they differ from similar doctrine in the Church of Rome? When the bishops of the Reformed Church of England speak of the "evils" that swarm from the confessional, they know precisely what they mean. Men of reading and men of thought, it is not to them a word of vague generality, expressive (as it often is in other applications) of small mischiefs and annoyances. They cannot utter the word in this connection without raising before their eyes evils that are evils indeed: evils that enter with sap and mine into every relation of life, every function of citizenship, finally reaching to the foundations of national character. These are the evils which the bishops declare themselves so sensible of, and it is of them that Lord Salisbury speaks when he says that, in the present state of the Church, its prelates cannot warn the people against them too earnestly or too often. Questions of swinging censers and lighting candles and praying to saints may most properly employ the princes of the Church-that is not denied; but the main of their duty at the present time is this. It was never much less, and they have doubled its obligations by neglecting them. But if now they would only apply themselves to their duty with the learning and the authority they possess, and with the heart and fervour they might borrow from the great divines of old, the "crisis in the

Church" might be turned to happy account after all.

That, however, they will not do. It would seem to them contentious, a prolongation of disquietude, offensive to Roman Catholics. In all that they say on the matter their cure for the evils that spot the Church is plainly seen: it is to fold them in, and cover them down, and think of them no more. If left unnoticed, they will presently disappear. Similar disorders have been safely treated in that way, no doubt; but with this one it is different. We are in presence of a turn to the Church of Rome from causes so natural that it was expected. One of these causes is the revolt from agnosticism—terror at the outlook from Mount Science. Others are the softenings of luxury, the growth of a craving emotionalism, a fashionable twist to Rome, an æsthetical twist in the same direction. These causes of which the ightest may be more lasting than they seem-have been turned to full account by the sacerdotalists in the Church; and they have a long field before them yet. In these circumstances, minor questions of ritual need not concern us much. Shelter should be denied, of course, to Romanising priests in the English Church; and, that determined, the prelacy should follow Lord Salisbury's counsel with all the eloquence they are possessed of and all the ardour of which they are capable.

THE new China blue-book is a handsome offering of the fruits meet for repentance. The Government has answered to the spur, and overcome its indisposition to take action regarding our interests in the Far East. Slowly indeed, and not without great reluctance, it has learned the lesson which the pressure of events has been for some years forcing on it, and apparently made up its mind to deal henceforth with facts and not with phantoms. We need not dwell on the deplorable consequences of previous neglect. We have indeed given away the vantage-ground which we held fifteen months ago; but all has not been lost, and though we have now to fight an uphill battle, it is something to have the nerve to fight it.

We think the record now submitted to the public will be received with satisfaction. It is a great point gained that at last the policy of the Government is pointing in the right direction: what remains is for the country to apply the impetus from below and from behind, to make sure of continuous progress on the course which is now being set. We are pleased also to be able to congratulate the Government on the achievements of their Minister in Peking. It was a hazardous experiment sending a man of

his official record to such a critical post, and the first half of his time of office in China did not afford much evidence of

We

the fitness of the choice. now understand that in those days he had the dead-weight of his Government paralysing all his efforts. The events of last year, however, the sharp experiences, and the humiliating rebuffs which this country had to put up with in the earlier part of 1898, have happily changed all that; and now we have the cheering spectacle of an active and energetic Minister backed by a Government that is beginning to know its own mind and intends to have its own way.

In its selection of correspondence for publication Government has implicitly, if not explicitly, acknowledged its indebtedness to the press, and we have rarely known an instance of the leading organs of public opinion rendering such persistent services to the country as they have done in connection with the Chinese crisis. But for their diligence in supplying the best information and the best reasoned comments thereon, our interests in the Far East would indeed have been in a parlous state. Where all have done their duty it may seem invidious to make distinctions; but the 'Times' newspaper may well be excused a little self-congratulation on the part it has played in the enlightenment of the public. Its correspondent in Peking has no doubt been favoured by circumstances and opportunities; but his industry in collecting and

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'salting down" his information from diverse sources, and in a few terse words giving the gist of the most important negotiations, prove him to be a man of capacity who has risen to the occasion. Whatever value we may attach to the services of our accredited Minister, those of the Times correspondent will always claim at least an equal share of appreciation, and we have little doubt that the things which have not been given to the public would be found quite as interesting as those that have been printed. But for further enlightenment from that source on the maze of Eastern diplomacy and the by - ways of intrigue, we shall probably have to wait a little while.

It is no new lesson which the Government and their Minister have learned; it is but the old lesson frequently learned, and as often forgotten, the one lesson which stands out in bold relief throughout our whole intercourse with China. It is the same which Lord Elgin had to learn by his own experience forty years ago, and which he put so tersely into the epigram, that "China yields nothing to reason but everything to fear." This sentence might be put as a motto at the head of every despatch of Sir Claude Macdonald's; but while this has always been the leading characteristic of Chinese diplomacy, the proposition has in these latter days to be considerably extended in its application. While China was an entity, with a will and a purpose and a certain power to give

effect to them, it was true that fear and not reason guided her deliberations; but we are now learning the further lesson which was impressed on close observers four years ago, that "there is no longer a China to negotiate with. This takes some time to realise; but every line in the new despatches makes it clearer that the Chinese rulers are getting into the condition of a person in the last stage of sea-sickness, when even the influence of fear ceases. to operate. What is there left for them to fear? Their country is potentially in the possession of foreigners, they themselves are under the protection, of foreigners; the more practical of them have considered the situation, and have made their selection of what they deem the strongest protector: which may be the explanation of what Sir Claude Macdonald found to be the anti- British policy of Li Hung-chang. That the influence of fear has not entirely ceased to act upon the Government is probably true enough. The effect generally survives the cause, and even scientific convictions do not entirely dislodge inherited superstitions. But it is evidently a disappearing phantom so far as the collective Government is concerned. The old forms may be kept up, and the foreign Powers continue to go through the pantomime of negotiation, but under such desperate conditions that it must more and more become with the Chinese a question of Sauve qui peut! This no doubt is what Russia has understood

long ago and acted upon with such striking effect.

The transactions recorded in the blue-book began on the morrow of the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur. It was then for the first time that her Majesty's Government saw the necessity of action in China in order to safeguard British interests. The whole position was changed by the establishment of Russia in a Chinese fortress, actually in the inner waters, not on the Pacific at all, except in the sense that the Gulf of Finland is on the Atlantic. As a counterpoise, Great Britain claimed the naval harbour which faces Port Arthur on the southern coast of the Gulf, and after certain peremptory negotiations, the lease of Wei-haiwei was extorted from the Tsungli-Yamên. Without venturing on any estimate of the value of that position, we may at least claim for its seizure that, as a definitively aggressive action on the part of her Majesty's Government, taken avowedly to preserve the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili between Russia and Great Britain, this stroke was the herald of the new policy on which the British Government has launched.

The other matters attempted and done, treated of in the correspondence, are chiefly connected with the progress of railway concessions on the part of the various countries. The most interesting of these is no doubt the concession granted to a Belgian syndicate for a line

from Peking to Hankow, on behalf of the Russian and French Governments. This concession, running right into the heart of the Yangtse Valley, which had been assumed as a British sphere of influence, was a bold but insidious attack on this country. Consequently Sir Claude Macdonald made the strongest remonstrance with the Tsungli-Yamên against the ratification of the contract. The Ministers of the Yamên appeared to be quite ignorant of the nature of the concession and of the consequences involved in it. Only one man, we are told, understood it, and that was Li Hung-chang, who was credited with rushing through the ratification under strong pressure on the part of Russia, France, and Belgium. On his failure to bar the conclusion of this contract, Sir Claude Macdonald makes the pertinent and obvious remark that, "if heavy payment is not exacted from the Chinese Government for their bad faith, Li will persuade his colleagues that it is easier to slight England than any other Power," and he formulates a set of demands which ought to be made on the Chinese Government as a punishment for their bad faith, which, however, he adds, "it would be impossible to obtain without bringing great pressure to bear." This is the recurring note throughout the whole three hundred and sixty pages: it is not right nor wrong, good faith or bad faith, injury or benefit, but pressure, that is

of any account in all these negotiations. If the fact that this railway concession into the very centre of China, with the large powers of control granted to the Russian agent or whether granted or not, certain to be exercised, if these considerations, plainly placed before the Chinese Ministers, did not deter them from granting this concession, it must be very clear that no argument but force, or the belief in it, will have any influence on their minds. The defeat of our Minister in Peking on this question seems to have made a sharp impression upon her Majesty's Government, who promptly instructed Sir Claude Macdonald to put forward demands for other concessions, to be enforced, if necessary, by an appeal to the Admiral. In carrying out these instructions, Sir Claude Macdonald seems to have had some rough passages with the Chinese Ministers. They repudiated his charges of breach of faith, and disclaimed any intention of giving offence to Great Britain. As far as writing a note went, they were quite willing to do so; but they would not name the Belgian agreement, because it was certain to lead to trouble with other Powers. The coincidence

of this explanatory and apologetic note of 7th September

last with the dismissal from the Yamên of the Grand Secretary, Li, is remarked upon by Sir Claude Macdonald; but the connection between the two events seems insufficiently established.

On the real opinions and feelings of the Chinese with respect to these trunk rail

ways, and the secret machinery which has been at work to procure such tremendous concessions to Russia, we obtain no light from the despatches, perhaps for the good reason that the writer had none to give. But that Chinese intelligence is not blind to the ulterior consequences of what they are now doing, is shown in a memorial from the Viceroy of Central China, Chang Chi-tung, in conjunction with a no less celebrated official called Shêng Hsuan - huai, Director - General of Railways. They say

"If England is allowed to build the Hankow and Canton line, afterwards when the Russian line advances southwards and the English line is continued to the north, although we shall be in possession of the Lu-han line [Hankow to Peking], we shall be stifled and our profits curtailed, for being between the other lines we shall not be able to defend our own. It is also greatly to be feared that our own line would pass into either English or Russian hands. In this case, not only is our throat stopped by the foreigners being in possession of our ports, but our vital parts are injuriously affected."

They add

"Your memorialists are distressed when they consider the extreme danger of the situation; but they think that the best method of meeting it is to proceed ourselves at once with the construction of the HankowCanton railway."

Here are the views of two Chinese officials antithetical in personal character; but, whatever their respective failings, men of first-class intelligence,yet they affect to speak of the