic agencies and marvellous rapidity of modern warfare? Even the slowest Governments of the Continent are immeasurably prompt when compared with our 'Aulic Council.' In 1866, when war had become inevitable, the Austrian Commissioner proposed to the Germanic Confederation that their forces should be mobilised within fourteen days, so as to march at the same number of hours' notice. But Prussia was even speedier. She allowed to the hesitating and recalcitrant States of the Confederation only twelve hours within which to decide between her and Austria. In 1870 Prussia was momentarily surprised by the French Declaration of War; but France was unable to improve the opportunity, and within ten days half a million of German troops were mobilised, and another half million were in process of mobilisation. Nor does the policy of foreign Governments hesitate to keep pace with military operations. European statesmen know the value of an initiative. The Belgian and Luxembourg questions, the repudiation of the Black Sea neutrality, grew up during the late war within the narrow compass of a few months, and gave but a few days' warning of their existence. They found England wholly unprepared to meet them, though Belgium and Switzerland knew how, within a fortnight of the outbreak of hostilities, to place 100,000 and 50,000 men on their respective frontiers and to make the neutrality of their small States respected by both belligerents. We, on the contrary, live so much in an atmosphere of wealth that we fancy that money will repair any mistakes or misfortunes. But a money vote of the House of Commons, though powerful, is not omnipotent, and cannot give us the promptitude of action which may be essential. Such promptitude depends on timely and long-considered organisation, with which no genius or fortune can dispense; and if any illustration of this homely truth were needed, the conduct of the three great captains and rivals of the last generation, on three critical occasions, would be a striking example. For two years Napoleon patiently trained his Grand Army' for the campaigns of 1805; equally patiently the Duke of Wellington formed and disciplined that famous army of the Peninsula with which it was said that he could march anywhere and do anything; and with equal patience but unequal fortune, because the miscalculations of politicians precipitated hostilities, the Archduke Charles sought, after Marengo and Hohenlinden, to build shattered organisation of the Austrian forces. up 'Nullum numen habes si sit Prudentia." Though we have wasted golden opportunities, we have yet the means and time to repair the past; and Mr. Cardwell, it must be remembered, has received or taken all the powers which he has declared to be necessary for the reconstruction of the English Army. Apart from |
